
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CITIZENSHIP

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CITIZENSHIP

BY

W. H. HADOW
Vice-Chancellor of Sheffield University

'A patriot is one who heartily wisheth the public prosperity, and doth also study and endeavour to promote it'

BERKELEY, *Patriotism*, § 24

Κοινὰς ὠφελίας ἰδίοις μόχθοισι πορίζειν

Contest of Homer and Hesiod

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PREFACE

THE following lectures were delivered on the Stevenson Foundation, in the University and City of Glasgow, during the spring and autumn of the year 1922. They are here published in accordance with the terms of the appointment.

The first chapter accepts the definition of Citizenship in terms of loyalty, goes on to discuss some of the difficulties which may arise when our loyalties widen or conflict, and then traces briefly the history of the civic idea from its early stage of unquestioning obedience, through the period of scepticism to that of reconstruction. Chapter II takes up again the question of conflicting ideals, and discusses some of the principal standards of conduct, other than civic, which have been maintained at different times and in different countries: beginning from the Religious, under which it contrasts Hebraism with Hellenism, and considering the various theories, utilitarian, aesthetic, and intellectualist, which principally occupied the moral philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ending with Kant and the Categorical Imperative. Hegel is reserved for a later chapter. After this preliminary survey of the ground, Chapter III follows by investigating the meaning and limitations of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity as the basis of

Citizenship, distinguishing between absolute and proportionate equality, tracing fraternity back to primitive conceptions of blood brotherhood, and inquiring into the civic conditions of liberty, both in action and in speech.

Chapters IV, V, and VI deal respectively with three different doctrines as to the relation between the individual and the State. Chapter IV considers the theory that the development of the individual is all important and that the function of the State is to provide the best possible environment within which that development can proceed. It enumerates some of the benefits which the State confers, e. g. security, the supply of material needs (of which the particular instance taken is that of road transport), the effect of social legislation, and the influence of common language and tradition. Chapter V considers the opposite doctrine, that the welfare of the State is itself the end, and that to this all actions and even all standards of individual life must be made to conduce. As upholders of this doctrine under widely different circumstances it discusses the teaching of Machiavelli and of Treitschke. Chapter VI endeavours to reconcile these two extremes by considering the relation between the individual and the state as between two persons. It discusses the question of personality both in its legal and its psychological implications and so proceeds to an analysis of Hegel's theory of Citizenship as expressed in his work on the Philosophy of Right.

Chapters VII and VIII enlarge the area of Citizenship by inquiring into its bearing first on problems of empire, secondly on those of international relations. Chapter VII describes the different types of empire, the personal empires of the Ancient East, the civic of Athens and Rome, and especially the Federal of which the British Empire is taken as an instance. There is, of course, no attempt to survey the whole field: a few typical illustrations are selected, especially from the histories of India and Canada. Chapter VIII begins with some account of nationalism, discusses various attempts at international co-operation, and so leads to a brief sketch of the League of Nations and of the work which it had effected up to the end of last year.

Chapter IX deals with education and citizenship. It begins by criticizing some prevalent conceptions of education, proceeds to show what in the opinion of the writer are its aims and methods, and so concentrates specially on civic education, and on the place which it should occupy in Schools, in Universities, and in after life. The chapter ends by sketching an institution which might be established for the furtherance of Adult Education in Citizenship.

Chapter X closes the series by describing citizenship on the spiritual plane. It takes as its typical examples, St. Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*; the works of Mazzini, especially the *Duties of Man*; and the works of Sir Henry Jones, especially *Principles of Citizenship* and

A Faith that Enquires. Its object is to show Man and State as co-operating together towards the fulfilment of a Divine purpose, in which the ends of both are absorbed.

My cordial thanks are due to Sir Graham Balfour who has helped me with some invaluable criticisms, and to Mrs. H. A. L. Fisher, Miss Troutbeck, and Miss Edith Troutbeck, who have most kindly given me their aid in correcting proofs.

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I

THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Citizenship has been well defined [1] as the right ordering of our several loyalties. In this definition two postulates are implied: one that loyalty is natural to mankind, the other that it may be claimed by different causes or institutions, and that the services due to these are capable of comparison and adjustment. It may be well, therefore, to begin by examining both these propositions.

With a very few exceptions all philosophic schools have agreed that a man's duties extend far beyond the limits of his own personal interest and advantage. These may be owed to some corporate body of which we are members, or to some ideal, ethical or metaphysical or religious, which has not yet found realization: in either case the debt is acknowledged as paramount. The bluntest of our Utilitarians look for their end to 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number', and, if they start from 'the two sovereign masters' of our own individual pleasure and pain, finish, sometimes at the expense of their logic, with a community in which 'everybody counts for one and nobody for more than one'. The most unworldly of our idealists point to a categorical imperative which shall be a law for all intelligence, or raise their eyes to a kingdom of God the governance of which transcends all human legislation. Despite differences of creed and opinion it is generally assumed that our life must be interpreted in terms of something not ourselves which makes for righteousness.

Apart from some perverted forms of individualism, which will be considered later, this doctrine has apparently been

[1] By Dr. William Boyd in *The Modern Teacher*, p. 224.

traversed by certain outbreaks of pure destructiveness and anarchy which from time to time have appeared in the history of our civilization. The early Christian belief in the millennium was exaggerated by the Montanists into a fierce denunciation of the whole established order of things, and it is worth noting that the Church, after enduring this heresy with unexampled patience, finally laid on it a ban which reduced it to the level of paganism. The Cathari of the Middle Ages denied that the world was God's creation, and *a fortiori* refused obedience to any institution which it contained. During the eighteenth century there appeared in Bohemia a curious sect of Satanists who worshipped the devil, not from fear, like some eastern nations,[1] but from sympathy with his misfortunes. 'May he who has been wronged salute you' was their watchword:[2] they were poor and humble people who regarded with deep misgiving the triumph of Michael and his angels. Again, among the Russian anarchists of the last century there appear to have been some who seriously regarded the destruction of society as an end in itself. 'It is better', said Bakunin, 'to kill a good bourgeois than a bad one: to kill a bad one proves nothing, to kill a good one is a protest against the system.' Yet these exceptions for all their wildness and extravagance are more apparent than real. It is true that their whole visible horizon was occupied with a passion of destructiveness, that they wished to break down the carved work of our civilization with axes and hammers, yet at the back of all their minds was the idea,

[1] 'In the mountains between Scanderoon and Aleppo at this day there are dwelling a certain kind of people called Coords, coming of the race of the ancient Parthians, who worship the devil and allege this reason for so doing: God is a good man and will do no harm, but the devil is bad and must be pleased, lest he hurt them' (Burton, *Anatomy of Melancholy*, III. iv. i. 3).

[2] 'Que celui à qui on a fait tort te salue.' See George Sand, *Consuelo*, ch. 37, and Gilbert Murray, *Satanism and the World Order*.

more or less consciously perceived, of a fairer fabric which should be built by the generations that came after them.

Loyalty then may be normally taken for granted: but in saying this we find ourselves confronted by another question. Loyalty means faithfulness, and in this word there may lie an ambiguous meaning. When we call a man merciful we mean that he is the centre from which mercy flows: when wonderful, that he is the object to which wonder is directed. Does faithfulness mean only the unflinching maintenance of a cause or does it include the assured and continuing conviction that the cause is right?

This is not a mere question of words: it is one of the most fundamental problems in human nature. Loyalty is easy when one believes: does it remain as an obligation when belief grows cold, or is its own passionate impulse enough to justify it apart from the acceptance of its object? Aprile's song in Paracelsus describes the voyage of an adventurous company who set out to erect the statues of their gods on the shores of the fortunate islands. At the first sight of land, against their pilot's advice, they draw in and disembark, and soon the 'hundred shapes of lucid stone' are safely enshrined. Then comes disillusionment. The isle which they sought is further westward, and the inhabitants come over and bid them carry their worship to a worthier home. And the song ends:

> Oh then we awoke with sudden start
> From our deep dream, and knew, too late,
> How bare the rock, how desolate,
> Which had received our precious freight:
> Yet we called out, 'Depart!
> Our gifts, once given, must here abide,
> Our work is done, we have no heart
> To mar our work,'—we cried.

Paracelsus speaks in rejoinder, but we cannot withhold some

admiration for the staunchness which will not take back what it has given or alter its mind in the face of disappointment. And yet to press this to an extreme would condemn every change of religion and every transfer of political allegiance.

The question becomes more complicated when we pass to its second statement, that a man may have more than one claim on his loyalty, and that these may differ or conflict. History shows us, for instance, many examples of an apparent opposition between public duty and personal honour. How are we to judge them? We need not be disconcerted by Johnson's famous sentence that 'patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel', because 'patriot' in his day was the cant name of a party which he elsewhere describes as 'factious disturbers of government', and the leader of which was John Wilkes.[1] But admitting that the life of the French Republic was saved by the September massacres, can we assert that Danton was justified in ordering them:[2] and when he exclaimed, 'Let my name be dishonoured so that France be free,' was he a greater or a lesser patriot than Fletcher of Saltoun, who 'would give his life to serve his country but would not do a base action to save it'? Regulus, according to the legend, deprived Rome of her greatest general rather than break his parole. Cavour, steering the ship through the rocks and quicksands of a dangerous diplomacy, complacently says in a letter to D'Azeglio: 'If we did for ourselves what we are doing for our country we should be great rascals.' Both alike have taken a place among the heroes of the nations. It is a hard matter to weigh these contradictions, still more to resolve them into some higher synthesis of conduct.

[1] See the whole passage in Boswell, 7 April 1775. Readers who take alarm at Johnson's outburst have perhaps forgotten that he was a convinced Tory and a firm believer in the supremacy of England.

[2] 'Sit down: it was necessary,' was Danton's answer to an opponent in the Chamber. See an admirable account of the matter in Louis Madelin's *Danton*, ch. 8.

A difficulty of no less moment arises from the concentric circles through which a man's loyalty may have to make its way. Narrowest in area is the circle of the family with its specialties of mutual service and affection; then successively the widening range of city, of region or province or clan, of the nation as a whole, of the comity of civilized people, of the whole body of mankind at large. We are hearing much to-day about international policy and the cosmopolitanism which obliterates frontiers: are the claims of our nation or our city more urgent because they speak closer to our ears? 'Proximus sum egomet mihi', says the selfish man in Terence: 'I am my own nearest neighbour.' We may dismiss him easily enough, but it is not so easy to determine the limits of our neighbourhood.

Nor are all our circles even concentric. A man's duty to his country has sometimes been traversed by his duty to his Church or distracted by the claims of his order or even perhaps of his profession. These circles are, as mathematicians say, eccentric: they cut across one another and direct us towards different orbits. A pathetic instance is quoted by Villari. In 1375 the people of Florence, who were both good Florentines and devout Catholics, found themselves at war with Pope Gregory XI, and appointed for the conduct of the campaign a military board of eight, who were called from their office the *Otto della guerra*, and from their integrity and uprightness the *Otto Santi*. At the citizens' meeting which elected them a formal motion was proposed and passed that for this purpose the vote should fall on those 'who had more love for their country than for the salvation of their souls'.[1] It is the more remarkable because, for various reasons, patriotism was not very prevalent or very stable in mediaeval Italy: Machiavelli, about a century later,

[1] 'Bisogna eleggere ad Otto della guerra uomini che amassero più la patria che la salute dell' anima' (Villari).

was called a blasphemer for expressing the same opinion. It was through a far more robust and vigorous tradition that Lord Howard of Effingham defended the shores of his country against the fleet of his Church.

The points which have been here summarily stated may be exemplified by a brief sketch of the civic idea as it has taken shape and wavered and recovered itself in successive periods of European history. To the Greeks of the pre-Sophistic age it appeared, indeed, as if there were no problem at all. 'Sparta is your portion, adorn her: as we for our part will do to Mycenae' was an axiom of conduct as inclusive as it was unquestioned. The State was the first essential condition of civilized life; when a party of mariners, cast up on the Trinacrian shore, found there some shepherds, living in separate homesteads, 'legislating each for his wives and children and paying no heed to one another', they had to represent them as one-eyed cannibal monsters in order to make the story credible. The State was perfect and all-embracing: in many places it was a penal offence to emigrate or to worship other gods than those of the city or to propose the smallest change of principle in its constitution. No doubt the sentiment was not everywhere equally strong: it was strongest where ideals were at their highest level, and its most ample expression is in the sentence of Pericles, that for such a city as Athens men might well feel it a privilege to die.[1]

Part of this was due to the natural uncritical enthusiasm which leads every one to think his own family or city or country the best in the world, and which, if not uttered in too strident a tone, is altogether wholesome and inspiriting. But there were two accessory causes which helped to focus and concentrate it.

[1] Thucydides ii. 41 *περὶ τοιαύτης οὖν πόλεως οἵδε τε γενναῖως δικαιοῦντες μὴ ἀφαιρεθῆναι αὐτὴν μαχόμενοι ἐτελεύτησαν, καὶ τῶν λειπομένων πάντα τινὰ εἰκὸς ἐθέλειν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς κάμνειν.*

First, that the Greek states were small. Mr. Ernest Barker, than whom no one speaks in this matter with more authority, estimates that Athens at the time of her highest renown contained 40,000 citizens, with their wives and families, 45,000 adult resident aliens, and about 80,000 slaves. Even this was too large for the philosophers. Plato (*Laws*, 737 E) makes his ideal State of 5,040 free households, and is seriously taken to task by Aristotle for extravagance:

'We must not overlook the fact that the number of 5,000 citizens just now mentioned will require a territory as big as Babylonia or some other vast country, if so many persons are to be supported in idleness together with their women and attendants, who will be a multitude many times as great. We may make what assumptions we please, but should avoid impossibilities.' [1]

Hence the civic feeling was close-knit by personal acquaintanceship and community of interests, and the whole city was bound together in a sort of family union by which patriotism was intensified as well as narrowed. Secondly, citizenship carried with it a number of political privileges, constitutionally established and jealously guarded. Athens, the most liberal of all Greek cities, invited foreigners to immigrate, especially if they were skilled craftsmen, and gave them free trade and intermarriage, and even a place in military service; but she never admitted them to vote or office or a share in the judiciary. They were always outlanders, and political rights were reserved for citizens of pure descent on both sides.[2] Antisthenes, for

[1] Aristotle, *Politics* ii. 6. 6. In *Politics* vii. 4. 11, the citizens should be not too many to hear the orders of a single general or the announcements of a single herald. In *Ethics* ix. 10. 3, a state of 100,000 men 'would no longer be a state'.

[2] See for this whole question Zimmern's *Greek Commonwealth*, especially Pt. II, ch. vi. His figures for the outlanders are lower than those given above.

example, the founder of the Cynic School, was kept all his life outside the pale because his mother was a Thracian.

In the latter part of the fifth century this natural patriotism began to be assailed. The 'men who fought at Marathon' had taken state-supremacy for granted; their sons maintained the tradition through the government of Pericles and the splendours of the growing Empire. But disintegrating influences made themselves felt during the course of the Peloponnesian War. One was a conflict of parties, not as both contributory to the welfare of the State, but as seeking independent ends even to its disadvantage. Sparta stood for oligarchy, and was supported in many cities by the oligarchs; Athens for democracy, and so had the democrats on her side. There were even cases in which the gates of a beleagured town were opened by political leaders who sympathized with the invading force. And the climax was reached when in 411 the Athenian army at Samos revolted and formally declared war not only on Sparta but on Athens, 'so long as the present government shall last'. An interesting pendant to this is the composition of the 'Macedonian party' at Athens in the time of Demosthenes. Their leaders were Isocrates, a high-minded doctrinaire, who firmly believed that Macedonian government was the best; Phocion, an honest, disdainful, anti-democratic pessimist, who was convinced that Athens was too helpless to struggle; Æschines, a brawling orator, animated by a personal hatred of Demosthenes; and Philocrates, a selfish time-server, who had no thought but of his own advancement. The last two were arraigned for treason; one fled, and the other was narrowly acquitted. But it is worth adding that when Philip's siege of Byzantium placed Athens in real danger, Phocion, who had opposed the war throughout, accepted the command of the fleet and drove back the invading forces. The old spirit was not entirely dead, even after a century of political intrigue.

A still more serious blow was dealt, during the same period, by the Sophists. Their earliest representatives were capable and upright men who, on one side at any rate, rendered good service to the Athenian democracy. It was not until a later generation that they laid themselves open to Aristotle's grim definition: 'A Sophist is one who makes money by selling wisdom which he does not possess.' But from the beginning they infused into the younger Athenians a spirit of criticism which was largely destructive, and which the elder men, untrained in dialectical skill, were wholly powerless to meet. Not one of them was Athenian born; not one of them had inherited the tradition of Athenian loyalty; and they began to 'smile away' the patriotism which could give no logical account of its preference. Under their tutorship the Athenians ventured to call all things in question: even to inquire what the State was doing for them in return for all their service and devotion. Socrates endeavoured to stem the tide, but in vain: the Athenian Empire crumbled away at Aegospotami, and the city sank into political insignificance: the civic ideal seemed to be tottering to its fall; even Plato despaired of existing social conditions, and built his 'city in the heavens' as a relief from the realities around him.

At this point there came into prominence two individualistic schools which frankly preached emancipation from all social and civic duties whatever. Of the Cynic it will be more fitting to speak when we come to discuss its influence upon Stoic cosmopolitanism: the Cyrenaic deserves some more detailed attention, because its history is a salutary warning against all systems of personal hedonism. Let them paint an inch thick, to this favour they must come.

The school had four principal leaders, of all of whom we are told that they were men of high character, great personal charm and considerable ability. The first of them, Aristippus,

came to Athens from Cyrene, where the inspiration of patriotism may have been somewhat fainter, and settled down into the comfortable doctrine that 'it is no part of a wise man's business to put himself about for fools'. All that we have is the present, all the good that it can give us is pleasure, the single uniform pulsation of personal enjoyment: pleasure is good from whatever source it comes,[1] and it is the chief good for in it all others are included. Happiness, our being's end and aim, is, in short, the sum of the pulsations.[2] Here plainly is no room for civic duties or for any other duties which restrict a man's primary inclinations. All that is needed for the perfect life is a foreign residence, an amiable temper, a sufficient competence, and an entire absence of responsibilities. The second, Theodorus, looked round upon this recreated universe and found no room for the claims of friendship or the prohibitions of the moral law or the existence of God. He was popularly known as 'the Atheist', and his theoretical code (which apparently he did not put into practice) admitted most of the actions which are usually brought before the notice of the legislator. To a hedonism so uncompromising the world is a harsh and unsympathetic stepmother: the laws both of nature and of man appear to have been framed on other principles, and the wholehearted search for pleasure is likely to result in ashes and disappointment. So the third, Hegesiacus, popularly known as 'Death's Advocate' proceeded, like Stevenson's reformer, to 'abolish mankind', and preached suicide with such convincing eloquence, that his lectures were forbidden by public authority. The fourth, Anniceris, took the only step that remained, and recanted. So far as he could see there was no supreme end of

[1] Εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν κἂν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀσχημοτάτων γένηται is the sentence as quoted in Diogenes Laertius, ii. 88.

[2] Τέλος μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὴν κατὰ μέρος ἡδονήν, εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ τὸ ἐκ τῶν μερικῶν ἡδονῶν σύστημα, Diogenes Laertius, ii. 87.

life: in default of such a criterion the wise man would find his greatest satisfaction in following the rules of the accustomed morality. It will be remembered that one of the most eminent of English Utilitarians, having laid down the premise that pleasure was the only end, saved himself by adding that benevolence to others was his way of enjoying himself.

With the Cyrenaics Greek philosophy reached its lowest level of destruction and degradation. The reconstructive work of Plato, of Aristotle, of Zeno was of later efficacy; they have more influence upon us than they had on their contemporaries, and the light of Greek citizenship, enfeebled during the fourth century, flickered and faded out during the centuries which immediately followed. And meanwhile the scene had shifted to another capital and another empire.

At Rome the conception of citizenship was more complex than at Athens, and its history more turbulent. It comprised the public right of vote and of eligibility to office, the legal right of appeal and of action, and the private right of free trade and lawful marriage: it was stratified in varying degrees from full citizenship, which included all six privileges, to the grade of the *civitates sine suffragio*, who had the private rights alone: it was often supplemented or traversed by special treaties concluded between Rome and her most powerful allies.[1] To the Romans it was perhaps less of a sentiment and more of an established order than it was to the Greeks, but it was animated in its best days by that grave and unswerving love of country which thanked a defeated general for not despairing of the republic, and, even with Hannibal at the gates, never lost heart or turned from its purpose. At the same time, and perhaps for the same reason, the Roman Republic held tenaciously to its rights and shared them only under pressure of civil disturbance or warfare. From the first Secession to Licinius, from

[1] See Abbott's *Roman Political Institutions*, especially ch. 11.

Licinius to the Latin War, from the Latin War to Drusus and the revolt of the Italians, every principal concession was won by violence, or granted after victory as a reward for service, and it was not until the time of Julius Caesar that the republican system was consolidated under a wise and equitable legislation. Then came the Empire with a new set of problems. Some measure of citizenship had been sparingly given among the provinces—we know that in the first century of our era a civilian Jew could boast that he was 'free born'—but a vast number of the people under Roman jurisdiction were still outside the pale of Roman liberty. It is one of the ironies of history that the proposal of universal franchise was mooted by the most foolish of Roman Emperors and carried into effect by the most wicked. In Seneca's bitter pasquinade on the death of Claudius there is a passage where Clotho and Mercury are waiting beside the bed, and Mercury asks his companion to put the old man out of his misery. 'I had thought', says Clotho, 'to give him a few more minutes so that he might bestow the citizenship on the handful of men who have not already received it (for he had determined to see all Greeks, Gauls, Spaniards, and Britons clad in the toga) but that some foreign harvest may be left for the future, you can have it your own way.'[1] Thereafter the question slumbered until Caracalla, in desperate straits for money, decided to increase to the utmost limit the number of his taxable subjects, and, caring for nothing but his income and his army, extended the empty privilege to the furthest bounds of his dominions.

Gibbon in a famous passage contrasts the new citizenship with the old.

[1] Sed Clotho, 'Ego mehercule' inquit 'pusillum temporis adicere illi volebam dum hos pauculos qui supersunt civitati donaret (constituerat enim omnes Graecos, Gallos, Hispanos, Britannos togatos videre), sed quoniam placet aliquos peregrinos in semen relinqui, et tu ita iubes fieri, fiat' (Seneca, *de Morte Claudii*, ch. 3).

'Rome and Italy', he says, 'were respected as the centre of government. A national spirit was preserved by the ancient and insensibly imbibed by the adopted citizen. The principal commands of the army were filled by men who had received a liberal education, were well instructed in the advantages of laws and letters, and who had risen by equal steps through the regular succession of civil and military honours. To their influence and example we may partly ascribe the modest behaviour of the legions through the first two centuries of the Imperial History.'

The effect of Caracalla's legislation was, he adds, 'to break down the enclosure' and to replace distinctions of rank by separation of professions.

'The more polished citizens of the internal provinces were alone qualified to act as lawyers and magistrates. The rougher trade of arms was assigned to the peasants and barbarians of the frontier, who knew no country but their own, no science but that of war, no civil laws and hardly those of military discipline. With bloody hands, savage manners and desperate resolutions they sometimes guarded but more often subverted the throne of the Empire.'[1]

There is a remarkable story that Honorius offered complete self-government to some of the Gallic states, and fined them for disobedience when they refused to undertake the burden. The fact is that the corruption of the Roman Empire rotted away the sense of national patriotism throughout its whole expanse. It took many centuries for this feeling to recover its due place in European politics. Our citizenship owes little enough to the 'dark ages'; they constituted one of those *eremi et vastitates* which, Bacon tells us, are to be found in history as well as in geography, but the same is almost equally true during the supreme period of the Holy Roman Empire. Sometimes the motive of action was personal: 'the cause of a distressed lady was often more powerful than that of country',

[1] Gibbon, i. 303.

and when Chaptal de Bouche helped Gaston de Foix in such a case he received the unstinted applause of all chivalry. Sometimes it was religion; in 711 the ecclesiastical party in Spain provoked one of the greatest crises of European history by inviting the Saracens over from Ceuta to depose the 'Arian Heretic' whom they had accepted as king. Most often it was determined by the changes and chances of an almost continuous and almost indiscriminate warfare. A man might be the vassal of the King of England and the King of France at the same time: armies were full of mercenary troops; barons changed their coats at will; traders supplied the enemies of their country with provisions and arms. The dividing lines were of feudal sympathy, or of chivalrous sentiment, or of commercial interest; and over all stood the two focal points of Pope and Emperor alternately attracting and repelling these loose and separate particles of political life.

The Holy Roman Empire did not receive its official title till the crowning of Otho by John XII in 962; but its foundations were laid by St. Augustine and its first charter is the epistle of Pope Gelasius (494), which lays down in stately and dignified Latinity that this world is governed by the two powers of Pontiff and Emperor, and that of these two the Pontiff bears the heavier responsibility, since at the last day he must render account of the imperial authority as well as of his own.[1] Gelasius, scholar and theologian, builded worse than he knew. A division of government, ill-defined and ill-determined, could lead in the long run to nothing but conflict, and the history of the bipartite empire is one almost continuous record of strife and conquest.

[1] 'Duo quippe sunt, Imperator auguste, quibus principaliter mundus hic regitur: auctoritas sacra Pontificum et regalis potestas. In quibus tanto gravius est pondus sacerdotum quanto etiam pro ipsis regibus Domino in divino reddituri sunt examine rationem.' The epistle is addressed to the Emperor Anastasius I of Constantinople.

The incredible blunder of Canossa, and the reprisals which it provoked, caused thinkers like St. Bernard to protest against the assumption of temporal power by the Papacy: his warning went unheeded, and the climax of arrogance was reached by Boniface VIII [1] (1294–1303), who proclaimed himself Caesar as well as Pope, and in his bull, 'Unam sanctam', declared it to be a tenet necessary to salvation that all men were politically as well as spiritually subject to the Papal See. The bull, issued in 1302, was primarily directed against Philip the Fair of France, and provoked the saturnine response that 'there were kings in France before there were Christians'.

It was this unreasonable assumption of Papal authority which led Dante, born and nurtured in a Guelf household, to change sides and range himself with the Emperor. As Prior of Florence in 1300 he agreed to the banishment of the Guelf leaders; in 1302, on a change of government, he was banished and sentenced to death; in 1311, when he was with the Ghibelline camp at Lucca, he was specially excluded from a list of exiles whom Florentine clemency allowed to return. At this juncture he sent a messenger to his fellow citizens bidding them submit to the Ghibelline forces, and on their refusal wrote a vehement letter to the Emperor, begging him to punish the 'Sceleratissimi Florentini' by sacking their city. The result was the siege of Florence in 1312, brought about by the entreaties of a man who had held one of the highest offices in the State, and who turned against his countrymen to support a foreign invader. That this man was Dante is an eloquent commentary on the conditions of civic patriotism in the fourteenth century. And at the end of the fifteenth a similar drama was enacted in the same city by Savonarola. It is true that he was not a Florentine by birth, but a Ferrarese: still Florence was the home of his adoption, the seat of his monastery, the principal

[1] For Dante's judgement on Boniface VIII see the *Inferno*, canto 27.

scene of his ministrations. In 1490 he began the period of his most brilliant success as a preacher, denouncing in particular the profligacy of current morals. After a time he began openly to attack the extremely vulnerable court of Alexander VI, who in 1495 summoned him to Rome to answer for his presumption. Savonarola refused to go—Rome was then no place for a man who had offended the Borgias—whereupon the Pope threatened the city with an interdict unless he were removed. To avoid the scandal he withdrew on a preaching tour in Tuscany, but Florence clamoured for him, and in February 1496 the Signory audaciously recalled him with special commission to preach the Lenten sermons. Alexander tried to bribe him with a cardinalate: he responded by a thinly-veiled invitation to Charles VIII, who had already begun to invade Italy at the request of the Duke of Milan. This was the occasion of his downfall. An accident of party brought his political enemies into power: the Florentines wearied of his reforms, and transferred their allegiance to a Franciscan rival: within some three months of his triumphal return he was arrested, tortured into confession, and summarily executed as a traitor.

It is no wonder that during these troubled centuries political thought should have veered through every possible extreme. John of Salisbury denied the divine right of kings and allowed tyrannicide, except by poison, 'for which there is no scriptural warrant'. William of Occam would subordinate the Papal authority to that of Church Councils, on which women were to sit as well as men, and openly discussed what power such a Council ought to have 'over a Pope that hath been taken in heresy'. In a world so chaotic there was no home for a settled and established patriotism. A man's loyalty was to his order, or his prince, or his religious belief: when on occasion it took a national colour it was usually inspired by organized resistance to oppression, as with the Dutch against Spain or the Swiss

against Austria. Voltaire called patriotism 'a mixture of self-love and prejudice'. Lessing said: 'I have no idea at all of love of the fatherland: it seems to me but a heroic weakness with which I can very well dispense.'[1] On the Continent, at any rate, the civic ideal was but rarely, and that in the smaller countries alone, a determining cause of policy before the French Revolution.

We may perhaps indulge the belief that in this matter Great Britain has been exceptional. Our insularity, our freedom from foreign invasion, the quality which we call staunchness, and which is sometimes called obstinacy by our neighbours, have all helped to foster the love of country and of city, which certainly seem to have revived in us earlier than in any other part of Europe. We claim to have been the pioneers of personal liberty both in thought and in action: both alike have had a lasting effect on our national temperament. Frederick's famous maxim, 'my people are to say what they like, I am to do what I like,' has nowhere been nearer realization than in our country; in no other European nation has the history of government combined so much of public criticism with so little of practical interference. During the last five hundred years our civil disturbances, great as some of them were, have never broken down our sense of national unity: they were family quarrels and left us masters in our own house. To this may be added as an accessory cause, the variety and vigour of our municipal life. The bibliography of its institutions is enough to fill a substantial volume;[2] the record of its achievements has often been a notable blend of loyalty and independence. An amusing instance has come down to us from the reign of Henry VIII.

[1] Quoted from Ziegler's *Social Ethics* by Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, p. 183.

[2] *Bibliography of Municipal History*, by Charles Gross, Ph.D. *Harvard Historical Studies*, vol. v. It contains 3,092 entries.

In one of his French wars the town of Fowey provided a volunteer fleet of over forty vessels to assist the royal navy. At the close of hostilities the townsmen were informed that their sailors might now disband as the king had concluded peace with his brother of France. They answered, 'This was well for His Majesty, but they had not,' and continued the defence of their country single-handed.

We must be on our guard against overestimating the part played in the revival of patriotism by British influence and example. The nineteenth century in particular is full of contributory causes. But it is not too much to say that before the nineteenth century we had done more than any other people to promote and consolidate it, and to show, in more than one way and on more than one field, the lasting effects of its operation. It follows to consider with what other ideals of conduct it may be compared, what necessary conditions it presupposes, and on what basic principles it is ultimately founded.

II

OTHER IDEALS OF CONDUCT

Advocates of the relativity of morals have usually based their contention on the diversity of ethical codes which have been formulated or adopted by different races of mankind. It is no part of our purpose to discuss whether this diversity is ultimate or whether it may not rather be explained by the influence of secondary causes which affect but do not impair a central uniformity of principle: we are here concerned with description rather than interpretation: with the statement of facts rather than the inquiry into the laws which they illustrate. No doubt the facts have often been misrepresented. Reports of savage customs, on which some of our seventeenth-century moralists depended, were often no better than travellers' tales brought back by voyagers who had penetrated but little beyond the coast, who knew no word of the language, and who had never been admitted to any intimacy with the tribe. Many of them have been corrected and many more explained by a more careful study of anthropology, the results of which have tended to reconcile rather than to widen the difference between uncivilized man and ourselves. Yet even within civilization the apparent divergencies have often been very great. To many eastern peoples the ideal would seem to be found in passivity and quiescence: to most of us westerns it expresses itself in some form of activity. To one age the ideal has seemed essentially religious, to another essentially political: one school has formulated it in terms of beauty, another in terms of usefulness. And though these have agreed more than could have been expected in the details of conduct which they enjoined or

prohibited, it can hardly be denied that, in the immediate interpretation of them, they represent wide differences of outlook.

To us one of the most important of these differences is that between the principles which Matthew Arnold has called Hellenism and Hebraism: 'live according to your light' and 'take heed that your light be not darkness'. The two great tributaries which have flowed into the stream of Christian ethics took their origin from far distant sources and traversed a wide expanse of country before they met. Hebrew ethics was based on the conception of a God of infinite righteousness, out of all relation to human standards and wholly beyond all human criticism. Hear the words of Isaiah:

'There is no God else beside me: a just God and a Saviour, there is none beside me.

Look unto me and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth, for I am God and there is none else.

I have sworn by myself: the word is gone out of my mouth in righteousness and shall not return: That unto me every knee shall bow, every tongue shall swear.

Surely, shall one say, in the Lord have I righteousness and strength: even to Him shall men come, and all that are incensed against Him shall be ashamed.

In the Lord shall all the seed of Israel be justified and shall glory.'[1]

Beside this Godhead the best that man can do is evil: 'all our righteousnesses are as filthy rags';[2] against that pure radiance our brightest flame is opaque and casts a shadow. And if the ways of God are sometimes obscure and dark, if man

[1] Isaiah xlv. 21–5.

[2] Isaiah lxiv. 6. Observe how this conception has been modified by the time of St. Paul: 'Not having mine own righteousness which is of the law, but the righteousness of Christ which is by faith' (Phil. iii. 9).

is tempted to call them in question and to raise his voice against pain and suffering, the answer is ready and final: 'Wilt thou disannul my judgement,' asks the Almighty of Job, 'wilt thou condemn me that thou mayest be righteous?'[1] God is all-good as well as all-powerful, and it is not for man to murmur against His decrees.

In the same century, which scholars have assigned to the second Isaiah, a Greek Rhapsodist named Xenophanes of Colophon gave up his profession in disgust at the immorality of its religious teaching. 'Homer and Hesiod', he said, 'have taken all things which are held in disrepute among mankind and have attributed them to the gods.'[2] As a pendant to this we may set against the conception of divine righteousness in Job, the parts assigned to the gods in Greek tragedy, and especially the cynical confessions of Aphrodite in the prologue to the *Hippolytus*, and Apollo, at the end of the *Ion*, cowering behind the scenes lest he see the just indignation of the audience.[3]

It is true that a far nobler conception of the godhead was gradually developed in the course of Greek philosophic thought. Xenophanes proclaimed its unity, Socrates its providence, Plato discarded all myths which reflected upon it, and set it up as a model for our imitation, Aristotle in the *Ethics* assigned to it the highest of all activities, and in the treatise on Prayer[4]

[1] Job xl. 8.

[2] Πάντα θέοις ἀνέθηκαν Ὅμηρός θ' Ἡσίοδός τε
ὅσσα παρ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνείδεα καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν.
Quoted by Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* i. 289.

[3] Ος ἐς μὲν ὄψιν σφῷν μολεῖν οὐκ ἠξίου,
μὴ τῶν πάροιθε μέμψις ἐς μέσον μόλῃ.
Euripides, *Ion* 1557–8.

[4] Aristotle, Περὶ Εὔχης: 'God is either Mind or beyond Mind', i.e. on the further side of Mind as Matter is on the hither side: ἢ νοῦς ἢ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ νοῦ. See the fragment in the Berlin edition.

gave perhaps the finest definition of it which is to be found outside Christianity: after his time the diapason closed full on Cleanthes's magnificent hymn to Zeus, from which St. Paul himself did not disdain to quote.[1] But these philosophic conceptions had little or no effect on the ordinary course of daily life and practice, and Greek orthodoxy left them almost entirely untouched. We may perhaps say that the average Greek citizen of the classical period regarded the Olympians much as the members of a slave household regarded their masters: splendid, radiant, unaccountable beings who were not amenable to any laws, whose caprices could not be foreseen, who were on the whole good natured, though liable to jealous anger, and who were most in evidence on the great days of pageant and ceremonial, when they unbent for the occasion and showed a smiling countenance. But the whole subject of Greek religion has been so thoroughly treated in Professor Gilbert Murray's volume on its four stages, that there is no need to do more than refer the reader to his account.

The result was that Greek ethics, in the time of Pericles, was not a projection downwards from a divine law revealed as at Sinai, but a projection upwards which had 'the good man' as its climax. And, as might be expected, the idea of goodness was coloured by the predilections and the environment of the men who formed it. We have already seen that it was largely civic: apart from this it was to a great extent determined by the Greek passion for beauty, and especially for that form of beauty which consists in perfect proportion. 'The beautiful', 'the proportionate', 'the befitting': these are the words

[1] 'As certain also of your own poets have said, For we are also his offspring' (Acts xvii. 28). St. Paul is usually assumed to be quoting Aratus, but it is probable that he had Cleanthes equally in mind. Both men wrote in the early part of the third century.

which most frequently occur in the Greek moralists, and which most fully represent the ideal of their people. A nation whose favourite art was sculpture, and whose favourite dramatist was Sophocles, could not have decided otherwise.

Two modern examples may be quoted of this deep and far-reaching antithesis. One is the passage in Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, which discusses most clearly the variations of moral criterion.

'In cases of this kind', he says, 'where we are determining the degree of blame or applause which seems due to any action we very frequently make use of two different standards. The first is the idea of complete propriety and perfection which in those difficult situations no human conduct ever did or ever can come up to: and in comparison with which the actions of all men must for ever appear blameable and imperfect. The second is the idea of that degree of proximity or distance from this complete perfection which the actions of the greater part of mankind commonly arrive at. Whatever goes beyond this degree, how far soever it may be removed from absolute perfection seems to deserve applause, and whatever falls short of it to deserve blame.'

Traill's dialogue between Lucian and Pascal[1] sets the two principles in even sharper contrast. Lucian has readily admitted that he feels a sense of shame and uneasiness if his conduct at any time has fallen short of the accepted norm of human nature. Pascal asks, 'But how if human nature itself be a shameful thing?' and the dialogue proceeds:

Lucian. How can man's nature seem to him shameful where there is no superior nature to which he can compare it?

Pascal. There, however, is the very point. He can, he must, compare it with a higher, a divine nature: though to you indeed I may not say 'with the nature of the gods'.

Lucian. No, indeed, you may not. I have always avoided

[1] Traill, *The New Lucian*, 1st edition, pp. 124–6.

comparing myself with the gods lest I should grow too proud of my virtue. Zeus the adulterer, and Hermes the pilferer, and Dionysus the tippler might keep the most profligate of mortals in countenance.

Pascal. I know; and I speak not of the divine nature as the barbarous and unclean legends of your religion represented it. But could you form no conception of Deity as something unspeakably higher, purer, holier than the nature of man? Could you not imagine it, let me ask you, by idealizing human virtues? Call to mind for a moment the most blameless man whom you have ever known: and then imagine a being—name him god or man, I care not which—who should so far surpass your friend in excellence as he himself surpassed the vilest of his race.

Lucian. I have obeyed you. Your monster of innocence is in my mind.

Pascal. Then now bethink yourself that even as he is, whom you are imagining, so might all men be: as noble as the worst of them are base, as perfect as the best of them are imperfect. And do you not feel, then, as if the burden of this reflection must abase you to the dust?

Lucian. No, by the Dog, not I. I should see no reason to blush for my inches before a live man of six cubits in stature: and you would have me cast dust upon my head because I have merely dreamed of a giant. Why should we hanker after the unattainable in anything, whether it be length of leg or altitude of virtue?

This does little justice to Pindar, to Sophocles, and to the speculations of the Greek philosophers, but it not unfairly represents the tolerant and equable judgement of Greek society during their period.

With the Stoics, as befitted their Semitic origin, there came into Greek ethics a new sense of sternness and rigidity. From them are derived, in the long run, those moralists who hold the noble but indefensible position that all defections from moral rectitude are equally to blame. 'There can be no moral questions', they say, 'when there is no moral choice. All choice is between alternatives: if you take the wrong one you have

thrown in your lot with evil; you have done the worst that the circumstances permitted, and it makes no difference whether the issue at stake is a straw or a kingdom.' This is in effect pure Stoicism. 'A stick', said Zeno, 'must either be straight or crooked.' There can be no degrees of culpability, no intermediates between right and wrong: there is no room for pity, and forgiveness is a betrayal of the cause. The four virtues of wisdom, temperance, courage, and justice cover the whole field of human goodness, any defection from them is unpardonable, and any softer judgement is self-indulgence.[1] To meet this doctrine *a priori* has sometimes proved difficult: *a posteriori* it places on a level with the traitor and the murderer any man who sends off a money-order without filling in the name of the recipient.

The ethical ideals of the Middle Ages were partly coloured by the conception of chivalry, mainly determined by the authority of Scripture, of Aristotle, and above all of the Church. The examples of independent moral speculation are rare, fewer at any rate than the casuistical treatises which endeavoured to interpret, and to apply to all possible cases, the operation of principles already accepted as axiomatic. But the reaction against Rome and Aristotle which began effectively with the Reformation and continued through Ramus and Bacon, reached its climax of rebellion in the seventeenth century, and from then onwards we have a series of ethical systems in which men disown authority and explain human action in terms of their own wisdom and experience. To discuss all these would far transcend the limits of the present volume: we can only select

[1] See Diogenes Laertius, vii. 101 and 127. Cicero devotes part of the *Pro Murena*, especially chapters 30 and 31, to an examination of Stoic ethics, which he describes as 'harsher and more severe than either truth or nature can suffer' ('paullo asperior et durior quam aut veritas aut natura patiatur'). For Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius see later, chapter viii.

a few as typical, and as specially germane to the progress of thought in our own country.

First in order we may take the doctrine that a man's motives are entirely determined by his own personal advantage, either directly through the natural consequence of the act, or indirectly through the rewards and punishments decreed by the social order. Of this the earliest and most uncompromising upholder is Hobbes. Brought up at the feet of Bacon he was a sturdy opponent of the Aristotelian philosophy, and particularly of its scholastic interpreters. A rebel against all established religion, he struck his hardest against the authority of the Church of Rome.[1] Aristotle had based his ethics on the conception of an ultimate and supreme good to which all other ends were ancillary. Hobbes answers 'There is no such *finis ultimus* or *summum bonum* as is spoken of in the books of the old moral philosophers.' The Church had interpreted human responsibility by the freedom of the will, and had placed all natural desires under its direction and control. Hobbes declares that free-will is a contradiction in terms, and resolves the whole psychology of conduct into the 'three affections' of desire, aversion, and contempt. Both Aristotle and the Church insisted, though in different language, on a standard of goodness which should not be relative to the caprice of the individual, but universally valid. Hobbes replies:

'Whatever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth "good", and the object of his hate or aversion, "evil", and of his contempt, "vile" or "inconsiderable". For these words good, evil, and contemptible are ever used with relation to the person that useth them, there being nothing simply and absolutely so.'

The whole criterion, in short, is to be found directly or indirectly in a man's own pleasures and pain. 'Pleasure is the

[1] See the last book of the *Leviathan*, ch. 46–7.

apparance or sense of good, displeasure the apparance or sense of evil.' What men call will is merely 'the last appetite in deliberating', and has no prerogative, except the accident of place, over any of the appetites that have preceded it. Benevolence is only 'love of power', pity is 'a fiction of the like calamity befalling ourselves', gratitude is an affair of policy, and hatred, at any rate of a victim, is elevated into a moral principle.

'To have received from one to whom we think ourselves equal greater benefits than we can hope to requite disposeth to counterfeit love but secret hatred. . . . To have done more hurt to a man than he can or is willing to expiate, inclineth the doer to hate the sufferer. For he must expect revenge or forgiveness, both of which are hateful.' [1]

In a world so constituted, where every man is seeking his own, the only hope of peace is a mutual compact with a legislature of unlimited power to see that it is enforced. Morality, if we can call it morality, is a matter of enactment supported on a drastic system of rewards and punishments.

We are not here concerned with the superstructure of absolute government which was built by Hobbes upon this psychological quicksand: [2] at present we have but to note the remarkable travesty of human nature which is put forward as reasoned truth by one of our most eminent English philosophers. One cause has already been suggested—the reaction against certain established orders of thought which he inherited from Bacon. Another may be found in the historical circumstances of his time. He published the *Leviathan* in the year of Cromwell's victory at Worcester, when he had gone into voluntary exile from a country which he found no longer endurable. The picture which he draws is not unlike that which Thucydides gives of

[1] See *Leviathan*, Bk. I, chs. 6 and 11, from which the above extracts are taken.

[2] See ch. iii, p. 59.

the state of public opinion during the Peloponnesian War.[1] In his earlier life he had written a translation of Thucydides expressly designed 'to inculcate a dread of democracy': it is not surprising that he thought ill of a world in which his antagonists were triumphant, and his native land, as he thought, ruined in the process. But it is of more moment that these counsels of despair set free a current of moral speculation which ran along our philosophy for a couple of hundred years. The Utilitarian doctrine is one with which our nation has been unfortunately associated, and in all essentials Hobbes was our first Utilitarian. Even Locke is not immune from his influence:

'Things, then, are good or evil only in reference to pleasure and pain. That we call good which is apt to increase pleasure and diminish pain in us . . . and on the contrary we call that evil which is apt to increase pain and diminish pleasure.'[2] And again, 'Happiness is the utmost pleasure we are capable of.'

It is true that Locke's 'civil government' is a great advance on Hobbes's absolute monarchy, but we have an uneasy suspicion that they spring ultimately from the same source.

A humorous commentary on this text is provided by Bernard Mandeville. As a fashionable London physician in an era of self-indulgence he was naturally inclined to take a cynical view of life, and his *Fable of the Bees* (1714) startled the precisians of Queen Anne's reign almost as much as the *Leviathan* had shocked those of the Commonwealth. Starting from Hobbes's premise that self-interest is the only motive, he drew from it a different conclusion. There is, he held, one curb and one alone which can hold in check the selfish and turbulent desires of man, and that is government not by restraint but by cajolery. Man is the vainest of animals, the most susceptible of praise and blame; 'interested politicians' have discovered this weakness and have made use of it to serve their

[1] Thucydides iii. 82–3.

[2] Locke, *Essay*, Bk. II, ch. 20.

own ends. Self-sacrifice is rendered attractive by the reward of public honour; anti-social acts are avoided because they lead to disapprobation. 'The moral virtues are the political offspring which flattery begot on pride.' This ingenious theory, perhaps only half-seriously intended, afforded an excellent topic for our satirists, and, over a century later, was repeated with little substantial modification by the severe and unsmiling gravity of James Mill.[1]

Nor was the religious teaching of the time always proof against this philosophy of selfishness. Butler was one of the noblest of English divines, one of the greatest of English moralists; his sermons, especially those on compassion and resentment have become classics, his analysis of conscience is one of the most acute and penetrating which we possess. Yet even Butler was too much the child of his age to shake off altogether the appeal to self-interest. Here is a significant passage:[2]

'To this it may be added that Religion, from whence arises our strongest obligation to benevolence, is so far from disowning the principle of self-love that it often addresses itself to that very principle, and always to the mind in that state where reason presides: and there can no access be had to the understanding but by convincing men that the course of life we would persuade them to is not contrary to their interest. It may be allowed without any prejudice to the cause of virtue and religion that our ideas of happiness and misery are of all our ideas, the nearest and most important to us: that they will, nay, if you please, that they ought to prevail over those of order and beauty and harmony and proportion if there ever should be, as it is impossible that there ever should be, any inconsistency between them. Let it be allowed though virtue or moral rectitude doth indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is right and good as such, yet when we sit

[1] James Mill, *Fragment on Mackintosh* (1835), pp. 246–52.

[2] Sermon, No. xi.

down in a cool hour we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it.'

And where Butler moves with dignified and cautious steps, intent on reconciling if possible the two sides of his difficult problem, Archdeacon Paley, some half century later,[1] advances with complete and confident intrepidity. To him there is no doubt about the religious sanction. 'Virtue is the doing good to mankind in obedience to the will of God and for the sake of everlasting happiness.' 'A man is said to be obliged when he is urged by a violent motive resulting from the command of another.'

'Let it then be asked "Why am I obliged to keep my word?" and the answer will be because I am urged to do so by a violent motive (namely the expectation of being after this life rewarded if I do, and punished for it if I do not) resulting from the command of another (namely of God). This solution goes to the bottom of the subject as no farther question can reasonably be asked.'

With the closing sentences we may find ourselves at least in partial agreement. No further question could reasonably have been asked of Archdeacon Paley.

There is no need to follow in detail the course of utilitarian hedonism. Bentham sets out from the same moral standpoint as Hobbes, and his chief development of the doctrine is his classification under four 'sanctions' of the 'sources whence pleasures and pains are in use to flow'. His 'pompous philosopher' talks about duties and receives no attention because all his hearers are thinking about interests, and men 'will not move their little finger to serve you unless their advantage in so doing is apparent to them'. James Mill blends the ethics of Hobbes and Mandeville with the psychology of Hume and

[1] *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy* (1785), II. ii and iii.

Hartley. John Stuart Mill follows with filial piety the steps of his father, but his heart is really on the other side. His qualitative distinction of pleasures, and still more his assertion that the hero may prefer the happiness of others to his own, lead inevitably to a surrender of the whole position. Once more the hedonist philosophy has ended by supplying its own antidote. But throughout its course it was sufficiently prevalent in this country to barb the venomous epigram of Nietzsche. 'No man wants happiness: only the Englishman desires that.'

Meanwhile the principles of the *Leviathan* had roused in opposition two other British schools of moral philosophy, known respectively as aesthetic and intellectualist. Shaftesbury, the leader of the aesthetic school, published his *Inquiry concerning Virtue* in 1699, and reprinted it in his more famous volume of *Characteristics* in 1711. He begins by reinstating the conception of an ultimate good, as that of the universal system of nature, to which any private end may justly and rightly be sacrificed. 'If the ill of one private system be the good of others: if it make still to the good of the general system, . . . then is the ill of that private system no real ill in itself.' The criterion is therefore not to be found in any weighing of personal advantage or disadvantage. 'We do not say of one that he is a good man when having his hands ty'd up he is hindered from doing the mischief he designs: or (which is in a manner the same) when he abstains from executing his ill purpose thro' a fear of some impending punishment or thro' the allurements of some exterior reward.' Acts done from self-interest may have a certain natural goodness, in proportion as the affection is itself laudable and the result beneficial, but no act can have moral worth unless it is done disinterestedly from a true affection for the general good. Further, moral virtue requires not only these affections toward the general good, but a conscious judgement upon them. This is made

by a ' reflected sense ', as our judgements of painting and music are made by a reflected sense on the natural objects of sight and hearing.

' If a creature be generous, kind, constant, compassionate, yet if he cannot reflect on what he himself does or sees others do so as to take notice of what is worthy or honest, and make that notice or conception of worth and honesty to be an object of his affection, he has not the character of being virtuous, for thus and not otherwise he is capable of having a sense of right and wrong.'

This reflected sense of right and wrong is as natural to man as any of his primary affections. It may be overlaid by ' false custom ' or traversed by some momentary impulse towards personal advantage, but it can never be destroyed or invalidated. The analogy of the arts is pressed home. ' Where is there on earth ', he asks, ' a fairer matter of speculation, a goodlier view or contemplation, than that of a beautiful, proportioned and becoming action? Or what is there relating to us of which the consciousness and memory is more solidly and lastingly entertaining? ' The virtuous man is the supreme artist in life, and to him ' beauty and good are still the same '.

Shaftesbury's teaching was extended and developed by Hutcheson, who for eighteen years was Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow, and whose first work (1725) bore the significant title, *An Inquiry concerning the original of our ideas of Beauty and Virtue.* Much of the substance of this was incorporated in his Glasgow Lectures which were published posthumously thirty years later. ' Moral goodness ', he held, ' denotes an idea of some quality apprehended in actions which procures approbation and love toward the actor from those who receive no advantage by the action.' The basis of our judgement is again stated to be aesthetic.

' As the Author of nature has determined us to receive by

an external sense pleasant or disagreeable ideas of objects according as they are useful or hurtful to our bodies, and to receive from uniform objects the pleasures of beauty and harmony . . . in the same manner he hath given us a moral sense to direct our actions and to give us still nobler pleasures.'

This is dependent not on reason which is but 'that sagacity which we have in pursuing an object', but on a 'benevolent universal instinct' anterior to reason, or rather to 'a determination of our minds to receive amiable or disagreeable ideas of actions, when they occur to our observation, antecedent to any opinion of advantage or loss to redound to ourselves from them'. With this may be compared the doctrines of Hume and of Adam Smith, who base our ethical judgements on that surest of all aesthetic foundations, the bond of sympathy.

Balguy, in his *Foundations of Moral Goodness*, first edition, censures Hutcheson for 'degrading' morality into an affair of sense or instinct which is variable among men and may even be shared by brutes. 'Not beauty but rightness', he says, 'is the essential attribute of morality.' In his second edition, he shifts his ground and claims Hutcheson as an unwitting ally. 'All beauty whether moral or natural is to be reckoned and reputed as a species of absolute Truth, as resulting from the necessary relations and unchangeable congruities of things.' Both these criticisms appear to be overstated. Beauty is not a matter of individual caprice, it is dependent on laws universally valid though only gradually and imperfectly apprehended. But to make these laws as rigid and inflexible as those of mathematical demonstration is to ignore our emotional nature and to confine art within the bounds of a narrow formalism. In any case the aesthetic doctrine of morals is far removed from the taint of personal selfishness. It may be too ready to admire virtue with the eye of a connoisseur, or to dismiss vice as a solecism, none the less it is based upon dis-

interested principles and the pleasure which it promises is, in Aristotle's words, 'a supervening end', not an external and adventitious reward.

The first founders of our 'intellectual' school were Henry More the Platonist, whose *Enchiridion Ethicum* was published in 1669, and Richard Cumberland, Bishop of Peterborough, whose tractate, *De Legibus Naturae*, followed it some three years later. We may, however, regard as the two most typical Ralph Cudworth (1617–88), who was master of Christ's College, Cambridge, and Samuel Clarke (1675–1729), a famous writer on physics, who for the latter part of his life held the living of St. James, Westminster. Cudworth's chief work is his *Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality*, which was written in answer partly to the political doctrine of Hobbes that morality depends upon enactment, partly to the metaphysical doctrine of Descartes, that 'things are what they are because God has willed them so'. To these Cudworth replies:

'Things are what they are not by will but by Nature. . . . Omnipotence itself cannot make a triangle without having the nature and properties of a triangle in it. . . . For though the Will of God be the supreme efficient cause of all things . . . yet it is not the formal cause of anything beside itself. God Himself cannot supply the place of the formal cause.' And again, 'No positive commands whatever do make anything good or evil, just or unjust, which nature had not made such before.'

Moral laws, therefore, like all other laws, are derived from the Wisdom of God, upon which the Will of God is itself dependent.

'For Wisdom in itself hath the nature of a rule and measure, it being a most determinate and inflexible thing: but Will being not only a blind and dark thing considered in itself, but also indefinite and indeterminate, hath therefore the nature of a thing regulable and measurable. Wherefore it is the perfection of Will as such to be guided and determined by

Wisdom and Truth: but to make Wisdom, Knowledge, and Truth to be arbitrarily determined by Will, and to be regulated by such a Plumbean and Flexible rule as that is, is quite to destroy the nature of it.'

Further, the wisdom of God is measured and determined by His essential goodness.

'Wherefore although some novelists make a contracted idea of God consisting of nothing else but Will and Power, yet his nature is better expressed by some in this mystical or enigmatical representation of an infinite circle, whose inmost centre is simple goodness, the rays and expanding plat thereof all-comprehending and immutable wisdom, the exterior periphery or interminate circumference omnipotent will or authority by which everything without God is brought forth into existence.'

Moral principles are thus among the eternal and unchanging laws of the universe, and are apprehended not by sense but by intellect.

It is doubtful whether Clarke was directly influenced by Cudworth, whose treatise remained in manuscript for over forty years; but in the Boyle Lectures (1704–5) he maintains a very similar position. Mathematical relations, he begins, are absolute and eternal, e. g. those of equality and inequality, proportion and disproportion. The same is true of 'the fitness or suitableness of certain circumstances to certain persons, and an unsuitableness of others, founded on the nature of things and the qualifications of persons antecedent to all positive appointment whatever'. And since all moral action depends on the relation of persons and circumstance, it is as immutable as mathematics. Distinctions between right and wrong are as eternally and rigorously valid as between straight and crooked or odd and even. 'All wilful wickedness and perversion of right is the very same insolence and absurdity in moral matters as it would be in natural things for a man to pretend to alter the certain properties of numbers.' The sanction of rewards

and punishments, 'though necessary to keep frail and fallible man in order', is only 'a secondary and additional obligation'. 'The original obligation of all is the eternal reason of things.'

Then follows a drastic examination of Hobbes. 'Justice the consequence of a social compact?' If justice were not presupposed the compact would not be kept. 'Morality dependent on the will of the legislator?' Then if the devil were omnipotent we should have to reverse our moral distinctions. Goodness is prior to the will of God, but the will of God is in conformity with it. For God, being self-sufficient, could have no motive for creating the world except to communicate his own goodness to it. Evil, therefore, is not willed by God, but is a 'consequential permission', the price, we may say, of human freedom. And immorality is the setting up of our own self-will against the will of God and the decrees of eternal reason.

If it be objected that not only individuals but whole nations are in total ignorance of these universal principles, a point on which Locke lays special emphasis,[1] Clarke answers:

'I am not satisfied the matter of fact is true: but if it was, yet mere ignorance affords no just objection against the certainty of any truth. . . . There are many nations and peoples almost totally ignorant of the plainest mathematical truths, . . . and yet these truths are such to which the mind cannot but give its assent as soon as they are distinctly proposed to it.'

The laws of Right are fitted with careful precision into the scheme of this mathematical calculus. They are (1) in respect of God that we worship Him, which follows from the definition of His nature; (2) in respect of our neighbour (*a*) that we deal with every man as under like circumstances we could reasonably expect that he should deal with us, which follows from the law that if $x=y$, $y=x$, (*b*) that we endeavour by universal

[1] See Locke, *Essay*, I. iii. 9.

benevolence to promote the welfare of all men, which follows from the two laws that good is more fit to be done than evil, and that man is naturally a social being; (3) in respect of ourselves that each man preserve his own being and 'take care to keep himself in such temper and disposition both of body and mind as may best fit and enable him to perform his duty in all other instances', which follows from the law that we have no right to take our own life, and therefore no right to mutilate it. All other moral rules are derived from these three which are themselves constituted by 'that Right Reason which makes the principal distinction between man and brute'.

It cannot be gainsaid that these are sound maxims, and that Clarke has laid them upon a firm and solid foundation. Yet as we read the Boyle Lectures we are conscious of some misgiving. Our writers on physical science may be left to decide what laws of nature are immutable and everlasting: the discovery of radium and the theory of relativity have made of recent years two breaches in their citadel; but we may ask whether the infinite complexity of human conduct can so easily be reduced to rule and measure. Morality seems a simple matter to one who looks at life from the quietude of a study window or the dignified seclusion of a master's lodge, and it is not surprising that two men who had been trained as mathematicians should find in the field of ethics some of the severity and lucidity of their favourite pursuit. But a wider experience of life teaches otherwise. Plato's trinity of perfection—goodness, beauty, and truth—is no doubt three in one, but it is still three, and we cannot wholly resolve any one of its number into the others. We may legitimately call bad art 'false', but not as we apply the term to an erroneous inference. We are perhaps too lenient to stupidity, but it is an intellectual, not a moral defect. And we assuredly cannot sum up cruelty or treachery or self-righteousness as 'that very same insolence and

absurdity' which would have us believe that two and two make five.

It is perhaps unfair to cite in this connexion a disciple whom Clarke would probably have disowned, but the Rev. William Wollaston is a phenomenon too remarkable to be omitted. In 1722 he published *The Religion of Nature delineated*, which sold 10,000 copies in sixteen years, and seems miraculously to have escaped the notice of Swift. In this work he starts from the intellectualist premisses of the Boyle Lectures, and endeavours, as the phrase goes, to carry them to their logical conclusion. This dangerous process, which usually means the inflation of a proposition until it bursts, reacts upon his philosophy with disastrous effect. All virtue is truth, he says, all vice falsehood, and therefore the man who beats his wife is guilty of lying, because by this action he denies that she is his wife.

The real doctrines of Cudworth and Clarke were inherited by Richard Price, whose *Review of the Principal Questions in Morals* (1758) has not, perhaps, received the attention that it deserves. But the last name on which it is appropriate here to dwell [1] was for a time the most influential, and is still the most famous, in the history of modern European thought. Kant's *Metaphysic of Ethics* (1785) and *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) are two dynamic forces which effected almost the same 'Copernican revolution' in the field of ethics as his *Critique of Pure Reason* did in that of metaphysical speculation. The main points of his ethical teaching may be summarized as follows.

There is nothing in the world which can be termed absolutely and altogether good, a good will alone excepted. All a man's possessions, mental as well as material, can be misapplied to ill purposes: the good will alone is secure, and its end is not happiness but duty. For 'if the final aim of nature in the

[1] For Hegel see ch. vi, pp. 122–30.

constitution of man had been merely his general welfare and felicity, then we must hold her to have taken very bad steps in selecting reason for the conduct of his life, for the whole rule and line of action necessary to procure happiness would have been more surely given by instinct than we perceive it to be by reason.' Thus the true end for which reason is implanted is to produce a will good in itself, not as means to some ulterior purpose. 'To study one's own happiness can never be directly a duty, still less a principle of duty.' And this requires that a right act be done because it is right, not because we gain pleasure in doing it. A benevolent deed done for the 'reflex delight' which we feel in the happiness of others 'has no moral worth'. The consequences of an act are usually irrelevant: all that matters is the motive, and the only admissable motive is intrinsic reverence for the moral law. This law, unlike those of nature, speaks in imperatives, which must be categorical, not hypothetical, valid in their own right, not as a means to something further. The ultimate form of the categorical imperative is 'Act from a maxim fit at all times to be law universal': to which Kant adds two subsidiary forms, 'Act so as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of others, always as an end and never as a means': 'act according to the will of all rational beings as the source of an universal legislation.' But all three are really facets of the same rule: the criterion of a moral act is in all cases its capacity for being universalized. Lying, for instance, is forbidden, because it depends on belief, and there would be no belief if it were habitual. Indeed, to Kant all forms of moral delinquency consist in 'making irrational exceptions in our own favour'. Hence obligation is determined not by any external constraint but by the inherent rightness of the maxim under which we act: it is 'the necessity of a free action falling under a categorical imperative of the reason'. And this categorical impera-

tive is 'a synthetic *a priori* proposition', not derived from experience but directly apprehended by us as intelligent beings.

This postulates the freedom of the will: that 'autonomy', as Kant calls it, by which it determines its own causality and gives itself its own law. And if it be asked how man can be at once legislative and amenable to legislation, Kant answers that this explains itself if we consider the twofold nature of man. As 'sensible' he is one phenomenon of nature among other phenomena: as 'intelligent' he is a universal subject to which the whole of nature, including his sensible self, is related as object. It is through his intellectual self that he apprehends the categorical imperative, it is through his sensible self that he is under obligation to obey it. And it is only because of these two aspects of his nature that there is any conflict in human life.

'The idea Freedom makes me an inhabitant of a cogitable system in which, if I were that alone, all my actions would harmonize with the autonomy of the will: so far as I am likewise connected with a different but dependent system they ought so to harmonize. And this "ought" expresses a synthetic *a priori* proposition.'[1]

The question how freedom is possible, Kant puts aside as beyond any answer.

'Reason would outstep all bounds and limits were she to undertake an explanation how pure reason can be spontaneous and self-practical, a problem identical with the explanation how the freedom of the will is possible. . . . But to postulate this freedom is not only possible but is unconditionally necessary for a being conscious of its intellectual causality, that is of a will which it can distinguish from its desires. . . . The idea of a pure cogitable world as an aggregate of reasonable beings to which we ourselves belong, although we are still parts of a physical system, is a fertile idea and one required by a reasonable faith.'[2]

[1] *Met. of Ethics* (Semple's translation), p. 66.
[2] Ib., pp. 72–6.

The most vulnerable part of Kant's theory is the statement that benevolent acts done from joy in the happiness of others have no moral worth. This is an exceedingly disputable proposition, which unduly contracts the meaning of the word 'moral', and may easily be distorted, as indeed it often has been, into the peevish and morose maxim that the pleasure felt in a good act somehow detracts from its goodness.[1] Schiller satirized this in a well-known epigram:

Gladly serve I my friends, but I do it alas! with affection
Hence I am plagued with the doubt, virtue I have not attained.

Moralists have too often asserted not only that goodness implies obligation, which is unanswerable, but that obligation implies reluctance; that a man who does his duty adds to the merit if he does it unwillingly. They are quite ready to prove this by mood and figure. 'Ought', they say, implies 'is not': if goodness came easy there would be no conflict, no obligation, and therefore no moral worth. This doctrine appears to me not only immoral but demonstrably false. Grant the dual nature of man, it is not rational to argue that because the 'lower self' obeys willingly therefore it has ceased to obey. There are people in the world, women perhaps more frequently than men, who are radiating centres of goodness, who seem to do right without an effort, and to dispense happiness as naturally as a bird sings. This is not because they are in Shaftesbury's phrase, 'cheaply virtuous', but because their whole being seems to be saturated with the Divine presence. They are the saints of the earth, not below morality, but at its highest level. Discipline is in their lives, as it is in the lives of all of us, but the true disciplinarian is he who no longer needs to prohibit.

We have reviewed these typical illustrations of ethical theory

[1] In the *Shepherd* of Hermas it is said that good actions done with pleasure are a luxury (*τρυφή*). But Hermas saves himself by adding that there are virtuous luxuries as well as vicious.

because it is of the first importance that before we approach the immediate problem of citizenship we should make up our minds as to our moral standpoint. As Aristotle has told us, ethics and politics form two chapters of the same volume: indeed he goes farther in one passage and describes ethics as an aspect of politics.[1] Our relations to the State, our duties to it and our claims upon it, are all to some extent interpreted by our attitude towards our fellow man: we can have no clear view about 'rights' until we have provisionally settled what we mean by 'right'; or about 'duties' until we have considered whether duty is imposed on us from without by the legislature or evolved from within by our own consciousness. It will be observed that of the modern schools which have been here briefly discussed, only one conceives its ideal directly in terms of political or social environment, and that is the one which we are least inclined to follow. The others do not exclude citizenship but go behind it: they draw their principles from more primary sources with all of which the conditions of civic life are compatible. But whatever be a man's principles, his conduct must necessarily be affected by his environment, and our actual environment is the State. It is plain that we cannot accept any account of its relations to us which is summed up in mere coercion: politically as well as metaphysically we claim at least some measure of freedom. Again many historical abuses have been due to wrongful inequalities of political or social position, and many more to personal hatreds and antagonisms. The two revolutions which did more than any other movement to spread through America and Europe the feeling of citizenship, took liberty, equality, and fraternity as their watchword, and with the general examination of these it may be fitting that the next lecture should be occupied.

[1] Ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται πολιτική τις οὖσα, *Eth.* i. 2. 9.

III

LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND FRATERNITY

'We take these to be self-evident propositions: that all men are created equal: that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights: and that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.'

These are noble and stirring words: not the less impressive to us from the fact that they were first uttered in a hostile camp. It is from no desire to criticize them, still less the spirit by which they were animated, that we may pause for a moment to consider one of the difficulties which at the time attended their literal application. Jefferson, the chief member of the drafting committee, proposed the addition of a letter to George III protesting against the further importation of negro slaves, and we are told that this 'was disapproved by some Southern gentlemen whose reflections were not yet matured to a full abhorrence of that traffic'. This is the more remarkable because Congress had already passed two resolutions on Jefferson's side, though it had taken no step to emancipate the negroes who were then in employment. At any rate the protest was withdrawn, and the Declaration of Independence which declared all men to be free and equal confessed itself unable to cope with the question of slavery.

Lest in this matter we should be righteous overmuch, it may be well to remember that not all American slaves were negroes. A good many came from England and Scotland: some of them criminals who had been offered the choice of the plantations or the gallows, some of them blameless citizens who had been kidnapped with as little scruple as if they were being pressed for the king's navy. It is said that the kidnapping

trade in Scotland was killed by one Peter Williamson, who having been sold in boyhood to a planter, escaped, and after many adventures, returned to his native Aberdeen, where in the teeth of prosecution he published a full and detailed account of his sufferings.[1] In England it lasted a few years longer, and the American Revolution had much to do with bringing it to an end.

This discrepancy did not escape the eye of Abraham Lincoln. 'When we were the political slaves of King George', he writes,[2] 'and wanted to be free we called the maxim that all men are created equal a self-evident truth: but now that we have grown fat and lost all dread of being slaves ourselves we have become so greedy to be masters that we call the same maxim a self-evident lie.' Lincoln writes warmly, in the thick of the controversy on emancipation, but the blow is none the less telling, and the hand that dealt it is the same which, a few years later, lifted the shadow of slavery from the United States.

And indeed we could hardly expect the reform to have taken place more rapidly. For many thousand years slavery had been an institution which everybody accepted, though with very different degrees of acquiescence. It goes back to the earliest records of Chaldea and Egypt, it is found in the book of Genesis, it is found in the Iliad. Originally, no doubt, it was the result of conquest, either the reduction to serfdom of a lower by a higher race, or the calculated mercy which spared a beaten enemy on the battlefield instead of killing him. Later came a third and distinct category, the children of bondage born in the house, and these were so clearly separated from the victims of battle

[1] The date of this is 1765. See Burton's *History of Scotland*, vol. viii, p. 520–3.

[2] Letter to the Hon. George Robertson, Springfield, Illinois, 15 August 1855.

that Thucydides can include among the inhabitants of a beleaguered city 'slaves both bond and free'.[1]

No fate was more dreaded. 'Zeus', says Eumaeus, 'robs a man of half his manhood when he appoints for him the day of slavery.' To Achilles, languishing in the shades, the most miserable life on earth is that of being 'thrall to a landless man'. To the Greek tragedians it is a symbol of degradation, to the Greek philosophers it is justified only on grounds of racial inferiority. 'Never enslave Greeks'[2] is one of Plato's fundamental laws of warfare, and Aristotle, though he defends slavery by the argument that some men are 'naturally slaves', clearly implies that such men are to be found outside the pale of civilization. 'Hellenes do not call themselves slaves', he says, 'but confine this term to barbarians.'[3] And this was not from fear of ill-usage, for the Athenians, at any rate, were kind to their slaves, and Aristotle even holds that servitude has its compensations, because it is the duty of the householder, by personal intercourse and example, to train his servants in such virtues as they are capable of acquiring. Nor was it merely discipline and obedience to law, for on the one hand 'the master should not speak to his slave only in terms of command' and, on the other, the citizen himself was amenable to the supreme rule of the State, and 'should regard this not as slavery but as salvation'.[4] It was rather the exclusion from that 'equality of governing and being governed' which Aristotle would restrict to those who have a mature power of deliberation.

The Roman lawyers went farther. It is true that under the Republic a slave, however highly skilled or cultivated, was in

[1] Ἀνδράποδα καὶ δοῦλα καὶ ἐλεύθερα (Thuc. viii. 28). Ἀνδράποδα seems to have been the general term for slaves obtained by purchase, but the distinction of δοῦλα and ἐλεύθερα is significant.

[2] *Republic*, v. 469.

[3] *Politics*, i. 6. 6.

[4] See *Politics*, i. 13. 14, and v. 9. 15.

fact no better than a chattel: he could not marry, he could not hold property; his very life was at his master's disposal. It is true that in the first century of the Empire Persius could gibe at manumission which 'by a single twirl of the Praetor' could turn Dama, the blear-eyed tippler, into Marcus Dama the Roman citizen.[1] But reflection brought with it the uneasy feeling that the whole system was unnatural, that it was based on force, not on reason, and that in the ultimate resort it was indefensible. The last great codes of Roman jurisprudence speak on this matter with no uncertain voice. 'By natural law', say the *Institutes* (i. 2. 2), 'all men are born free.' 'Slavery', says the *Digest* (i. 5. 4), 'is a constitution of the law of nations by which a man is brought, against nature, under the dominion of another.'[2] There is much significance in this discrimination between the 'ius gentium' and the 'ius naturae'.

Yet, during the Middle Ages and after, slavery persisted. The Saxons enslaved the Celts, the Normans enslaved the Saxons; serfdom was not abolished in England till 1660, in Scotland till 1775, in Germany till the reforms of Stein, in Russia till the ukase of Alexander II. The negro slave-trade was a staple of our commerce in the reign of Elizabeth, was secured to us by treaty in the reign of Anne, and was overthrown but two years before the reign of Victoria. And there is not very much difference between actual slavery and the conditions of industrial life which are described by Disraeli in *Sybil*, and which moved Shaftesbury and Osler and Sadler to the passing of the Factory Acts. Freedom of any sort, as the heritage of

[1] Persius, v. 76–8.

[2] 'Servitus est constitutio iuris gentium qua quis dominio alieno contra naturam subiicitur.' The 'ius gentium' is distinguished from the 'ius civile' which was restricted to Romans. See Gaius, *Institutiones*, i. 1. In i. 189 he speaks of the 'ius gentium' as founded on the 'Naturalis ratio' of mankind.

mankind at large, is an ideal which it has taken many centuries of effort to realize.[1]

Conditions in France, though not less intolerable, were widely different. Serfdom, not formally abolished until 1789, had been for many years almost non-existent, except in a few outlying areas such as the Jura, and a considerable part of French territory was already in the hands of small peasant-proprietors. With politics they had at the time but little concern : all that they wanted was to be allowed to live. Indeed the French monarchy was extremely popular so long as it did its work : it was only after it fell into contempt that it began to prepare its own death-warrant, and the crucial event in its downfall was not the capture of the Bastille, whatever the Duc de Liancourt may have said, but the flight to Varennes.

The causes of the French Revolution were thus far less political than social and economic. On the one hand was the abuse of privilege by a frivolous court, a corrupt Church, and a profligate and arrogant aristocracy. On the other the country people, though nominally owning their farms, were reduced to starving misery by the countless imposts and taxes which overburdened them ; banvin, banalité, péage, and many others which went to the seigneur, beside the gabelle which went to the crown. Grimm, in 1763, speaks of a poor village of about two hundred cottages, which was assessed to pay over 30,000 livres a year. 'Il y a beaucoup de princes en Allemagne', he adds sardonically, 'qui tirent à peine cette somme de tout un bailliage.' And this at a time when men were dying 'like flies'

[1] In August 1920 there was held in New York an International Negro Convention which 'drew up a Negro Declaration of Independence, adopted a national flag and a national anthem, and elected a provisional President of Africa, a leader for the American negroes, and leaders for the negroes of the West Indies and of Central and South America'. See 'Essay on Racial Minorities', p. 370 of *Civilization in the United States*, by G. T. Robinson of Virginia.

from starvation, mothers strangling their children, to save them from worse, 'the whole population of a village, except two, found dead of hunger'.[1] The disdainful courtier who said that the people might eat grass was nearer the truth than he knew. But there was not always grass.

If a man is being taxed into literal starvation he has some claim to inquire on what objects of public utility his contributions are expended. This legitimate curiosity was satisfied by the publication in 1790 of the *Livre Rouge*, which contained an official list of pensioners: 1,500 livres a year to a lady who had once whitened the cuffs of M. le Dauphin; 1,700 livres a year to the coiffeur of Mademoiselle d'Artois, although, as she had died at the age of three, his services had not, as a matter of fact, been called into requisition; and so on through a long and increasing catalogue of gifts, pensions, benefices, and other scandals, rising with degree of rank, and swelling at the end into a total of inconceivable magnitude. 'Si les rois savaient ce que valent trois sols', said a petition from the hungry vine-dressers of Chaillerois; but this lesson was not to be learned by studying the Encyclopaedists as a man might study entomology, or by reading Rousseau as a substitute for *Astrée*, or even by establishing an Arcadian dairy at Le Petit Trianon.

If then we are ever inclined to lay stress on the 'crimes which have been committed in the name of Liberty', we must admit that they have often had their excuse. In any case we are not here concerned with excuse or censure, but with the endeavour to understand what certain terms mean, how they originated, and how they can be applied to the more equable conditions of the present day. Like all other nations we have had our periods of upheaval, and they have given salutary instruction to those of us who are willing to learn. What, we

[1] See Jules Claretie, *Camille Desmoulins*, pp. 36–42.

may ask, is the real meaning of liberty, equality, and fraternity, and within what limits are these conceptions valid?

According to some writers, equality is the fundamental conception from which the other two are ultimately derived.[1] This conclusion is supported on two arguments so diverse, indeed so apparently conflicting, that they might serve as texts for the two Oxford sermons on pride and on humility. The first is that all men, in virtue of their humanity, have worth, 'and more worth than anything else'; that as rational beings they are raised above all else in creation, and form an aristocracy of nature in which individual differences may be disregarded. 'Man', as the poet tells us, 'is the master of things', not because of some adventitious decoration of wealth or power or ability, but because of the common qualities which constitute his prerogative of manhood. The other holds that all men are equal in the sight of God because in the light of His unapproachable perfection all human attainments sink into insignificance and nothingness. Is it not what Clarke would call 'an insolence and absurdity', that standing as we do in the divine presence we should plume ourselves on our pigmy gifts and our infinitesimal differences of stature? To the dweller upon an Alpine peak the inequalities of the valley are all on a level: how much more to the everlasting stars, and to the eternal Judge that regards us from above the Heavens.

Into the deeper implications, scientific or theological, which these arguments involve there is no need for us here to enter. It is enough that for the present purpose both are entirely inconclusive. To the first we may answer that an aristocracy does not exclude differences of rank, and that men may be lords of creation without possessing equal degrees of lordship. The second, whatever be its inherent value, is here illustrated by

[1] See a very interesting discussion of this subject in Dr. McCunn's *Ethics of Citizenship*, pp. 1–5.

a metaphor more than usually misleading. If from an Alpine peak all the levels of the valley appear the same, the reason is not that they are really the same, but that we are short-sighted. Spire and roof, crag and boulder, tree and bush are not in fact of the same height: if we judge otherwise it is because our eyes are at fault. And apart from the metaphor, this doctrine postulates a theory of the divine judgement which we have no right to assume. We are paying it no honour by holding that it does not see any difference between Cleon and Pericles, Ganelon and Roland, Caesar Borgia and Francis of Assisi. Our standards of discrimination have often been erroneous: it does not follow that God has none.

Indeed from whatever side we look at it the doctrine of absolute equality is so untenable that it would hardly be worth discussing but for the fact that it so often reappears in controversy. It is not even an ideal at which we should aim: if all persons were equally beautiful or able or swift-footed, there would no longer be any beauty or ability or swiftness of foot, just as if all colours were the same there would be no colour, and if all sounds were the same there would be no music. The whole of human life depends on diversities of gifts, and on their due adjustment to circumstances and opportunities: the one eternal truth which underlies this doctrine of equality is that there should be such an adjustment, a fair and right relation between merit and reward, or still more between capacity of service and the occasion for its use. 'An equal law', says Professor McKechnie, 'is a just law, not one which recognizes the equal right of every one to everything.' [1]

This double meaning of the term 'equal' is explained by Aristotle's distinction of exact and proportionate equality.[2] Exact equality is absolute, that of two coincident geometrical

[1] McKechnie, *The State and the Individual*, p. 326.

[2] Aristotle, *Ethics*, v. 3–5, especially 3. 5–8, 4. 3, and 5. 6–8.

figures: proportionate equality is relative, the right of two shareholders to receive dividends corresponding to their investments. The former holds good in all cases of penal legislation, for the law is no respecter of persons; the latter in all the ordinary relations of civil life. Distributive justice is essentially based on proportion, the equality not of integers but of ratios; reciprocal justice, 'by which the state is held together' is equally based on the reference of all goods and all services to a standard of values. Ricardo's famous paradox that the day's bag of the hunter should be exchanged at par with the day's catch of the fisherman has long been laughed out of court: not less erroneous is the belief that the sole unit of value is an hour of labour-time irrespective of the quality of the labour. The true standard, it would seem, is a function of two variables: the difficulty of the task and its conduciveness to the public welfare. The great physician is paid more than the village herb-woman, partly because of his superior knowledge, skill, and education, and partly because he is of more use to the community. How much more it is for the community to decide.

In all material possessions there is a law of diminishing returns. One umbrella is a necessity of life; a second, in these dishonest days, is a precaution; a third is a mere superfluity. But this is not true in the sphere of intellectual equipment. A man who knows one foreign language may double his value by learning a second, and quadruple it by learning a third; a scientific research may produce no results in five years and revolutionize the world in ten: an administrator may find that each year of experience brings him added wisdom and a firmer grasp of public affairs. The real differences between men are intrinsic: differences of character and knowledge and ability; the externals of wealth and power are of value in so far as they testify to something beyond themselves. A rich man may be estimable

for the qualities that have won him his wealth, a man of high station for the training that has taught him the lesson of *noblesse oblige*: it is equally foolish to admire them for what they have and to refuse them recognition for what they are. The rank, no doubt, is but the guinea stamp, and a guinea stamp upon copper should have no currency: but it does not require Plato to remind us that not all men are golden.

Equality of desert, therefore, means a right ratio between character and circumstances. It follows to consider what is meant by equality of opportunity, and here again we have a phrase the truth of which is often obscured by loose and careless overstatement. So far as it means the breaking down of artificial barriers it cannot be gainsaid: much depends on what barriers are artificial: if it is extended to imply that if they are broken down all men can proceed to like achievement, and have a right to complain if they fall by the way, it is merely false and mischievous. We do not afford equality of opportunity if we give tickets for the picture gallery to two men, one of whom is blind; or for the French play to two men, one of whom does not know French; or for the metaphysic lecture to two men, one of whom cannot understand a word that is said. My opportunities are not my circumstances, but the uses that I can make of them. Not all feet will fit the same boots, or all words the same context, or all men the same conditions: nature, significance, training, are the important factors, and by them should our judgement be determined. Every citizen has a right to be educated to the utmost of his capacity, and to make what he can of his life afterwards: but this is not to say that all will attain the same excellence or are deserving of the same reward.

Equality, then, at any given moment of life, means the disregard of irrelevant inequalities. Differences of wealth are of no importance in a college class-room: they are of con-

siderable importance in a public subscription-list. It does not matter, at a political meeting, if a man's coat is poor; it does matter if he is ignorant or self-seeking or ill-mannered. Nor can this be traversed on the other side by any appeal to an external or absolute standard: we are concerned not with the highest gifts in themselves but with the highest that are relative to the occasion. 'Beauty', says Aristotle, 'is better than skill in flute-playing, but we give the best flutes to the best player.'[1] Or to put it another way. Oligarchy believes that the train should be run by the first-class passengers, because they pay most for their tickets; democracy by the third-class passengers, because they are most in number: we venture to urge that it should be run by the engine-driver, because he knows most about it.

This means that relevant inequalities, of whatever kind, are not only real but paramount. And this is true not only of distinctions between individuals but of distinctions between classes. Each group, each craft, each profession has something of its own to contribute to the general welfare: society at large can see that it is suitably employed and adequately rewarded. Excessive claims should of course be cut down; we do not always buy a man at his own valuation: untenable claims should of course be disallowed, like that of the mere plutocrat for honour or of the mere anarchist for a share in the legislature: it still remains that within due limits proportionate equality is the law of distributive justice. And the criterion by which it should be determined is the relative capacity to serve God in Church and State.

Historically speaking, the conception of fraternity seems to be the most primitive: not, of course, in any sense of the brotherhood of man—this has hardly yet been completely formulated—but in that of a tribal society founded on the fact

[1] *Politics*, iii. 12.

or fiction of blood-relationship. Half a century ago it was customary to accept Sir Henry Maine's view that the earliest stage was patriarchal, recognizing derivation from a common male ancestor, and of this we have historic examples in the Jewish tribes, in the Greek myths of Dorus, Aeolus, Ion, and even Hellen: perhaps in the Ramnes, Tities, and Luceres of Rome:[1] and among our own people in the Scottish clans, in the Brehon laws of Ireland, and in the ancient Cymric code which recognized blood-relationship at least as far as the ninth degree. Indeed Higden, contrasting the Welsh with the 'medled people of Engelonde', adds ironically, 'That peple thenkethe men nye to theyme by bloode whome a C degrees do separate'.[2] More recent anthropological research has, however, shown conclusively that the patriarchate is itself a comparatively late and derivative stage in the course of tribal development, and that it was preceded by a system of totemism and exogamy which may still be illustrated by actual tradition and usage. Thus, for instance, the Kamilaroi-speaking tribes on the Darling river are divided into six gentes, in two main groups: the first of Iguana, Kangaroo, and Opossum, the second of Emu, Bandicoot, and Blacksnake. The males on one side must marry the females on the other, each man being technically the husband in common of all the women to whom he is assigned. This again is traversed by a cross-division (possibly older) into eight groups, four of men, Ippai, Kumbo, Murri, and Kubbi, and four of women, Ippata, Buta, Mata, and Kapota. These groups are distributed among the six gentes, so that two of men and two of women are represented in each, and determine still more the principles of lawful marriage. Thus,

[1] At any rate they were Latin, Sabine, and Etruscan respectively.

[2] Higden, *Polychronicon*, trs. John of Trevisa, ii. 165, and 'Mediaeval Translation' (Harl. MS. 2261), Rolls Series, p. 405: quoted in Coulton's *Social Life in Britain from the Conquest to the Reformation*, pp. 7 and 18.

the male groups of Ippai and Kumbo, and the female groups of Buta and Ippota, are distributed among the three gentes of Emu, Bandicoot, and Blacksnakes; the male groups of Murri and Kubbi, and the female groups of Mata and Kapota, among those of Iguana, Kangaroo, and Opossum. All Ippai, to whichever of their three gentes they belong, are legally brothers, and must marry Kapota women from another gens: their male children are Murri and their female Mata; and a similar rule holds good with all the others. All children belong to the gens of the mother, and the group-system is arranged and distributed with this end in view. We are told [1] that in practice the rigidity of the law is sometimes relaxed, but under no circumstances is intermarriage permitted within the limits of the gens.

A more interesting example of fraternity in action is afforded by the Iroquois confederacy, the origin of which is assigned by tradition to the wisdom of the mythical chief Hiawatha. It is said to date from the beginning of the fifteenth century: it was discovered by Europeans in 1608, and reached the culmination of its power in 1675. Its earliest home was probably beside the upper waters of the St. Lawrence; in course of time it spread eastward and southward until its territory included not only a considerable part of Canada but the whole of what is now New York State, most of Pennsylvania, large tracts of Michigan and Ohio, and offshoots as far as the Carolinas and Tennessee. There are still over 4,000 of them in New York State alone, and a large number scattered among the surrounding states and in Canada.

The confederacy consisted of five 'nations': the Mohawks, Senecas, Cayugas, Onondagas, and Oneidas.[2] Each nation con-

[1] Dr. Lewis H. Morgan, *Ancient Society*, pp. 50–59. For an exhaustive account of the whole subject see Sir James Frazer's *Totemism and Exogamy*.

[2] A sixth, the Tuscaroras, obtained admission in the eighteenth century, but is of less account. The Cherokee, who are now probably the most

tained a varying number of totem gentes, according to its size, and of these gentes three—the Wolf, Bear, and Turtle—were common to all five, and three—the Deer, Snipe, and Hawk—to Senecas, Cayugas, and Onondagas. Intermarriage within the gens was strictly prohibited; the children followed the mother, so that descent was in the female line, and there could be no hereditary succession of chiefs. Each nation was individualized by its name, its dialect, its government, and the territory which it occupied and defended. In local matters it had almost complete autonomy, elected its own sachem and its own council, and within limits followed its own particular laws and customs. The characteristics of the gens were free right to attend the national council, with universal suffrage for men and women alike, the right to elect and depose sachems, subject to the council's ratification, the right to bestow names on its members and to adopt strangers into its society, the right of inheritance, of common religious ceremonies and of a common burial place, and the binding and reciprocal obligations of mutual help, defence, and redress of injuries. The number of people in a gens varied from 100 to 1,000, and was usually about half-way between these extremes. These again combined into larger groups or 'phratries', which conducted ceremonial games, deliberated on points of policy, and confirmed or sent back the gentile elections.

The affairs of the confederacy were managed partly by a general council on which the five nations were represented, partly by a special council of 50 sachems, who were chosen for their wisdom and integrity, and were not allowed to imperil themselves in battle. The general meeting-place was in the Onondaga valley, as being the most central, and it was established by law that all decisions should be unanimous. Every

numerous, are said to be of Iroquois blood but were never members of the confederacy.

adult male was warrior as well as counsellor, and his admission to full membership of the nation was marked by the bestowal of a 'new name' which he usually had to earn by some act of prowess. For special bravery or public service there was a distinctive title of honour,[1] which carried with it, for life, the rank of a sachem. The conduct of war was placed in the hands of two chiefs, elected always from the Senecas, whose frontier territory was first exposed to attack, and sharing the command, like Roman consuls, lest one be tempted to set up a military dictatorship. The tribal union was further maintained by the six religious festivals—Maple, Planting, Berry, Green Corn, Harvest, and New Year—which were organized by a body of officials called 'keepers of the Faith' in conjunction with the sachems.

It must not be supposed that the Iroquois confederacy bore any close analogy with the federations of Europe. At the time of their greatest power their number must have fallen far short of 100,000; they were scattered over a territory comparable to the united areas of France and Spain. They had no towns, no considerable villages; their nearest approach to settlement was a cluster of wigwams gathered together for mutual convenience and easily moved when occasion required. When we consider the vast distances, the difficulties of communication and the pressing needs of the daily life, it is clear that some unusually strong cohesive force must have been necessary to maintain for three hundred years the system of government and defence which is here described. Some part may have been due to respect for a mythical founder, and to the innate conservatism of primitive tradition; a more potent influence was the belief in a common blood which not only held together the clansmen within the tribe but extended the tie of brotherhood across the whole community.

[1] Ha-sa-no-wă-na which means 'elevated name'. See Dr. Lewis Morgan's *Ancient Society*, from which most of the above account is taken.

Fraternity in this literal sense is obviously not compatible with our intermingled and complicated civilization, and the sense of race, which has partly superseded it, has in many European countries been productive more of conflict than of unity. How far the term can be widened to apply to all human relationships is a matter which must be reserved for later discussion: it follows here to examine the last of the three great conceptions, that of liberty, and to estimate its value as a condition of citizenship.

Aristotle in the sixth book of the *Politics* distinguishes between two 'principles of democratic freedom': first the equality of control, that all citizens should rule and be ruled in turn; second, the absence of control, that every man should do as he pleases.[1] To the former he objects that it is based on numerical, not on proportionate justice, that it does not secure properly qualified legislators, and that it may easily degenerate into a tyranny of majorities. To the latter he objects that it is recognized as impossible even by those who profess to uphold it, and he adds that its semblance is as likely to exist under a monarchy as under any other form of government. This, at any rate, is incontestable, that no community of men can exist without regulation, and that there can be no regulation which is not accepted as authoritative. 'Liberty', says Burke, 'must be limited in order to be enjoyed.'[2]

Among the most notable ways in which philosophers have tried to account for this limitation are the theories of the origin of civil society as held, in different forms, by Hobbes, by Spinoza, and by Rousseau. According to Hobbes[3] the primitive state of mankind was one of individual aggression and hostility:

[1] Ἰσότης τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι and τὸ ζῆν ὡς βούλεταί τις. See *Politics*, vi. 2–5.

[2] Speech to the Sheriffs of Bristol.

[3] See *Leviathan*, chs. 13–15: and compare Glaucon's account of the origin of society, *Republic*, ii. 358.

each was impelled solely by his own selfish appetite, each fought for his own hand, there was no security, no industry, no knowledge, no society, man was no better than an ill-equipped animal, and his life was 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short'. In such a state the loss clearly outweighs the gain: if you rob you merely increase your store: if you are robbed it means starvation: if you kill you gratify a momentary impulse, if you are killed it is the end of all things. So finding their condition intolerable men agreed (for purely self-seeking reasons) to forgo some of their natural rights in order to secure the remainder; and so established certain articles of peace or 'Laws of Nature' upon which the fabric of society is founded. Hobbes codifies these into nineteen rules, of which the first is 'to seek peace and ensue it', and the second, 'by all means we can to defend ourselves'. From them the next sixteen are severally derived, and the last, which sums up the whole is, 'Do not that to another which thou wouldest not have done to thyself.' These rights hold good only within the sphere of human relations: there can be no justice between man and God or man and brute. Further, since all men by virtue of their nature have a right to everything that they can acquire, it follows that any curtailment of these rights can only mean their surrender to authoritative arbitration. Now if two men submit their case to an arbiter they are bound to one another and to him, but he is left free—he can make whatever award he chooses. Government, therefore, which is the arbiter of the social state has complete power over the governed, but is in no way responsible to them. All distinctions of right and wrong, virtuous and vicious, meritorious and criminal, depend on its enactment, and are enforced by whatever rewards and punishments it determines to impose. The outcome, in short, of a compact voluntarily made for personal ends, is unquestioning obedience to a supreme and coercive autocracy.

About twenty years after the *Leviathan*, Spinoza published his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*,[1] the sixteenth chapter of which contains in brief his view of the origin of civil institutions. It is clear, he says, that nature as a whole—*absolute considerata*—has a right to everything; and since the whole is but the sum of its component parts, it follows that every object in nature has a right to whatever is congruous with its particular stage of development. Thus it is right for fishes to live in water and for the large ones to eat the little ones. To this rule man is no exception, nor is there in this matter any distinction to be drawn between hero and coward, saint and sinner, wise and fool: each in his way is fulfilling his own nature and following the laws of his own being. Indeed the laws of nature, being determined by God, are universal, and do not admit of any exceptions at all. 'Every man does with the highest natural right those things which follow from the necessity of his own nature.' Further, man is not originally born moral or religious or civil or even rational, but endowed with passions which because they are human have the power of unfolding into these attributes. In the first 'state of nature' these passions are no more than appetite and love of power;[2] which, while man knows no better, have inevitable right to gratification. The state of nature is without law and without religion, and consequently without sin and wrongdoing; 'Where no law is', as St. Paul says, 'there is no transgression.'[3] It is antecedent to civil institutions, but not to social relations: indeed one of such relations is the state of war which it assumes. 'Companions in arms recognize each other's needs', and 'to fight a man is, next to making him your friend, the highest

[1] 1670. His doctrine is further developed in the *Tractatus Politici* which was published posthumously. An excellent commentary on both may be found in *Spinoza's Political and Ethical Philosophy*, by R. A. Duff.

[2] 'Cupiditas et potentia' (*Tract. Theo.-Pol.*, ch. 16).

[3] Romans iv. 15.

compliment you can pay him: it sets him on his mettle and shows that you think him a person of consideration.' Even 'the victor who enslaves the vanquished does not act anti-socially but substitutes one kind of social tie for another'. The *Ius naturae* 'forbids nothing except that which no men desire, . . . it never runs counter to inclination'.[1]

As reason develops man rises from the *ius naturale* to the *ius civile*, and proceeds in virtue of his fuller knowledge to formulate and adopt laws of peace. These laws are merely *placita*, conventions upon which men agree for the maintenance of public utility: they arise out of the necessary laws of humanity, but they do so 'arise' and are therefore dependent on the social and civil conditions of the age. They are 'extrinsic notions', and men differ from time to time as to what constitutes them. But every construction of them is equally right when it is formulated, for it is equally an expression of the stage which humanity has reached at the time. God is not a judge or a legislator, He is not 'just' or 'merciful': all that He does is from necessity of his own nature, and all our moral distinctions are successively created by man as he progresses. And if we ask what is meant by progress, Spinoza answers that it is the *conatus* towards perfection, that is towards the elimination of everything self-contradictory from human nature. The state exists because of the war in our members and the consequent necessity of control and regulation: and the same holds good of all anti-social acts. Theft, for instance, both contravenes and presupposes the law of property, and is therefore punishable as a contradiction in terms.

The state, then, exists because men are partly rational, partly animal. If they were wholly rational they would not need it. Again, it is based on a common understanding of what is best, at the time, for the welfare of the citizen: not on

[1] *Tractatus Politici*, ch. 8.

particular stipulations, for it may be necessary to break these, but on a general agreement as to the *salus populi*. And it is valid only in so far as it is efficient. 'The obligation to obey rulers lasts only so long as they maintain their power': [1] the State that governs by violence alone is right so far as it goes; its error is that like the natural man it does not go far enough. In the same manner the transference of the *iura naturalia* to the *ius civile* may be effected either by spontaneous agreement or by force: the former is the better way, but both within their limits are equally binding.

It may be asked, does not a man in exchanging natural for civil rights forfeit his entire freedom? Spinoza answers that ethically there is no antithesis between freedom and necessity, that the opposite of freedom is compulsion, and the opposite of necessity contingency or chance; that man is free *ex necessitate naturae suae*; and that politically his freedom is only temporarily constrained by law until he has learned the full use of reason. He who wills the right is above conflict with the law; and again more definitely, 'the laws of the state are the freedom of the citizen.'

It will be seen that Spinoza's political position differs in many ways from that of Hobbes, and that in particular he regards the State not as an artificial creation but as a necessary stage in the progress of mankind. But this distinction, striking as it must appear, is really secondary. The essential is that both philosophers assume a pre-civic period, during which men fought for the personal rights which they afterwards transferred to the *ius civile*. The transference was to both inevitable, to both it was effected by human agency. And it matters little that Hobbes regards the pre-civic period with disgust and Spinoza with equanimity: the answer to both alike is that there is no historical evidence of its having existed.

[1] *Tract. Theo.-Polit.* ch. 16.

Rousseau escapes this objection by frankly asserting that he does not intend his philosophy to rest on a historical basis.[1] He is more concerned with ideals than with facts, more with pure political theory than with its application to the course of events: his work is a protest against the evils of a corrupt civilization and a recall to the state of innocence which, against Hobbes and Mandeville, he believes to be natural to mankind.[2] From this innocence man is gradually perverted by unthinking impulse or by ignorance of his true welfare: errors once admitted have a habit of perpetuating themselves: the 'unlimited right of every one to everything' gives way to a clash of private rights and private interests which, if he only knew it, are as noxious to their possessor as to those from whose common stock they are taken; thence follow unfair inequalities with their widening distinctions of wealth and poverty and their inevitable consequence of disease and litigation, until the fetters, insensibly forged, have riveted themselves on the victims of a universal slavery. 'Man was born free', say the opening words of the *Contrat Social*,[3] 'and is everywhere in chains'.

The sole remedy is 'to find a form of association which defends and protects with all the force of the community the person and possessions of each member, and by which each, uniting himself to all, nevertheless obeys himself alone and

[1] *Discours sur l'origine d'inégalité parmi les Hommes* (1753), Introduction: 'Commençons donc par écarter tous les faits, car ils ne touchent point à la question. Il ne faut pas prendre les recherches dans lesquelles on peut entrer sur ce sujet pour des vérités historiques, mais seulement pour des raisonnements hypothétiques et conditionnels plus propres à éclaircir la nature des choses qu'à en montrer la véritable origine.'

[2] See *Discours*, part I, p. 58 (Garnier edition).

[3] *Contrat Social* (1763), Bk. I, ch. i: 'L'homme est né libre et partout il est dans les fers.' The next words are equally significant: 'Tel se croit le maître des autres qui ne laisse pas d'être plus esclave qu'eux.' The 'changement' against which Rousseau is protesting is not a particular tyranny but the whole evil of a corrupt social order.

remains as free as he was before'.[1] This is the problem to which Rousseau offers the social compact as the solution. 'Each of us places in common his own person and all his power under the supreme direction of the general will, and we accept each member as an indivisible part of the whole.'[2] In adopting this compact man loses his natural liberty and 'the unlimited right to everything that he can acquire', and gains in its place civil liberty, and 'the right to hold all that he possesses'. The former has no bounds but those of natural force, the latter is limited by the general will.[3] Any one who resists this shall be constrained to obedience by the whole body politic, 'which means only that we shall force him to be free'.[4]

The sovereign power, therefore, is to be found not in an external arbiter, as Hobbes maintained, but in the general will of the community at large. There is no need of any safeguards or guarantees for 'the body cannot wish to hurt any of its members'.[5] Its will is always right and conduces always to the good of the public. But it does not follow that the actual deliberations of the people at any given moment are sure to be right. 'Man always desires his own good, but he does not always see it clearly: the people can never be corrupted, but it may often be deceived, and this is the sole reason why it sometimes appears to wish for what is evil.'[6] The determining force, therefore, by which the will of the people is 'generalized', is not so much the number of voters as the common interest which unites them.[7] The expression of the general will is

[1] *C. S.* I. vi.

[2] *C. S.* I. vi. 'Chacun de nous met en commun sa personne et toute sa puissance sous la direction suprême de la volonté générale, et nous recevons encore chaque membre comme partie indivisible de tout.'

[3] *C. S.* I. viii. [4] *C. S.* I. vii. [5] *C. S.* I. vii.

[6] *C. S.* II. iii: 'On veut toujours son bien, mais on ne le voit pas toujours: jamais on ne corrompt le peuple, mais souvent on le trompe, et c'est alors seulement qu'il paraît vouloir ce qui est mal.' [7] *C. S.* II. iv.

technically compatible with any form of government, but 'it is much more likely to be ascertained by consulting the people directly than by any indirect approach through persons or parties or organizations'.[1] It is, in fact, most clearly evident in a pure democracy where all individual interests are sunk in the common good, and where no law can be unjust because 'no man can be unjust towards himself'.[2]

It is not a fair criticism of Rousseau's ideal that it is unattainable in practice: that it is like the *Saturnia regna* of Virgil, the golden age to which so many writers have turned wistful eyes.[3] Nor is it just to urge that a contract is valid only for those who make it, and that no generation has a right to bind its successors;[4] for Rousseau regards it not as a stipulation made at some particular point of time, and hence renewable, but as a principle of action which constantly renews itself in the growth of the community. We may legitimately say that he has not sufficiently worked out his conception, or made it square with the variety and complexity of corporate life: that rightful inequalities as well as wrongful tend to be absorbed in this extreme simplification; but we cannot deny that the ideal of justice and of the common good which he puts forward is noble and inspiring. And we may hesitate before we undervalue the practical content of a book which did more than any other spoken or written word to prepare for the French Revolution.

To sum up, liberty of action is clearly, in its due measure, a necessity of the civic life; and it may be defined in two stages, first the absence of any external constraint which may hinder a man from doing service to the community, and second, the permission so to manage his private affairs as to bring himself

[1] *C. S.* II. iii. [2] *C. S.* II. vi. [3] See Tacitus, *Annals*, iii. 15.
[4] This objection appears in Tom Paine's *Rights of Man*, p. 11, and in Godwin's *Political Justice*, III. ii.

to the highest pitch of efficiency which does not encroach upon the similar rights of others. The State has the right to punish anti-social acts because in so doing it is asserting the real will of man against his temporary impulses and aberrations. It does not intervene as an external force, it is the expression of the man's own reason as directed towards the end set up by his permanent self, and as such it is not subversive of liberty, but its fullest embodiment. 'Authority which is guided by rational principles', says Professor McKechnie, 'is the friend of all freedom which is not mere anarchy.'[1]

There remains the more difficult question of the liberty of speech and opinions. Every sane person admits that action in a community must be subject to some restraint, otherwise apart from any question of malevolence, men may blunder into positions where they impede each other's welfare. But some writers, and especially J. S. Mill, contend that liberty of speech should be entirely unrestricted; that to suppress an opinion is 'to claim infallibility', and that the only rational way of meeting it is by fair argument. Certainly we may agree that argument, where it can be used, is not only the most honourable response but the most effective; to refute a false doctrine is remedial, to drive it inward may only aggravate the disease. And we may go farther and readily admit that governments and institutions have often been unduly timorous in prohibiting open discussion: undue coercion is usually a more disgraceful form of flight. But there are moments of crisis in which argument cannot be used; it is no time for debate when the house is on fire, or the enemy battering at the gates, or the multitude out of hand and incapable of listening. In such a case to suppress opinion is not to tyrannize, still less to 'claim infallibility', but to ensure, by legitimate command, that something is done before the opportunity for action has passed away. It is like

[1] *The State and the Individual*, by Professor W. S. McKechnie, p. 24.

the temporary dictatorship at Rome: assumed when the danger is present and laid aside when normal circumstances return. Other things being equal, the largest measure of liberty is the best; the State must have the right of determining when a case should be regarded as exceptional.

And the same is true, though with more careful consideration, when in normal times, opinions are put forward which are plausibly immoral, or subversive of the common good. If all men were wholly rational there should here be no restriction at all; as they grow in the use of reason the restrictions should gradually be relaxed until they disappear. But in the meantime some wise and liberal supervision would seem to be necessary. The trumpeter in Aesop's fable was treated as a combatant: the spoken word, in spite of what Mill says to the contrary, may have all the potency of an act; harm done in a moment of unreasoning impulse may prove to be irreparable. Yet, on the other hand, the very fact of restricting freedom may be in itself a greater evil than the immediate consequence of its misuse; suspicion and discontent are heavy prices to pay for the semblance of tranquillity, and injustice is heaviest of all. We are wise if, in this matter, we follow the counsel of Milton:

'I deny not that it is of the greatest concernment in the Church and Government to have a vigilant eye how books demean themselves as well as men. . . . For books are not absolutely dead things, but do contain a progeny of life in them to be as active as that soul whose progeny they are. . . . I know they are as lively and as vigorously productive as those fabulous dragon's teeth, and being sown up and down may chance to spring up armed men. And yet, on the other hand, unless wariness be used, as good almost kill a man as kill a good book. Who kills a man kills a reasonable creature, God's image: but he who destroys a good book kills Reason itself: kills the image of God, as it were, in the eye.'[1]

[1] *Areopagitica.*

Authority and liberty are like the centripetal and centrifugal forces which keep the earth in its orbit.[1] Take away the centripetal, we should wander into outer darkness and perish of cold: take away the centrifugal, we should fall into the sun and perish of combustion. Our existence depends on a due balance between them: thus and not otherwise can we maintain our appointed course. The life of man as citizen is in like manner a balance between cohesive and independent forces: it is by a true conception of the State that we shall ascertain the befitting relationship between them.

[1] See Sir James Stephen, *Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity*, p. 176

IV

THE STATE AS MEANS

THERE are three ways of describing the relationship between the citizen and the State of which he is a member. The first would lay its chief emphasis on the furtherance of the separate life and character of each man: admitting that he can attain his full development only under civic conditions, it yet holds that it is only as a means to this development that the conditions themselves are of value. This doctrine has often been maintained by writers who take a metaphysical or religious view of life: who emphasize the 'cogito' rather than the 'mundum cognosco', or who regard God and the soul as the two focal points of existence. One of the chief lessons of Christianity, we are told is 'the infinite importance of the individual'. 'Not society but the individual', says Professor McTaggart,[1] 'is the end of social life.' And it is shared in almost equal degree by the larger body of followers who do not pitch the key so high, but are content with the social environment because of the many tangible benefits which they derive from it. The second view which has been more held by administrators and politicians is that the State is in itself the end; that to its welfare, progress, and stability all right action conduces, and that beside it all other aims and ambitions are insignificant. The third regards the relation between man and State as one between persons, bound together by mutual rights and duties, by mutual responsibilities, and by a common purpose. This theory, ridiculed by some critics as unduly imaginative, began to gain ground in the early part of the nineteenth century,

[1] *Hegelianism and Cosmology*, § 195.

though like most philosophic doctrines it may trace its ancestry back to Athens, and is enjoying its full share of attention at the present day.

It will be serviceable at the outset to consider what we mean by the term 'State'; and to begin with what Logic calls a nominal definition. Its numerous meanings—state of health, royal state, States General, United States, state control, and many others—are derived from the Latin *status*, of which the earliest usage seems to have signified little more than position.[1] Cicero takes up the word and gives it a fuller connotation, applying it to the 'present condition' of the republic, or the patres, or the world at large, or whatever else he may happen to be describing. Thence it was adopted by the lawyers, Ulpian, for instance, and the editors of the *Digest*, to mean the sum total of rights and duties which belonged to any class of men as such, irrespective of any particular rights or obligations determined by specific contracts. *Status liberi* meant 'what it is to be a free man', what is entailed by his place among the free citizens of the Empire.[2] In the twelfth century the *Digest*, or nearly all of it, was rediscovered, a great stimulus was given to the study of Roman law, especially at Paris and Bologna, and the word 'status' came back into current use with the significance which had been given it by Justinian. From this, by a very natural outflow of language, it was transferred

[1] Mr. Dowdall, in an interesting letter to *The Times*, 1 June 1922, attacks Bluntschli's doctrine of the 'status reipublicae', and holds that the root ideas are eminence as well as stability, and are therefore primarily applicable to 'superior rank, position, or office of a permanent type', i. e. to the 'status principis'. But it may be argued that neither of these ideas is necessarily primitive. Plautus uses the word in the sense of mere position or attitude, just as Homer possibly and Sophocles certainly use the intransitive tenses of ἵστημι as a stronger and more emphatic form of εἰμί. It is significant that the Latin *stare* has provided Italy, France, and Spain with verbs for 'to be'.

[2] See Hammond's *Bodies Politic and their Governments*, ch. xxi, pp. 280–3.

to the person or corporate body by which the rights and duties were possessed. Mr. Hammond has collected some valuable instances; a bull of Pope Innocent IV (1244), speaking of the 'status et honor' of the English prelates, a letter of Edward II (1339), joining his subjects to himself in the 'status regis suique populi', and so to the resolution of the Parliament that deposed Richard II, in which the three orders of the realm call themselves—not their rights and privileges—the 'status regni'. It is an easy step to Machiavelli's 'stato dei pochi' for an oligarchy, to the 'tiers état' of the French Revolution, and to the present usage which covers any nation or people that is politically organized.

One of the earliest expressions of the view that such an organization existed solely for the benefit of its individual members is Plato's derivation of society from mutual needs and the division of labour. 'The city', he says, 'comes into being because, as a matter of fact, each one of us is not self-sufficient but full of wants.'[1] And because the first necessities of life are food, house, and clothing, the State will begin with a builder, a husbandman, a weaver, 'perhaps a shoemaker'—four or five persons at least. Round these other crafts are aggregated, industrial and mercantile, all on the Platonic principle of one trade to each man; the discovery of money brings with it the hired labourer; presently comes luxury with its attendant evil of discontent; new territory must be acquired and old possessions safeguarded; there will arise a special military caste, for the civilians are sufficiently occupied with their own affairs, and out of this a government, 'brave, gentle, and philosophic', the members of which shall be trained from infancy with special privileges, education, and restrictions, chosen out of the 'golden'

[1] *Republic*, ii. 369. *γίγνεται τοίνυν πόλις, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἕκαστος ἡμῶν οὐκ αὐτάρκης ἀλλὰ πόλλων ἐνδεής.* It will be observed that Socrates puts forward his opinion rather tentatively.

members of every class and set apart in an almost monastic seclusion for their supreme work of direction and control. The basis of the State is, in fact, division of labour, so that each man may best realize his own capacities, and the tasks are assigned partly by the progressive needs of the community and partly by the respective abilities of its constituents.

We have heard a good deal in recent years about the economic interpretation of history: Plato gives us an economic interpretation of the social fabric. There is no need for us to discuss questions of origin: no State ever began on the lines which Plato describes, and no colony was ever founded which did not presuppose some social organization at home: but it may seriously be doubted whether the economic bond, apart from other cohesive force, has ever been sufficient to hold a community together. We may recall a signal instance of its failure in circumstances which seemed to hold out every prospect of its triumphant success. In the year 1890, William Lane, a man of true genius and unimpeachable integrity, issued at Brisbane the manifesto which led to the establishment of New Australia. A convinced socialist, deeply dissatisfied with the existing order, he proposed to found a community of workers, each of whom should begin by contributing 'not less than £60' to the common stock, and should then start life anew as a free and independent citizen of an ideal republic. The scheme set under way with the most favourable of auspices. Lane's manifesto appeared immediately after the great strike of 1889, and at once attracted thousands of eager applicants. The government of Paraguay, still crippled from the effects of a devastating war, welcomed the chance of new colonists, and presented them with nearly six hundred square miles of fertile land, rent free and tax free, together with free transport for themselves and their belongings, and a liberal grant of local autonomy. The money came in so fast that it was soon necessary to form a legal company,

£20,000 in non-interest-bearing shares, to take charge of it. In July 1893 the first party, some 250 picked men and women, set out under Lane's personal leadership, and on 11 October the colony was formally inaugurated in its new home. The story of its disaster is narrated by Dr. Stewart Graham.[1] Before the end of the year a large number of the colonists had seceded; by the spring of 1894 the whole place was in such a state of mutiny that Lane shook off the dust from his feet and founded a new settlement; the most urgent missionary efforts in Australia and England proved unavailing; the numbers steadily decreased; after a few miserable years the Paraguayan Government withdrew its grant and rescued the handful of remaining settlers under the usual terms of colonization. The story is a bad omen for any society, of whatever political colour, which tries to establish itself on a wholly economic basis.

But, Aristotle tells us,[2] the State exists for the happiness of its citizens, and its whole purpose is to secure their welfare. We shall consider later to what extent this statement is true: for the present we may observe that by 'citizens' Aristotle ostensibly means a privileged caste of soldiers and civil servants, and that he excludes even from his 'freeman's agora' the whole class of mechanics, tradesmen, and industrialists. This is the more noteworthy because it was entirely against current Athenian practice. During the Peloponnesian war, which ended only a few years before Aristotle's birth, three successive leaders of the democracy were a tanner, a lampseller, and a lyre-maker, and we are told that the first of these outraged conservative opinion by attending the assembly in his working clothes.[3] To our minds it is as unfair that any section should be exclusively

[1] See his book *Where Socialism Failed.*

[2] *Politics*, ii. 5. 27 and vii. 9. 1–8.

[3] *Constitution of Athens*, ch. 28. Contrast Aristophanes, *Acharnians* 497.

favoured as that any, even the highest, should be sacrificed for the welfare of the whole.[1] Indeed, whatever be the solution at which we ultimately arrive it must clearly transcend this antagonism; otherwise our community will be no community at all, and our city, as the Greek jest had it, 'states, but not a state'.

It follows to discuss in more detail what are the benefits conferred by the social organization: what are the actual gifts which it brings in its hand. That these will not exhaust the relationship between man and State may be already assumed; they are none the less factors in the general result. Sir Henry Jones once asked his Glasgow students to evaluate a sum in book-keeping. 'Put down', he said, 'all the services that you have rendered to your country, and put a good price on them. Then put on the other side all the services which your country has rendered to you, and cast up the account.' We shall go farther than this before we have finished, but it is a problem with which we may well exercise ourselves on the way.

These benefits have commonly been cited under the heads of (1) the maintenance of security, (2) the supply of material needs, (3) the guidance of social legislation, and (4) the influence of language and tradition. There is no State which has not offered them, in a greater or less degree, to its citizens: there are no men, except a few mistaken ascetics[2] amid circumstances of great stress and provocation, who have not availed

[1] See *Republic*, iv. 419–20, and the criticism of this passage in *Politics*, II. v. 27–8.

[2] Both St. Anthony and St. Paul of Thebes seem to have retired to the desert partly from fear of religious persecution, though no doubt in both cases the 'contemptus mundi' was a powerful motive. Such aberrations as that of St. Simeon Stylites can hardly be explained on any ground compatible with sanity. Far different are those who have withdrawn from the world in order to enrich it by research or scholarship. They are citizens of what Seneca calls 'the wider commonwealth'.

themselves of the offer. The first three depend principally upon the State as organized in government; the last upon the wider organization of the communal life.

Security implies protection not only from the invader but from the tyrant, and in both respects Britain has been well served. The last effective invasion of this country was in 1066, the last considerable raid in 1216; for over seven hundred years we have enjoyed a complete immunity from the incursion of foreign armies. Philip II, Louis XIV, Napoleon set no footstep upon our shore; Moltke, according to the legend, 'had six plans for getting forces into England, but none for getting them out again'. Much of this immunity we undoubtedly owe to our geographical position: 'moated', as John of Gaunt says, 'by the silver sea which serves it in the office of a wall': but at least as much is due to the wise policy of defence which through all the centuries has kept the wall manned and patrolled. Nor is our record less notable in domestic matters, though here, from the nature of the case, we have moved more slowly and encountered more frequent obstacles. The weapon of Magna Carta was forged by the barons; it has been used ever since for the protection of the people at large. Sir John Fortescue, writing in the fifteenth century, extols with true patriotic fervour the blessings of English constitutional government.[1]

'For the King of England cannot alter nor change the lawes of his Realme at his pleasure. For why, he governeth his people by power not only royall but also politique. If his power over them were roial only, then he might change the lawes of his realme and charge his subjects with Tallage and other burdens without their consent, and such is the dominion that the civil Lawes purport when they say the Prince his pleasure hath the force of a Law. But from this much differeth the power of

[1] *De Laudibus Legum Angliae*, especially chs. 9 and 35: quoted in Coulton's *Social Life in Britain*, pp. 31 and 36.

a King whose government over his people is politique. For he can neither change Lawes without the consent of his subjects nor yet charge them with strange impositions against their wills. Wherefore his people do franckly and freely enjoy and occupie their own goods, being ruled by such lawes as they themselves desire.'

Again, after describing the oppression of the French by the practice of billeting soldiers upon private houses, and by the system of monopolies and exactions, he continues:

'Within the Realme of England no man sojourneth in an other man's house without the love and leave of the good man of the same house: saving in common Innes where before his departure thence he shall fully satisfie and pay for all his charges there. Neither shall he escape unpunished, whosoever he be, that taketh another man's goods without the good will of the owner thereof. Neither is it unlawful for any man in that Royalme to provide himself of salt and other merchandise or wares at his owne will and pleasure of any man that selleth the same. Howbeit the King, though the owner would say nay, may by his Officers take necessaries for his house at a reasonable price, to bee assessed by the discretion of the Constable of the town: Neverthelesse he is bound by the Lawes to pay therefore, either presently in hand or else at a day to be limited and set by the higher Officers of his house: for by his Lawes hee may take away none of his Subjectes goods without due satisfaction for the same. . . . Wherefore every inhabiter of that Realme useth and enjoyeth, at his pleasure, all the fruites that his land or cattel beareth, with all the profits and commodities which, by his own travell or by the labour of others hee gaineth by lande or by water: not hindered by the injurie or wrong detainement of any manne but that hee shall bee allowed a reasonable recompence.'

It is possible that Sir John Fortescue occasionally describes as a practice what was still to some extent an ideal. Yet even an exaggerated picture must bear recognizable resemblance to the features of the original, and it is sufficiently remarkable that

this account should have been written within ten years after the Wars of the Roses. It is worth recalling that our only other great civil war was waged for the restatement of these principles when the most wrong-headed and most ill-fated of the Stuarts had endeavoured to substitute the 'royall' for the 'politique' method of government.

But there is no need to labour this point. It cannot be doubted that the political organization of Britain has tended, in a conspicuous degree, to the personal security of the citizen: still less that, whatever be our view of our relation to the State, we regard this security as an inalienable right. The conclusion is so familiar that we are in danger of dismissing it as a platitude: we should do better to reflect how much of our citizenship is involved in the fact that we can so regard it.

Next after security may be considered the question of material needs. Here the range is of such width that it is impossible to take more than a few typical examples; indeed there is scarcely a circumstance of our life in which the influence and service of the State are not apparent. Through every country and every age, for example, there has been some public control of barter and commerce. Athens had her clerks of the market,[1] whose duties were to prevent adulteration, and in some cases apparently to limit prices: the Roman Aediles dealt faithfully with short weight and unjust measure:[2] their successors in Greece and Italy have often gone farther and regulated in detail the conditions of sale and profit.[3] In England from the Norman Conquest to Magna Carta the whole regulation of commerce was in the hands of the king, an example of autocracy which

[1] Aristotle, *Constitution of Athens*, ch. 51. See Aristophanes, *Acharnians* 719 et seq.

[2] Italo quod honore supinus
Fregerit eminas Arreti Aedilis iniquas.—Persius, i. 129.

[3] See the chapter on Retail Trade in Zimmern's *Greek Commonwealth*, part iii.

was the more readily tolerated because it was chiefly exercised upon a class of alien immigrants.[1] In the fifteenth century severe penal laws were enacted against forestalling, engrossing, and regrating, the customary methods of the profiteer, and it was not until 1844, in the thick of the Free Trade controversy, that these finally disappeared from the statute book. Even since then they have been kept in reserve rather than abolished, and we have recently seen their reappearance as emergency measures.

But among the material benefits which have been bestowed on man by his social organization none is more valuable than the institution of roads. A ready and safe means of land communication is one of the most important assets of civilized life: not only for the transport of its most elementary appliances, but for the vital and enduring influence which it exercises on the development of character. M. Desmolins, in his book, *Comme la Route a créé le type social*, has not overstated the case: a community can realize itself only by intercourse, and can progress only by exchange of ideas. It may therefore be worth while to give a brief sketch of the history of road-making in this country, and of its bearing on the social life of the people.

In the twelfth century our roads were so bad that the rents of the king's farms, which had been fixed in kind, were replaced by money payments, because transport even to the various local centres had become impossible. The Roman roads had fallen largely into disrepair, and beside them there were few or none. Towns and villages only a few miles apart were almost completely isolated, and in most parts of the kingdom a man's horizon was limited by the cluster of roofs which he could see from his window. Vast tracts of country consisted

[1] For the commercial position of the Jews in England see McKechnie, *Magna Carta*, pp. 265–73.

of forest and moorland, barely accessible and usually unsafe. Nor did the matter as yet come under the cognizance of any effective authority; the roads such as existed were not regarded as public property at all. A well-authenticated story tells us that as late as 1499 an Aylesbury miller who wanted clay for brick-making, dug a pit ten feet by eight in the roadway outside his house, that during the rainy season a belated traveller fell in and was drowned, and that the miller, whose only plea was that he could not find clay elsewhere, received a triumphant and unanimous acquittal.[1] Even at the end of the Tudor period there was no such thing as a light carriage in England: only a few lumbering coaches, which the great families kept for show. The Queen herself always rode on her royal progresses, her baggage carried in six hundred two-wheeled wagons, each of which required six horses.[2]

By the time of the Commonwealth there was some slight improvement; stage-coaches began to run, in spite of gloomy prognostications that they would induce effeminacy and impair the breed of horses; soon the old Oxford jest, 'as impossible as to travel to London in a day', had to be modified, for the journey could be accomplished in twelve hours. In the early years of Charles II it was even possible for a light carriage, drawn by a single horse, to make headway in certain parts of the country, provided that the weather was favourable. And at this point legislation began. An Act of 1663 set up toll-bars along portions of the Great North Road; Acts of 1696–7 required justices of the peace to erect guide-posts and to hold special sessions for road-making; no carter was allowed to drive more than eight horses in a team, and the number was shortly afterwards reduced to six. Still none but the main roads were at all passable in winter, and even these with considerable diffi-

[1] See Mrs. J. R. Green, *Social Life in the Fifteenth Century*, ii. 31.

[2] See Traill's *Social England*, ii. 297.

culty and danger.[1] It is not surprising that during the reign of Queen Anne London was the focus of English civilization, and that to journey beyond Windsor or Twickenham was to go into exile.

In 1724 General George Wade was sent up to the Highlands to receive the submission of those chieftains who were still holding out after the '15. Finding that their fastnesses were wholly inaccessible to regular infantry he detailed 500 of his troops—his 'Highwaymen' as he called them—to open up the country, and within a comparatively few years had constructed 250 miles of serviceable roads, 16 feet wide, and had built 40 bridges. His fame was commemorated by an obelisk on the wayside between Inverness and Inverary which bore the well-known inscription:

> Had you seen but these roads before they were made
> You'd throw up your hands and bless General Wade.

It is one of the ironies of history that after a long and honourable career he was disgraced because, being stationed at Hexham in the '45, he was unable to march his troops in time to join the royal force at Carlisle.

England was indeed slow to follow the Scottish example. In 1730 the King and Queen were overturned in their coach between Kew and Kensington;[2] through many parts of the country the turnpikes proved vexatious and provoked riots; in 1760 an Act had to be passed making it a felony to remove a toll-bar. The Government, in fact, became seriously concerned, and between 1762 and 1774 placed on the statute-book no less than 452 measures for the improvement of road-transport. Most of these were evaded by fraudulent contractors or incompetent engineers, and the net result may be estimated by the

[1] Trail, *Social England*, iv. 491 and 603.
[2] Ibid. v. 149–50.

witness of Arthur Young, who started his English tours in 1767, and published his accounts of them in 1768 and 1771 respectively. There are, he says, only four good roads in the country: one from Salisbury to Romney, one from London to Barnet, one from London to Chelmsford, and 'a bit of new road' in Wales. 'The rest', he adds with his accustomed vigour, 'it were a prostitution of language to call turnpikes.' In the eighteen miles between Preston and Wigan he measured ruts four feet deep and filled with water, and passed three broken-down carts. In Essex the road was often blocked by a string of carts and carriages which it took thirty or forty horses to extricate.[1] Apart from the inconceivable discomfort of this we may well imagine its effect on the life and temper of our rural districts.

The first real reform came from an unexpected quarter. Jack Metcalf, usually known as Blind Jack of Knaresborough, was born in 1717 of very poor parents, who made shift to have him taught the violin because, by accepted custom, that was the only career open to sufferers from his affliction. In his early years he actually subsisted on wayside alms: then little by little he improved his fortunes, became a man of substance, and in 1765 turned his attention to road-making. In this he was at the time extraordinarily successful, and though little or none of his work remains at the present day, both Yorkshire and Lancashire have good reason to hold him in remembrance as a pioneer. He was followed in close succession by the two greatest of British road-makers—Thomas Telford and John Loudon Macadam—who both had the advantage, denied to him, of official Government support.

Telford (1757–1824), son of an Eskdale shepherd, was a stonemason and poet, some of whose early verses gained a word of approbation from Robert Burns. In 1802, being a recognized

[1] Ibid. v. 455–6.

master of his craft, he was set to relay some of the Scottish roads, with the aid of a national subvention. His work cost £200,000, and, as he said, 'advanced the country by more than a century'. In 1814 he was appointed by Parliament to make seventy miles of the road from Glasgow to Carlisle, and shortly afterwards to similar work in North Wales, especially between Shrewsbury and Holyhead. This, which included the Menai Bridge, was the crowning achievement of his life, and earned him his resting-place in Westminster Abbey.

Macadam (1756–1836) was a Scottish landowner of gentle birth,[1] who started his road-making experiments on his family estate of Sauhrie in Ayrshire. In 1815 he was made surveyor-general of the British roads, and began to practise on a large scale the theory of broken stones, 'no piece to weigh more than six ounces', which has brought his name into our common vocabulary. His plan was adopted by Parliament in 1823, and led to his appointment, four years later, as surveyor-general for the whole of Great Britain. In his evidence before the House of Commons he stated that he had travelled over 30,000 miles to carry out his investigations. From his time onward this side-stream of history enters upon a more settled course. We are all familiar with the division of duties between districts, boroughs, and counties; we know so well that we take for granted the network of roadways which have gradually been spread over the whole surface of the land. The story of this growth is illustrative alike of our national slowness and of the success which we ultimately achieve when national support is added to individual enterprise.

The value of social legislation is a matter of dispute between those who hold that all state-intervention, even if necessary,

[1] He belonged to a branch of the McGregors who adopted the name Macadam, apparently as a challenge, when the clan was outlawed by James II of Scotland.

is evil, and those who would bring us back if they could to a Spartan strictness of discipline and control. But these antagonists have, by admission, some common ground, and on this we may erect a row of examples, all taken from the history of our Government for the two decades which followed Lord Grey's Reform Bill. It happened that during that time the combined forces of competition and ignorance were doing their maximum amount of harm; some legislation at least was required to protect the weak and to clear the arena for more equal combatants.

Of these examples the earliest in time is also, perhaps, the most controversial. The Poor Law of 1834 has been so vehemently attacked by Carlyle and Dickens [1] that it may require some hardihood to speak in its defence; and there can be no doubt that some of its provisions were open to criticism and that it was often harshly administered. But its inmost defects were virtues in comparison with the well-meant but disastrous experiments of the practice which it superseded. For some years before its enactment English agriculture had been suffering from the Speenhamland [2] system, devised at a meeting of county justices, which attempted to alleviate the poverty of the labourer by supplementing his wages with doles out of the rates. An additional grant was made for each child, legitimate or illegitimate, and as a concession to the farmers, high rates, but not high wages, were considered in the determination of their rents. The result was, as Huskisson said, to pauperize the entire agricultural population. Rates rose to twenty-one shillings, wages in some districts fell to sixpence a day, villages passed their paupers on from one to another;

[1] *Past and Present*, ch. i. *Oliver Twist*, chs. i, ii. *Our Mutual Friend*, Bk. III, ch. viii.

[2] Speenhamland is a suburb of Newbury. The meeting of justices was held there in 1795.

and it is easy to estimate the effect on character of a scheme which put ostensible premiums upon immorality and subservience. These growing abuses were met by the new Poor Law, which swept away the bestowal of 'rates in aid', which discouraged outdoor relief for all persons under sixty, which established Boards of Guardians throughout the country, and thus not only paved the way for better conceived and better administered legislation in the future, but by reducing the rates materially contributed towards the repeal of the Corn Laws.

Next year the Municipal Corporations Act altered the whole system of town government throughout the kingdom. It made municipal councils elective, widely extended their electoral franchise, and ordained that all their meetings should be public and their proceedings open to report in the press. There can be no doubt that it helped to foster that purity and public spirit which, with hardly an exception, characterize our civic government at the present day.

Third came the Acts for the regulation of labour in mines and factories: measures which started from an earlier date, but encountered more opposition and spread over a longer period of time. The first Factory Act, limiting the hours of child labour to ten a day, was proposed by Michael Sadler in the unreformed parliament, and referred by the House of Commons to a select committee. Before this could report the Reform election came, and Sadler was ousted from his constituency by Macaulay. In the new parliament Lord Ashley, better known by his later title of Lord Shaftesbury, took the matter up and proposed that children under nine should not work in the factories at all, and that no one under eighteen should work more than ten hours a day. These proposals, hotly contested by the manufacturers and the advocates of *laisser-faire*, were referred to a royal commission, which reported strongly in their

favour. The employers' representatives persuaded the House to reduce the age-limit from eighteen to thirteen, whereupon Ashley in despair withdrew his Bill. The Government took charge, and in 1833 enacted that under the age of thirteen the limit of work should be eight hours a day, and between thirteen and eighteen should be sixty-nine hours a week. It was a grudging step, but a step in the right direction. In 1840 Ashley proposed that a Royal Commission be appointed to inquire into the employment of women and children in mines. Two years later it reported, and such was the effect of the report that a Bill was passed in the same session excluding women and children from the mines altogether. After another two years Graham brought forward a measure limiting the work of 'young persons' [1] in factories to twelve hours a day. Ashley proposed ten hours as an amendment, and the House broke into furious conflict. Peel's Government backed Graham with threats of resignation, and were vehemently supported by John Bright. Ashley stuck to his guns and found an invaluable ally in Disraeli, who was at the time planning *Sybil*, and had a far more than sentimental sympathy with the sufferings of the factory-hands. After a long struggle the amendment was carried, and the 'Ten-hours Bill' placed on the statute-book.

Another valuable reform was the establishment of the penny post, mooted by Rowland Hill in 1837, and carried by the Government, against great opposition, in 1840. Before that time the rate of inland postage had varied according to distance from 4*d.* to 1*s.* 8*d.*, and this tax, though partly evaded by smuggling and other devices, had pressed heavily on a large part of the population. For a few years it appeared that the measure would be unsuccessful, and Lord Lichfield, one of the most moderate of its opponents, publicly ridiculed the estimate

[1] Boys from 13 to 18 and girls up to 21. See the *Life of Disraeli* (Monypenny and Buckle), vol. ii, pp. 234–5.

that the Post Office would ultimately carry 480,000,000 letters in a year. In 1921 the number of letters and papers was about 5,500,000,000. When to this is added the vast improvement in rail and motor transport which has developed since the middle of the last century, it will be seen that here also State service has benefited not only the amenities, but we may almost say, the necessities of civilized life. Our public and private business are both largely dependent on correspondence: the circulation of the daily paper places the news of the world at our disposal, and has influenced to an incalculable degree the political opinions of the nation.

The Repeal of the Corn Laws, in 1846, averted a famine, and taught British agriculture to stand once more on its own feet. The importance of the measure must be the reason for the brevity with which it is here mentioned: an adequate account of it would involve the history of prices for half a century. No more beneficent action has ever been taken by any Government; its most capable opponents acquiesced in it as soon as it was done, and had given up all idea of revising it long before they assumed the responsibilities of office.[1]

During these same years were passed three measures which have exercised, in very different fields, a vast influence upon the course of social life. The Cheap Trains Act of 1842 brought railway travel within the reach of the poor; the Bank Charter Act of 1844 limited the issue of paper money, and not only saved the country from a financial crisis, but established some valuable principles of finance; the Health of Towns Bill in 1848, included such important provisions, both sanitary and hygienic, that it has justly been called 'the foundation of State medicine in England'. Assuredly the people of this country had reason to be grateful to a social order which in twenty years had reduced pauperism, regulated the hours of industry, recon-

[1] See the *Life of Disraeli*, vol. iii, p. 196.

stituted municipal government, stabilized the currency, and given to the nation cheaper food, cheaper transport, and more wholesome surroundings.

Lastly it was within this period that our Government began to interest itself in education.[1] Brougham had sent the schoolmaster abroad as early as 1816, but his work had been seriously impaired by religious jealousy and by that dislike of change which all reformers are bound to encounter. However, in 1833 the House of Commons made a humble beginning with an annual grant of £20,000 'towards the erection of schoolhouses in Great Britain'. It is worth noting that Cobbett opposed the measure on the ground that 'it is an attempt to force education on the country—a French, a doctrinaire plan', which means that Guizot had just passed a law establishing a school in every commune in France, but despite these words of fear the Government secured the money, and having no machinery available for distributing it, handed it over to the two societies—National and Lancasterian—by which the education of the poor was mainly conducted. The proposal to set up a Board of Education was in 1838 negatived without a division; but in the next year a committee of the Privy Council was entrusted with the administrative work. Meanwhile the grants were extended, training colleges and trade schools were established, and charters were granted to the Universities of Durham and London and to the three Queen's Colleges in Ireland. In course of time it became necessary to supervise and control some of the existing institutions, and two important landmarks were passed by the Oxford and Cambridge Commission of 1850, and the further organization of school inspectors—Lord John Russell's bashaws as they were called—in 1853.

[1] See Sir Graham Balfour's *Educational Systems of Great Britain and Ireland*, pp. 1–14.

Among the most potent of educative forces may be ranked community of language and the influence of custom and tradition. Nothing more estranges man from man than the mutual ignorance of one another's speech: nothing more restricts the flow of thought than the need of guiding it through the channels of an unfamiliar tongue.[1] We have all felt this in our own experience: we can all sympathize with the British visitor in a French château whose enjoyment was seriously marred by the exigencies of conversation: 'I was obliged to say not what I believed to be true but what I knew the French for.' And on the other side even our coldness and reticence is not proof against the cohesive power of a common vocabulary and of the history which it presupposes. We are all nearer to one another because we have behind us the English of Shakespeare and of the Authorized Version. Even dialect has a singularly intimate and affectionate sound to those who have been brought up within its frontier.

It is worth considering for a moment what civilization has done for language. A hasty and impressionist judgement would probably maintain that as the horizon of the primitive savage is confined to a few elementary experiences, so his speech would be limited to a few words easily articulated, brief in sound, and simple in meaning. Scholars tell us that this is the exact reverse of the truth: language, incredible as it may appear, seems to have begun in complexity and to have gradually undergone a process of detachment and simplification:

[1] John of Trevisa (translation of the *Polychronicon*, ii. 157) complains bitterly of the corruption of English speech by the intermixture of the race with foreigners. Once, he says, there were only three languages in England, north, south, and midland, 'notheles, by commyxtion and melling firste with Danes and afterward with Normans, in manye thynges the contray longage is apayred, and som useth straunge wlafferynge, chiterynge, harrynge, and garrynge grisbayting'. I will not insult the reader with a translation. See Coulton, op. cit., p. 5.

'Take', says Dr. Marett,[1] 'the inhabitants of that cheerless spot, Tierra del Fuego, whose culture is as rude as that of any people on earth. A scholar who tried to put together a dictionary of their language found that he had got to reckon with more than 30,000 words, even after suppressing a large number of forms of lesser importance. And no wonder that the tally mounted up. For the Fuegians had more than 20 words, some containing 4 syllables, to express what to us would be either "he" or "she": then they had two names for the Sun, two for the Moon, and two for the full Moon: each of the last-named containing four syllables and having no element in common.'

Primitive man, in short, speaks less by words than by holophrases, each of which, like a legal document, attempts to cover the whole of the ground entrusted to it. A remarkable instance, which should be inscribed over the door of every conference-room in Europe, is *Mamihlapinatapai*, which means, 'to look at each other hoping that either will offer to do something which both desire but are unwilling to begin.'

The purification of language is by no means yet completed. Many nations are still under the influence of that primitive superstition which assigns sex by the verbal form rather than by the implied meaning, so that it is even now grammatically impossible for a nightingale to lay eggs in France or to sing in Germany; but the most fruitful of all changes in the history of human speech is that by which the numerals have been detached from the holophrase to the separate term. In primaeval days the numerals were very few and were inseparable from the things numbered—there is a good deal of history behind the fact that the first four numerals in Greek and the first three in Latin are declinable adjectives. They did not always put the subject into the plural,[2] but merely qualified it like a word of

[1] Marett, *Anthropology* (Home University Library), pp. 139–40.

[2] There seem to be some queer survivals of this in English, e.g. ten head of cattle, twelve stone six, &c. In Hungarian the numeral does not put the noun into the plural, but it is, of course, detachable.

colour or magnitude. An enormous advance was made when there first dawned the conception of what Plato calls 'philosophic number', that is number considered as a separate reality, apart from the things numbered. 'Nine', for example, need not mean 'nine apples' or 'nine eggs', but nine by itself, a magic entity with properties of its own, intermediate between the phenomena of sense and the ideal world of intelligence.[1] The discovery, wherever it originated, is even more important than that of Algorism and the so-called Arabic numerals;[2] on it the whole of our numerical system depends, and if any one thinks this comparison of little significance, let him try to extract a cube root or solve an equation with no more than the Roman numerals for his medium.

There are thus two ways in which the development of language has conspicuously added to the resources of the personal life: one by intercommunication of the ideas already current, the other by embodying, and sometimes it may be suggesting, the process of new discoveries. In either case it is a notable instance of man's debt to his social environment. It has even been held that the civilization of a people can most surely be traced through its language, and though some anthropologists would question the pre-eminence, none assuredly would disregard the testimony. After all, this is no more than to say that speech is a first condition of human life, and that speech is both fostered and developed by communal intercourse.

The influence of tradition and history, the inheritance of past effort and past organization, will more fitly be discussed in the chapter which deals with our relation to the State as personality. It is enough here to say that although far more subtle than any force which we have here considered, it is in

[1] See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, A. 6. 987 b.

[2] They appear to have been Indian in origin. They were introduced into Europe at the end of the ninth century by Mohammed ben Musa.

the same degree more efficacious. 'Society without the individual', says Mr. F. H. Bradley, 'is not more an abstraction than the individual without society', and this judgement includes not only our present surroundings but the antecedents which have made them what they are. Each of us is, in part, an epitome of his race: a stone of the rock whence we are hewn, a clod of the pit whence we are digged. Not only our bodily substance but our impulses, our emotions, our propensities have been moulded by the growth and are stimulated by the contact of the environment in which we live. And herein, if we admitted no other obligation, our debt to our civic community is paramount.

V

THE STATE AS END

'He loved all men; honoured the good and pitied the infirmities of the wicked. He never sought any public office, yet in turn he administered them all: and he never visited the palace except by command. He loved peace and hated war, relieved men in adversity and assisted them in prosperity, never applied the public money to his own uses but contributed generously to the funds of the commonwealth. He was courteous in office; not a man of great eloquence but prudent and judicious. His demeanour was at first grave, but after a time his conversation became pleasant and humorous. He died rich in money but still more in esteem and veneration, and he left both inheritances to be preserved and augmented by his son.'

This description is like a portrait by Raeburn: it puts us on terms of personal friendship not only with the sitter but with the artist who could so nobly delineate him. And if it be true, as a great English preacher has said, that a man specially notes in others the qualities for which he is himself conspicuous, we might even balance against each other the virtues of the great citizen who is here depicted and those of the historian who has traced his character with such sympathy and insight. The portrait in this case is of Giovanni dei Medici, the painter is Niccolò Machiavelli.[1]

Nor can this tribute to virtue be regarded as isolated or exceptional. It far more nearly represents a settled ideal. 'In all my narratives', says the author, 'I have never desired to cloke or palliate a dishonourable action with an honourable pretence or to traduce a good action though it led to a contrary

[1] *History of Florence*, Bk. IV, ch. iv.

end.'[1] And again, 'Those who have given us the wisest and most judicious scheme of a commonwealth have laid down the conservation of liberty as a necessary fundamental, and according as this is more or less secured the government is likely to be more or less durable.'[2] And again, 'Those princes and commonwealths who would keep their government entire and incorrupt are above all things to have a care of Religion and its ceremonies, and preserve them in due veneration, for in the whole world there is not a greater sign of imminent ruin than when God and His worship are despised.'[3] And again:

'Great men are never discomposed: let Fortune vary as she pleases, let her advance them sometimes and depress them at others, they are in the same settlement and tranquillity, so quiet and firm in their minds that men may see it is not in the power of fortune to disorder them.'[4]

And again:

'A minister should be entirely devoted to the public service and should never address the Prince on his private affairs. It is the part of the Prince to attend to the interests of his ministers.'[5]

Honour, generosity, public spirit, a modest demeanour, a care for liberty and for religion, a firm and stable character, a disinterested devotion to the welfare of prince or commonwealth, these are not the causes of which current opinion would expect to find Machiavelli the advocate. We should more readily associate his name with such maxims as 'The state has a perfect right to govern through force and fear if it cannot do otherwise'; or 'The obligation to obey rulers lasts

[1] Epistle, dedicating the *History of Florence*, to Pope Clement VII.

[2] *Discourses on the First Decade of Livy*, Bk. I, ch. v.

[3] Ibid., Bk. I, ch. xii. Gregorovius (xiii. 5) believes this to be insincere, but not, I think, on sufficient evidence.

[4] *Discourses on the First Decade of Livy*, Bk. III, ch. xxxi.

[5] *The Prince*, ch. 22.

only so long as they maintain their power,' or 'No compact has any validity except from its usefulness,' or 'Only from fear of a greater evil or hope of a greater good can any one sincerely promise that he will give up the right that he has to all things. And only for the same reason will any one keep his promise.' These, we say, are truly Machiavellian: these are the doctrines with which he poisoned the wells of political thought. And then we collect ourselves and remember that the passages which have just been quoted occur not in the works of Machiavelli but in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* of Spinoza.[1]

Macaulay, with his brilliant gift of antithesis, has done little more than accentuate the difficulty. It is not really helpful to say that Boswell, 'if he had not been a great fool would never have been a great writer'. It is no better, and is equally untrue, to say that in Machiavelli's work, 'one sentence is such as a veteran diplomatist would scarcely write in cipher for the direction of his most confidential spy; the next seems to be extracted from a theme composed by an ardent schoolboy on the death of Leonidas.' The statement that the most depraved principles 'are assumed as the fundamental axioms of all political science' is a mere misunderstanding of the issue, and when Macaulay adds, 'We doubt whether it would be possible to find in all the many volumes of his compositions a single expression indicating that dissimulation and treachery had ever struck him as discreditable', the only inference which the reader can draw is that the encyclopaedic memory was for once at fault. There is no finer denunciation of political treachery than the speech which Machiavelli puts into the mouths of the Milanese envoys after the battle of Caravaggio.[2]

One of the curiosities of literature is a supposed letter from Machiavelli to his friend, Zanobio Buondelmonte, defending himself against the charges of atheism and political corrup-

[1] See especially chs. 4 and 16.

[2] *History of Florence*, Bk. VI, ch. ii.

tion.[1] It is an obvious forgery, but it throws some light on the conflict of opinion which placed on the Index volumes that had been published with the Papal imprimatur. The true explanation would seem to be not that Machiavelli was the monster of iniquity which figures in popular caricature, nor even that his character could be arranged in a neat disposition of black and white squares, like a chessboard; but that he was a sincere and whole-hearted patriot who placed the welfare and preservation of his State above everything else on earth, and who advocated his views at a time when the conditions of all the civic life within his purview were those of unintermittent treachery and violence.

He has been far too frequently judged by one work—the *Prince*—and the scope and purpose of this has been commonly misunderstood. To suppose that it was written with the deliberate intent of bringing odium upon the man to whom it is dedicated, is not criticism but hysteria.[2] Those who regard it as a cynical defence of wickedness, with Caesar Borgia for its hero, can hardly have read it with the attention that it deserves. Even the view that it is a study of politics applicable, or intended to be applicable to normal circumstances, sets it in an entirely false perspective, and wrests it unfairly from the context in which it was written. It is, in fact, a treatise on political pathology, on the morbid anatomy of the Italian states at a time when disease was heavy upon them. Some of it is terrible, reminding us of Stevenson's phrase about 'the abhorred dexterity of surgeons'; some is almost despairing, as though it were impossible that a cure should be found. But

[1] It will be found at the end of the Folio English Translation, 2nd edition (1724).

[2] This view is entirely refuted, if it needs refutation, by the most famous of Machiavelli's private letters: that written to Vettori on the 10th December 1513. The relevant portions of it are quoted by Villari, *Machiavelli*, Bk. IV, ch. iv.

throughout the whole is a steady intention to cut away the cancerous evils of the age, to restore the Florentine State to health and vigour, and, as we see in the noble concluding chapter, to set before it a worthier purpose than those of conspiracy and civil strife. But the most immediate object of his desire is the perpetuation and security of the State: that is the end to which all else is to be sacrificed, and he has therefore been here selected to illustrate the doctrine of State supremacy at a time when its chances of realization were most untoward.

Born at Florence in 1469, he entered the city's service in his thirtieth year as secretary to the Council of Ten. He proved himself an excellent administrator, was entrusted with several important tasks, among others, an embassy to Caesar Borgia at Sinigaglia, and remained continuously in office, esteemed and respected by every one, until in 1512 a political upheaval brought the Medici back into power. He was accused, apparently without justification, of conspiracy against the new government, was imprisoned and tortured, and owed his life solely to the intercession of Pope Leo X. On his release he went into retirement near Florence, and devoted the rest of his life to political and historical composition. The *Prince* was written in 1513, apparently as a private memorandum to Lorenzo dei Medici;[1] at any rate it was never published by its author. Then followed the *Discourses on the First Decade of Livy* (1513–19), the *Art of War* (1521), and the *History of Florence* (1525), together with some smaller pieces. He died in 1527, poor and neglected. Among the works here enumerated the *Art of War* alone was published during his lifetime: all the rest were posthumous.

By the beginning of the sixteenth century the old quarrel of Papacy and Empire had come to an end, mainly through the

[1] It was originally intended for Giuliano dei Medici, and on his death was offered to Lorenzo.

submission of two weak emperors, Frederick III and Maximilian. To the investiture dispute which shook Italy for five hundred years, Machiavelli makes only one allusion, a brief and inaccurate sentence in the *History of Florence*. But the settlement of this conflict brought no peace to a distracted country. Italy was the prey of foreign ambitions, the victim of foreign invaders, attacked by Germany, by France, by Spain, defended by mercenaries who were worse than the foes that they were paid to repulse, torn by internal dissension, city against city, faction against faction, family against family, with no rule but oppression, no guidance but intrigue, no ideal but pleasure hastily snatched before it was too late to enjoy. Religion and morality had alike grown powerless: Savonarola lay buried in a felon's grave, and Alexander VI and Julius II were occupants of the papal chair: the hired assassins in Rome carried safe conducts which gave them immunity from arrest; the Tiber boatman who heard the Duke of Gandia's body splash in the river paid no attention 'because he heard the same sound every night'. The Renaissance brought back the pagan appetities but not the pagan virtues, and tempted with all manner of voluptuous delights a people which had thrown off the habit and practice of self-restraint: the maxim of conduct was 'let us eat and drink for we may not live till the morrow', the highest flight of wisdom and prudence was 'make a man your friend or put it out of his power to be your enemy'.

This was the *milieu* in which Machiavelli wrote. As Mr. Burd says in his admirable edition of the *Prince*:

'He had seen Italy overrun by the foreigner, and the daily vicissitudes of town after town: five kings of Naples in three years, the Sforzas at Milan tossed from their throne at the caprice of a barbarian, Venice crushed, Pisa ruined, Florence enslaved. In his own narrow zeal for Florence he had co-operated to destroy Pisa, he had rejoiced in the ruin of Venice.

Gradually the idea was driven home to him that the only hope of safety was to get rid of foreign intervention, and thus establish an independent and ultimately an united nation. Though Italy was a corrupt nation and could not be depended on to reform itself he still thought that it might be restored to its ancient vigour, might "ritornare al segno" if only a man could be found who would not shrink from employing the means which this very corruption rendered necessary.'[1]

There can be no doubt that Machiavelli ideally preferred a republican form of constitution, 'at any rate where the people are on a fair level of economic equality'. The only other alternative which he admitted was the principate: an oligarchy of nobles was, he thought, destructive of the stability which above all else he desired. And it must be remembered that his famous treatise was written for the guidance of a prince who had won his position by force of arms, who was holding it in an age of treachery and violence, and who had already found abundant reason to fear conspiracy. Maintain, he says, the permanence of the State by whatever means you can: they will always be found honourable if the end is secured. 'Salus populi suprema lex.' If you can be both loved and feared so much the better: if not, such is the wickedness and ingratitude of mankind that you will find fear the more potent force.

Of principalities he recognizes four kinds. The first is ecclesiastical, which he salutes with a bow of perhaps ironical submission:

'They are', he says, 'more easy to preserve than to acquire.' They can be won only by special merit or fortune, 'but this species of government is founded on ancient religious institutions which operate so powerfully that a prince may keep possession of them with but little trouble, let his mode of government be what it may. Ecclesiastical princes are the only ones who can possess states and subjects without govern-

[1] Preface to *Il Principe*, p. 26.

ing or defending them; the only ones whose territories nevertheless continue to be respected, and whose subjects never possess either the inclination or the means of shaking off their dominion. In a word they are the happiest and most secure princes in the world. As they are under the superintendence and direction of an Almighty being whose dispensations are beyond our weak understanding it would be presumptuous in us to discuss this point further.' [1]

The second is hereditary: far easier to maintain than those won by conquest:

'It is only necessary for the hereditary prince to conform strictly with the measures established by his predecessors and comply with the exigencies which particular occasions may require. . . . For the natural prince, having no motive for irritating his subjects, it follows of course that he will be more beloved by them than another: hence if some extraordinary vices do not render him odious it is natural that he should engage their affection and regard.'

The third is civil, where the prince is elected either by the nobles or by the people at large. It is much more secure in the latter event, because the nobles are nearer to the throne and are therefore likely to be jealous. Popular election is less provocative of injustice, and less liable to partisan intrigue:

'A prince', says Machiavelli, 'has little to fear from conspiracies if he possesses the affections of his people'; and again, 'let no one quote against me the old proverb that he who trusts the people builds on a sandy foundation. This may be true in the case of a simple citizen opposed to powerful enemies or oppressed by the magistracy, as happened to the Gracchi at Rome or to George Scali at Florence: but a prince who is not deficient in courage and is able to command, who, not dejected by ill-fortune nor deficient in preparations, knows how to preserve order in his state by his own valour and conduct, need

[1] *Il Principe*, ch. xi. This should be compared with the character of Alexander VI as given in ch. xviii.

never repent having laid the foundations of his rule on his people's affections.' [1]

Let him 'sedulously avoid everything that can make him odious or despicable' and his throne will stand four-square.

The fourth, which was the most prevalent at the time, and is therefore treated at the greatest length, is succession by conquest. It is in this part of the treatise that the maxims occur which have most tended to bring the whole into disrepute: it is here that we need most carefully to read and estimate in the light of contemporary events. When, for instance, Machiavelli says that a conquering prince should observe two rules, one to extinguish the family of his precessor, the other to content his new subjects by maintaining their ancient customs and manners,[2] we naturally recoil from the first proposition, which was a matter of common policy at the time, and disregard the second, which was a real and beneficial reform. And again when he recommends that every conquered city which is likely to revolt should be either ruined or colonized, it is worth reflecting which of the two alternatives had, during his life, been more frequently adopted.

Successful conquest may, he held, be attributed in some cases to pre-eminent merit, in others to good fortune, and in others again to crime. As examples of merit he quotes Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, and Theseus, to whom he afterwards adds Hiero of Syracuse, men who were at once great leaders and great administrators, and who left behind them something more durable than the laurels of victory. Then follows a significant passage:

'These men could never have secured an observance of the constitutions which they severally formed except by force of

[1] *Il Principe*, ch. ix.

[2] Ibid., ch. iii. If we were to bring into court every conqueror who has carried this first maxim into practice we might be rather embarrassed in delivering judgement.

arms. This has been proved in our own days by brother Girolamo Savonarola, whose designs were at once frustrated when the multitude ceased to have faith in him, for he was destitute of the means to compel belief or inspire confidence.' [1]

His instance of fortune is Caesar Borgia, for whom, though he does not place him in the first rank, he has evidently a sincere admiration. It is worth while dwelling for a moment on that sinister figure. Caesar Borgia, an acknowledged natural son of the cardinal who afterwards became Alexander VI, was born at Rome in the year 1475. Of his early life we have only a black record of violence and profligacy; on his father's accession to the papacy in 1492 he was made, at the age of sixteen, Archbishop of Valencia, and two years later promoted to the cardinalate. In 1497 his elder brother, the Duke of Gandia, was murdered, possibly at his instigation; [2] in the same year, aged twenty-two, he resigned his orders and began to take part in public affairs. In 1498 he served with great distinction on an embassy to France; on his return he took command of a mixed army, French and Italian, to recover the cities in the Romagna which had revolted from his father's government. For three years he fought with varying fortunes, but ultimately with complete success, and in 1502 was placed in supreme control of the country which he had subdued. The next year he was ruined by the death of Alexander VI and by the accession of his most inveterate enemy, Julius II. He was disgraced and banished to Spain, where he died in great misery at the age of thirty-one. His whole public career lasted for a little over five years, one of which was spent on the French embassy and nearly all the rest in civil war. Villari sums him up by saying that he was unscrupulous and cruel in achieving his conquests,

[1] *Principe*, ch. vi.

[2] This has never been historically established. It was certainly believed at the time, mainly on the principle of Cassius: 'Cui bono fuit?'

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but just and firm in administering them. The cities that he took usually preferred his rule to that of their former governors, and it is significant that after his ruin, when he was lying sick and broken at Rome, with no possible hope of a return to power, his subjects in the Romagna held out for two months against his enemies, and sent him cordial messages of affection and loyalty. Machiavelli evidently regards him as the typically successful leader of a civil war, gives cordial praise to his courage, ability and readiness, and dismisses the moral question with the cautious plea, 'I do not see how in the circumstances he could have done otherwise.'

For his example of crime Machiavelli prudently leaves the history of his own days, though he could have selected the Baglioni of Perugia with perfect propriety, and goes back to the Sicilian tyrant, Agathocles, 'whose intrepidity and firmness were not inferior to those of the greatest warriors, but whose inhumanity, cruelty, and wickedness prevent him from being included in the list of celebrated men.' His qualities, in short, 'were such as may lead to sovereignty, but not to renown'.[1] The distinction between him and Borgia marks quite clearly the general line of Machiavelli's thought. He is revolted by gratuitous cruelty or wickedness; all else he judges by its bearing on the permanance and stability of the State. It is the fickleness and treachery of mankind which make it necessary for a prince sometimes to dissemble: 'if men were good I should not say this.' It is their ingratitude which makes it necessary that 'even a merciful prince should sometimes be careful how he exercises his clemency'; a few stern examples may forestall a greater evil in the future. The preservation of prince and country, these must come before everything: even before the principles of religion and the prohibitions of moral law. Above all let there be a united Italy under a strong leader. Let the

[1] *Il Principe*, ch. viii, abridged.

land be cleansed of civil war, let it be purged of foreigners, and above all of mercenary troops. And so the book ends with an eloquent appeal to Lorenzo that he should come to his country's aid, that he should drive out her enemies, and that he should restore to her those blessings of peace and tranquillity which she had almost forgotten how to enjoy.

We have discussed Machiavelli in some detail because he is the extreme instance of a patriot who regards State welfare as paramount in a time when the whole world is full of conflict and intrigue. Hence no criticism of the *Principe* can be more idle than that which bids us 'cut out and burn half of it and take the rest to our hearts'.[1] The book is an organic unity, pointing to an ideal which seemed at the time wholly unattainable, describing in plain language the obstacles to its fulfilment, and indicating with a cold and scientific precision the means by which they could be removed. We may feel outraged or indignant at some of the maxims: they are but the diagnosis of a prevalent disease, and it is hard to see how any more effective cure could have been then proposed.

It is interesting to compare the *Principe* with another view of the State as end, promulgated in a different age and in widely different circumstances; the doctrine of a famous university professor delivered, at a time of complete security, to the citizens of a great and successful Empire. The comparison is made all the more instructive by the fact that Treitschke[2] ostensibly took Machiavelli for his point of departure. It is the abiding glory of

[1] 'Ure, seca partes aliquas: reliquum collige, ama' (Artaud). See Lord Acton's Introduction to Mr. Burd's edition of the *Principe*, from p. 42 of which this quotation is taken.

[2] Heinrich von Treitschke (1834–96) was born in Dresden: wished to enter the German army, but was disqualified by deafness: taught successively at Leipzig, Freiburg, and Heidelberg: and in 1874 was appointed Professor at Berlin where he held office until his death. The lectures comprised in the two volumes of *Die Politik* were published posthumously

the *Principe*, he says, that it rendered political morality independent of religion, and clearly declared, for the first time, that 'the State is power. . . . This is the truth, and he who is not man enough to look this truth in the face ought to keep his hands off politics'. In the same passage, however, he speaks of the State as 'justifying itself by its employment for the highest moral good of mankind', which clearly means that the State is paramount because it is the most perfect expression of ethical law. It may fairly be said that these two views are not wholly compatible, that the second, indeed, is little more than an apology to render the first more acceptable. It is on the State as power, and especially as enduring power, that Treitschke lays his principal emphasis. Hence he refuses to make a hero out of Caesar Borgia, 'that unchancy man', as he calls him, who left no permanent memorial, and 'whose state was broken up immediately after his death'. 'Nothing lasts, in the ethical world, which has not the power of resistance.' This does not mean any concession to idealist ethics, which Treitschke regards as unreal, if not as hypocritical. 'It is sad to observe', he says, 'that so-called public opinion is always more moral than the deeds of individuals themselves. The average man is ashamed 'to mention publicly, and still more to approve, a thousand acts which he habitually performs.'[1]

Power, then, is the differentia of the State, as faith is of the Church, and love is of the family. The expression of this power

in 1897. The edition here used is that of 1897, supplemented by Mr. Gowans' very useful volume of *Selections from Treitschke*, which is translated from the edition of 1899–1900. See especially Bks. I, IV, and V of that work.

[1] *Die Politik*, i. 90–2, especially 91. It may be observed that Machiavelli estimates Caesar Borgia mainly from the standpoint of promise, Treitschke from that of achievement. Nietzsche, in a particularly wild passage (*Twilight of the Idols*, § 37), declares that Caesar Borgia is his ideal of the Superman.

manifests itself in two ways. First, towards the citizens within its borders:

'On principle it does not ask how the people is disposed, it demands unquestioning obedience, its laws must be kept whether willingly or unwillingly. It is, no doubt, a step in advance where the tacit obedience of the citizen becomes a rational consent, but this consent is not an absolute necessity. Kingdoms have lasted for centuries as powerful and highly developed states without this inward consent on the part of their subjects. The state needs in the first place what is external: its nature is to execute what it chooses. . . . When it can no longer enforce its will it perishes in anarchy.' And again: 'The State is no Academy of Arts: if it neglects its power in favour of the ideal strivings of mankind it renounces its own nature and goes to ruin.' [1]

'No Academy of Arts.' It is as disdainful as an eighteenth-century prelate talking about enthusiasm: indeed it goes further than any Establishment in its disregard of private opinion. Religion, in any true sense of the term, requires before all things an inward adhesion, a personal devotion and love, the family subsists only on a basis of mutual affection and esteem: the State alone says to its members, 'I care nothing for what you think, you must obey.'

A doctrine of such uncompromising absolutism at home is not likely to weaken on questions of foreign policy, and it is even more stridently asserted when Treitschke, in the second place, comes to discuss the relations between the State and its neighbours. These depend upon the two principles of supremacy and independence:

'The essence of the state consists in this, that it can suffer no higher power above itself.' 'The state is power in order that it may maintain itself alongside of other equally inde-

[1] *Die Politik*, i. 32–4. With the first part of this compare Spinoza's *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, ch. iv.

pendent powers. . . . The idea of a world-state is odious: the ideal of one state embracing all mankind is no ideal at all. . . . Peoples, like individuals, are onesided, but in the interplay of this onesidedness the richness of the race as a whole is displayed.' [1]

A plurality of States is therefore necessary to civilization, and one of the inevitable consequences of this plurality is war.

Against this arbitrament of war nothing can stand: all international agreements are scraps of paper which may be repudiated at will:

'The state cannot possibly bind itself for the future; . . . it has no judge above it and will therefore conclude all its treaties with the silent reservation, *rebus sic stantibus*. . . . As sovereign it has the indefeasible right to declare war when it chooses, and consequently to cancel any treaty which it has accepted. . . . It is clear, then, that international treaties which restrict the will of a state are no external barriers but only voluntary limitations of itself. From which it follows that the establishment of an international court of arbitration, as a permanent institution, is incompatible with the nature of the state. Only in questions of minor importance could it think of submitting itself to such a court. . . . To the end of History arms will maintain their rights, and in this fact lies the sacredness of war.' [2]

This at any rate is clear beyond misunderstanding. The State should always enter upon its treaties with a mental

[1] *Die Politik*, i. 72; cf. i. 29. Dante in the *de Monarchia* puts forward the ideal of one universal state under one government.

[2] Ibid., i. 37–9. Two comments may be made. (1) At the London conference of 1871 a Protocol was signed, by all the Plenipotentaries who were present, to the effect that 'No Power may repudiate treaty engagements or modify treaty provisions except with the consent of the contracting parties by mutual agreement.' (2) The first session of the Hague Conference (1899) set up an international tribunal: the second (1907) submitted a list of twenty-four possible matters of dispute which might be referred to it for arbitration. The proposal fell through because the German representatives voted against every one of the twenty-four.

reservation, of the applicability of which it is the sole judge; its liberty and independence are shown by its right to cancel them whenever it pleases. Treitschke, in fact, is applying to State-intercourse the maxim which Pascal translates from Escobar,[1] 'a promise is not binding if when you made it you had no intention of carrying it out. . . . When you say, "I will do this," it is with the mental reservation, "if I do not alter my mind in the meantime." Otherwise you are forfeiting your freedom of action, which no reasonable man would consent to do.' Not that it is always necessary for a politician to be false. On the contrary, Treitschke tells us that a real statesman is truthful in essentials, though he rather weakens the force of this opinion by quoting Frederick the Great as his example.[2] But he holds that any method of diplomacy or violence is justified if it bring about not only the stability of the State—we have left Machiavelli far behind—but its aggrandizement. By this time the ethical ideal with which he started has shrunk to 'si possis recte, si non, quocunque modo'. 'It is a regrettable fact', he says, 'that in the intercourse of nations as in that of individuals we cannot always use perfectly pure means.' And in this he was consistent throughout. When Bismarck mutilated the Ems telegram and so brought about the Franco-Prussian war, Sybel tried to excuse him on the plea that 'abbreviation was not alteration'. Treitschke swept this piece of sophistry on one side. 'No excuse is needed', he said; 'we beat the French.'

War, therefore, is not only inevitable but sacred, the highest means by which the State as Power can maintain itself:

'All the States known to us have arisen through war, . . . it

[1] See the passage '*Des restrictions mentales*' in the ninth of the Provincial Letters. 'He that sweareth unto his neighbour', says the Psalmist, 'and disappointeth him not though it were to his own hindrance.'

[2] *Die Politik*, i. 97.

is the remedy for ailing peoples, the realization of those that are sound. . . . Political idealism demands wars, it is only materialism that condemns them. . . . He who does not delight in them is too cowardly to bear arms for his fatherland. All references to Christianity in this matter are merely perverse. The Bible expressly says that the powers that be shall bear the sword,[1] and it also says, " Greater love hath no man than this that a man lay down his life for his friend." '[2]

All this is on the false assumption that courage and heroism are confined to the battlefield; but Treitschke has a grimmer reason for the faith that is in him. ' The majesty of war is just this, that in it murder is done without passion ',[3] and again in the second volume, ' We have learned to know the moral majesty of war in the very thing that appears brutal to superficial observers. . . . A man must sacrifice not only his life but also the natural and profoundly justified feelings of the human soul: he must yield up his whole ego to a great patriotic idea.'[4] From this he proceeds to an eloquent panegyric on war as the true realization of the national spirit—not the medicine of mankind but its normal food and exercise; and culminates at last in the open belief that ' we must regard it as an institution established by God '.[5] We must remember that this is not restricted to defensive warfare: it is war as such which is the test, the *examen rigorosum*,[6] by which a nation attains its highest rank and builds up its most glorious achievements. As we read his pages we seem to hear the tramp of the German forces marching through Belgium.

For one of the results which inevitably follow from his teaching is a disdain for the little States. This he readily admits. ' It is manifest ', he says, ' that if the State is Power, those

[1] This is a very lamentable misquotation of Romans xiii. 1–7, where St. Paul is maintaining that the civil government ought to be held in respect.

[2] *Die Politik*, i. 72–5. [3] Ibid. i. 77. [4] Ibid. ii. 361.

[5] Ibid. ii. 362–71. [6] Ibid. ii. 361. It is Treitschke's own phrase.

States alone which are powerful will correspond with our idea. Hence the undoubted ludicrousness which underlies the conception of a small State.' [1] And when we ask in bewilderment whether the battlefield is really the sole criterion, whether in fact the small States have not made their contributions to the civilization of the world, he maintains the courage of his opinions to the verge of hardihood. 'The poet and the artist', he rejoins, 'must be able to rest on a great nation. When did a small one ever produce a masterpiece?' [2] With which astonishing question, equally remarkable for its history and for its implications, we may close for the time our survey of the State as Power.

It is not pretended that the excerpts quoted above do justice to the interest and value of a very notable book. But they may seem to show in one way, as those from the *Principe* in another, the dangers that attend any rigorous application of State absolutism. A complete surrender of the individual will is not a wholesome condition of human life: it tends on the one side to mechanism and on the other to tyranny; in either case it cramps the intelligence and impedes all growth and progress. Again, though it be true that to regard the State wholly as means is to encourage personal selfishness, yet to regard it wholly as an end may well encourage in its organs of government a feeling of irresponsibility which is at least equally dangerous. In the course of history the two extremes have often been modified by extraneous causes: State absolutism has commonly appeared under an autocracy, or at least a highly centralized government, where it has been veiled by pageantry or sweetened by generosity and patronage; State utility has been most often

[1] Ibid. i. 43.

[2] 'Wann wäre je ein Meisterwerk in einem kleinen Völkchen erstanden?' (i. 47). He disallows Camoens and Thorwaldsen, but the instances are almost innumerable.

secured where people are most free to co-operate in carrying out their own designs, and hence has brought in its train the opportunities at any rate of united action. But in principle each of the two doctrines is imperfect, and yet at first sight they would appear to be logical contradictions of which, as the text-books tell us, one must be true. It will be the object of the next chapter to inquire whether there is any higher synthesis in which they can find reconciliation.

VI

THE STATE AS PERSONALITY

The last chapter brought us to the comfortless conclusion that the relation between man and State could be expressed by either of two competing formulas which appeared to cover between them the whole field of inquiry, to be alternative to one another, and to be both alike one-sided and untenable. Each, indeed, has at one time or another been maintained: the individualism of Herbert Spencer is not less uncompromising than the State absolutism of Treitschke, but neither is able to 'satisfy a fair mind' or to deal adequately with the facts of human experience.

The difficulty, however, is really of our own making. For historical reasons, into which it is not necessary here to enter, we have offered too docile an allegiance to the logic of exclusion, or rather we have extended its operation to types of judgement with which it is not properly concerned. A vast majority of our statements are ostensibly incomplete, and involve, as correlative, the truth of their apparent opposites. Every negative proposition is in substance affirmative: to say that parallel straight lines will never meet is to say that they will always maintain the same distance apart. The famous triad of Gorgias, 'Nothing exists: if anything exists it cannot be known, if anything can be known the knowledge is incommunicable,' was put forth as the advertisement of a popular teacher: mere denial like mere anarchy is self-contradictory and unmeaning. Again, the proposition 'A is like B', tells us that A has some qualities in common with B; that is, some but not all (otherwise we should be asserting not resemblance but identity); it therefore implies that A and B have qualities

which are not in common, or in other words that 'A is different from B'. Indeed it may be held that all judgements, except those which affirm totality, are subject to the law of thesis and antithesis, and it is only when both these are recognized as of equal validity that we can find a synthesis in which they are mutually absorbed.

The error then would seem to have arisen from our habit of regarding the individual and the State as mutually exclusive entities, or even totalities, which although they could not actually subsist apart from each other, may nevertheless be treated as independent. It disappears if we regard them as interdependent: as constituent elements in a whole which is not merely an aggregate of parts but a self-determined reality. 'The Englishman', said a Japanese envoy at Washington, 'reveres the State because it belongs to him; the Japanese because he belongs to it.' Both are right in so far as both mean the same thing.

When a patriot speaks of 'my country' or a monarch of 'my people', what are we to understand by the word 'my'? In current English usage it has two entirely different meanings: on the material plane it is unilateral and works only in one direction, on the spiritual plane it is bilateral and works equally in both. When I speak of 'my watch' or 'my boots', I mean something which is wholly in my possession, with which I can do as I like, over which my power is absolute, and which has no right or claim against me in return. But when a child says, 'my mother', or a lover, 'my sweetheart', or a husband, 'my wife', the significance is altogether different: on the spiritual level possession means surrender, because both mean union. There has been no higher strain of devotion than that which inspired St. Thomas's cry, 'My Lord and my God'.

This sense of mutual relationship—this 'bilateral my'—can subsist only between persons. 'There can be no justice', says

Aristotle, 'between a man and his chattel'; where no rights are to be claimed there are no duties to incur. This plain issue has sometimes been confused by the postulate that a man may have responsibilities in regard of his own property; the landowner to maintain his park, the connoisseur to enlarge his collection, the violinist to cherish a favourite Stradivarius. In one of Mr. Benson's stories a *nouveau riche* buys a Reynolds for the purpose of creating a sensation by destroying it, and is justly hounded out of society in consequence. But it is clear that these are not real exceptions. The responsibilities arise not from the fact of possession, still less from any right of the thing possessed, but from standards of behaviour set by the community at large and enforced by its own verdict and its own sanction. And this is only possible in so far as both sides of the transaction can be conceived as having personal claims and a personal existence.

The attribution of personality to the State is regarded by many writers as a mere abuse of metaphor. A corporate body, they say, consists of the sum of its members; it is neither more or less: there are not a hundred persons present when a committee of ninety-nine is deliberating. No doubt the doctrine can be stated in so abrupt and crude a fashion as to lay itself open to irony or burlesque: none the less we may venture to hold that in its essential meaning it stands as the basis of all tenable doctrine on the question of relationship between man and State. Socrates, at any rate, had no misgivings on the subject. When Crito visited him in the Athenian prison and tempted him to subvert the laws by escaping from their penalties, his answer was ready and decisive.

'Tell us', he makes them say, 'what complaint you have to make against us which justifies you in attempting to destroy us and the State. In the first place, did we not bring you into existence? Your father married your mother by our aid and

begat you. Say whether you have any objection to urge against those of us who regulate marriage.' None, I should reply. 'Or against those of us who, after birth regulate the nurture and education of children, in which also you were trained. Were not the laws which have the charge of education right in commanding your father to train you in music and gymnastic?' Right, I should reply. 'Well then since you were brought into the world and nurtured and educated by us can you deny that you are our child and slave, as your fathers were before you? And if this is true you are not on equal terms with us, nor can you think that you have a right to do to us what we are doing to you. Would you have any right to strike or revile or do any other evil to your father or your master if you had one, because you have been struck or reviled by him or received some other evil at his hands?—you would not say this? And because we think fit to destroy you, do you think that you have any right to destroy us in return, and your country too, so far as in you lies? Will you, a professor of true virtue, pretend that you are justified in this? Has a philosopher like you failed to discover that our country is more to be valued and higher and holier far than mother or father or any ancestor, and more to be regarded in the eyes of gods and of men of understanding; and to be soothed and gently and reverently entreated when angry, even more than a father, and, if not persuaded, obeyed? And when we are punished by her, whether with imprisonment or stripes, the punishment is to be endured in silence; and if she leads us to wounds or death in battle thither we follow as is right; neither may any one yield or retreat or leave his rank, but whether in battle or in a court of law or in any other place he must do what his city and country order him, or he must change their view of what is just; and if he may do no violence to his father and mother much less may he do violence to his country.' [1]

This indeed goes farther than our contention, as might be expected from the relationship between child and parent in the ancient world; but there can be no doubt that it regards the relationship of individual and community as equally personal.

[1] Plato, *Crito*, 50 D–51 C.

Again, no one will suspect our English statute-book of over-indulgence in image and metaphor, yet it clearly recognizes the attribution of personality to corporate bodies of the most diverse kind, commercial as well as administrative, which can even, in case of conflict, 'act collectively against the interests of any or all of their members'.[1] It is true that one great authority, Sir Frederick Pollock, confines his definition within the bounds of 'a fictitious substance conceived as supporting legal attributes',[2] which is almost as cautious as the 'unknown somewhat' of Locke; but these are far transcended in the paper on 'Moral and Legal Personality' which appears in the third volume of Maitland's *Collected Essays*.

'If', he says, 'the law allows men to form permanently organized groups, those groups will be, for common opinion, right-and-duty bearing units: and if the lawgiver will not openly treat them as such he will misrepresent, or, as the French say, he will "denature" the facts: in other words he will make a mess and call it law.'

And again:

'Group personality is no purely legal phenomenon. The lawgiver may say that it does not exist when as a matter of moral sentiment it does exist. When that happens he incurs the penalty ordained for those who ignorantly or wilfully say the thing that is not.'

Again, in the same essay, he quotes with approval a sentence from Professor Dicey:

'When a body of twenty or two thousand or two hundred thousand men bind themselves together to act in a particular way for some common purpose they create a body which by no fiction of law but by the very nature of things differs from the individuals of whom it is constituted.'

[1] See Maitland, *Collected Essays*, iii. 241. For instances see Renton and Richardson, *Encyclopaedia of the Laws of England*, vol. xi, s.v. 'Personality'.

[2] Pollock, *Contract*, 6th edition, pp. 107 et seq.

And his own summing up is still more significant:

'The march of the progressive societies was from status to contract; . . . there are many to tell us that it is now through contract to something that contract cannot explain, and for which our best, if inadequate, name is the personality of the organized group.' [1]

In the same spirit Erskine writes:

'The institution known to the Romans as an Universitas and to us as a corporation . . . lived on as a separate *persona* in spite of changes in its membership.' [2]

If then the attribution is legally sound when applied to comparatively small and subordinate bodies, we may hold *a fortiori* that it is applicable to that organization of the whole community which we call the State.

The analogy holds good also in a very different field. Many of the early psychologists concentrated the question of human personality upon some one power or activity, treated in isolation, and deriving its prerogative from its supreme place in an accepted scale of natural values. 'The intuitive reason,' says Aristotle, 'seeing that it governs by right of worth, would seem to be the true self of each of us.' [3] The Stoics, for all their materialist conception of the soul, held the same doctrine as to its rational function.[4] In most mediaeval theology the same view prevailed; the soul as a separate distinct entity guiding the bodily affections 'as the sailor the boat'. It is the logical interpretation of Descartes's *Cogito*, and even, if pressed to the end, of Kant's Synthetic unity of apperception, it still reappears

[1] Maitland, *Collected Essays*, vol. iii, p. 306, and pp. 314–15.

[2] Erskine, *Principles of the Laws of Scotland*, Bk. III, p. 410.

[3] Δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο (i.e. ὁ νοῦς) εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον, *Ethics*, x. 7. 9; cf. *De Anima*, iii. 5.

[4] Chrysippus appears to be the first philosopher who called it the *ego*. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐγὼ λέγομεν κατὰ τοῦτο. See Zeller's *Stoics*, p. 203 note.

in more than one psychological treatise of the present day. Many of us who began our philosophical training under T. H. Green will remember the surprise with which we heard him enunciate that will, intellect, and desire were not three separate entities but three manifestations of the same human nature.[1]

An illuminating sidelight is thrown upon this by a passage in Jean Paul Richter's *Selina*, the work which he intended to be his masterpiece, and which he left unfinished at his death.

'We attribute', he says, 'far too small dimensions to the rich empire of our Self if we omit from it the unconscious region which resembles a great dark continent. The world which our memory peoples only reveals in its revolutions a few luminous points at a time, while its immense and teeming mass remains in shade. . . . We daily see the conscious passing into unconsciousness, and take no notice of the bass accompaniment which our fingers continue to play, while our attention is directed to fresh musical effects.'

This comparison of human life to a set of variations on a ground-bass is very characteristic of the philosopher who 'taught Schumann counterpoint'. The figures and melodies which give most obvious interest to the composition may well be founded on a continuum of sound which seldom rises into full consciousness, but which is nevertheless an essential part of the texture. And it may be added that as our knowledge and

[1] Illingworth, who declares the three constituent elements of personality to be 'reason, will, and love' (*Personality Human and Divine*, Lecture 2), quotes a remarkable passage from Alcuin, *De Anima Rationali*, 149 'Anima seu animus est spiritus intellectualis, rationalis, semper in motu, semper vivens, bonae malaeque voluntatis capax. . . . Atque secundum officium operis sui variis nuncupatur nominibus: anima est dum vivificat: dum contemplatur spiritus est: dum sensit sensus est: dum sapit animus est: dum intelligit mens est: dum discernit ratio est: dum consentit voluntas est: dum recordatur memoria est. Non enim haec ita dividuntur in substantia sicut in nominibus: quia haec omnia una est anima.' Cf. Descartes, *Principia*, i. 9.

understanding increase, so in proportion do we become aware of the fundamental notes on the staple of which the harmonies are woven. Surely it is not fantastic to find here a comparison with that growth of political insight which has come to identify the State no longer with a governing caste but with the whole mass of the community. The stone which the builders rejected is becoming the head of the corner, though it is still by cornice and architrave and tracery that the beauty of the architecture is known.

It may well be true, as Christensen asserts, that a preponderating influence in national character comes from 'the sum of the nation's creative individuals and their interaction on the crowd',[1] but it is not true that the character itself is an aggregate —a mere mechanical combination of separable ingredients. It is not even chemical, in the sense in which the whole absorbs or obliterates the characteristics of the various parts; rather it is organic if we can imagine an organism each member of which retains its individual vitality and yet is profoundly affected by its association with others. Even a crowd is far more than the enumeration of its constituents, and no metaphor can be more misleading than that which describes its intelligence as 'the G. C. M. of the intelligences which compose it'.[2] And when we pass from the crowd to the organized associations of men, trades unions, councils, and the like, we are still more conscious of a common personality which is far more than a fiction of the laws or an abstraction of metaphysics. Most of all is this apparent in the nation at large, the character of which has been moulded through generations by the forces of race, of tradition,

[1] Christensen, *Politics and Crowd-Morality*, p. 136.

[2] Christensen, pp. 24–7. The *reductio ad absurdum* of this doctrine is the conclusion of Le Bon (whom he quotes) that a council of savants is no more likely to be wise than a council of simpletons because their distinctive qualities cannot be factors in the total result.

and of experience until it has acquired a life and force of its own. John Bull is a real person, though there has never in the course of history been a single prominent Englishman who resembled him.

An interesting commentary on this is the suggestion that only in terms of State personality can the rule of the majority-vote be defended. It is not, indeed, easily defensible in terms of simple arithmetic; if there were nothing in the case except a clash of individual wills or individual interests we could assuredly not maintain that the right must inevitably rest with the larger number. To say that majority-rule is a 'substitute for combat' is merely to confess that the problem is insoluble: to count heads may be better than to break them, and yet, on this hypothesis, it may be almost equally coercive. But if we can regard the council-room as the expression of a corporate personality, we are at least saved from the comfortless conclusion that might is right. When a man is deliberating on a course of action he balances the motives for and against; he is swayed by competing impulses and divided counsels; when his decision is reached he goes forward with his whole will and purpose, the defeated impulses withstand no longer but are absorbed into the unanimity of the act. So in like manner, if we can ascribe personality to a corporate deliberation, we may there see the same process actively operative. The duty of the minority is to hold out during the debate and then loyally to co-operate as an integral portion of the whole. 'Validior pars', says Marsilius of Padua, 'totam universitatem repraesentet': which means not that it is to dominate by numerical superiority, but that it is to stand for the social organism which speaks through its voice.[1] On this assumption the majority-vote is not a makeshift when unanimity cannot be secured: it is an essential aspect of social deliberation in cases which are difficult or com-

[1] See Hearnshaw, *Democracy at the Crossways*, pp. 324–8.

plex, and in which arguments on both sides need to be stated. Unanimity in debate is not even desirable; the only council which ever attained it was that of the Caliph Omar, who ordained that in case of a divided vote the minority should be put to death: unanimity in action is the ideal condition of effectiveness.

Again there can be no doubt that the human personality grows and develops as the man's experience of life becomes richer, as his synthesis of the world increases in strength and comprehensiveness. Its identity remains the same, being as Illingworth says, 'never a disconnected aggregate but always an organic whole', yet in the process of organization it uses and in a sense vitalizes the primitive impulses that constitute so much of its material. The grown man is far more conscious of it than is the child, the civilized man than is the savage, and not only is the consciousness more vivid, it acquires year by year a fuller and more diverse content. The same is true of the State. That 'dark continent' of which Richter speaks occupies a wide area in primitive history, a considerable area even at the present day: the object of civilization is to bring it more clearly into consciousness and to subject it more firmly to the rational will. And here we may perhaps find the explanation of what is commonly called 'crowd-psychology', that curious and rather disquieting phenomenon which seems to traverse so many maxims of human nature. The crowd as such, we are told, acts usually by impulse, not by reason, and though the impulses may sometimes be just and right, they are often animated by fear or anger or some other ungoverned passion, and are in any case unstable and capable of misdirection. To this it may be answered, first that such examples of unreason are less frequent than is commonly supposed, and that when they occur they are due far more to ignorance of the facts than to false judgement of the principles involved; second,

that they represent the sub-conscious or semi-conscious elements in the social organism which have not yet risen to a full realization of their citizenship. Many of the most disastrous outbreaks in our industrial history have been stimulated by a feeling of loyalty which is good and praiseworthy in itself, but is not controlled by adequate knowledge or by a due sense of proportion. And even in moments of sheer panic and riot, when the crowd is out of hand and does no good at all but only evil, we may note that the same fault is committed and the same penalty incurred as when a man at some personal crisis of fear or passion abrogates for a time the use of his reason and is swept away in a mob of mutinous desires.

We may go a step farther. The personality of the State is not less real than that of each constituent member: it is more real in proportion as its life is fuller and more complete. Its purpose, as Professor McKechnie has said, is 'the perfecting of the whole community', through it alone can be realized 'the higher nature of mankind in all its grandeur and complexity'; [1] its good is that of every man, identical in kind, but both wider and more intense in operation. There is no need for it to fear the rivalry of subordinate organizations, as the French Assembly did in the years of revolution: [2] it can perfectly well absorb them, and even grant them a large measure of autonomy, without impairing its own force or diverting its own purpose. Nor is there any need that it should obliterate or overlay the freedom of individual citizens; we have already seen that the

[1] See McKechnie, *The State and the Individual*, pp. 30, 92, and 98. Hearnshaw, op. cit., pp. 316–17. But the root of the whole matter is to be found in Aristotle, *Ethics*, i. 2. 5–8, which justifies his description of Ethics as *πολιτική τις*.

[2] 'Un État vraiment libre ne doit souffrir dans son sein aucune corporation, pas même celles qui vouées à l'enseignment publique ont bien mérité de la patrie.' French Assembly, 18th August 1792. Quoted by Maitland (who disagrees): op. cit., vol. iii, p. 311.

law does not restrain but liberates, and the personality of the State is interdependent on those of the citizens and involves them in mutual recognition. The relation of child and parent may give only a rough analogy, but it is one which the use of ages has sanctioned, and which political science will not easily supersede.

The most famous exposition of state-personality is to be found in Hegel's *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (1821), and this lecture may fittingly conclude with a brief account of his doctrine. In the first place he clearly emphasizes the rights of the citizen. Personality, which includes moral freedom as well as intelligence, and is at the root of all morality and religion, constitutes the essence of the self-conscious individual, and cannot be alienated. Abstract right, therefore, is violated by

> 'slavery, bondage, incapacity to hold property, or imperfect control of it. The surrender of reason, morality, and religion is exemplified in superstition, in ceding to another the authority and power to determine matters of conscience and religious truth for me, or to prescribe what I shall do, as when I explicitly hire myself to rob or kill or undertake any other crime.' [1]

Man, therefore, as self-conscious, stands four square against any attempt at tyranny or absolutism. And this is a sufficient answer to those critics who have derived from Hegel the abuses of modern German political philosophy.

But mind, to Hegel, is not only self-consciousness: 'the world which is set against it is part of its real being, and the antithesis between mind and object falls within mind itself.' [2] Not only is it true that as Kant said, 'cogito' implies 'mundum cognosco', the two are simply aspects of one activity, and their objects are interdependent. So also in the moral sphere right lies 'in the

[1] Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, § 66. See Professor Reyburn's excellent monograph on 'Hegel's Ethical Theory', p. 136.

[2] See Reyburn, op. cit., p. 165.

universal aspect of the will, in reason which is of one texture in all rational beings'. Or, as Hegel puts it in his own curious phraseology:

'Since in carrying out my end I maintain my subjectivity, I thereby sublate its immediacy and individuality in objectifying it. The external subjectivity which is thus identical with me is the will of others. The field of the existence of the will is now subjectivity, and the will of others is the other existence which I give to my end. The carrying out of my end thus involves the identity of my will with other wills, and it has a positive relation to the will of others.' [1]

It need hardly be added that this doctrine applies only to rational volition—to what Rousseau would call the *volonté générale*—and that it has no validity for individual caprices or appetites. The will, as an earlier philosopher has told us, is moral in proportion as its imperatives are categorical and universal.

The logical principle, therefore, which underlies the moral order is what Hegel calls the Idea, and its categories, according to his well-known logical theory, are unities of opposites.

'The intrinsic will of abstract right is to be found here, but it must not be maintained at the expense of individuality. Moreover, the unity must not be immediate like that of Conscience, but must sustain the distinction of the aspects. The standpoint of the analysis must be behind the crude distinctions of egoism and altruism, of right and duty, of self and others, and at the same time it must preserve whatever truth there is in these divisions.' [2]

Morality, in short, is neither individual nor social, but both in one: it is not a balance of rights and duties, for in the highest analysis these two coincide. It is the self-development

[1] Hegel, op. cit., § 112; Reyburn, p. 166.

[2] Reyburn, pp. 197–8. Note especially the last sentence: and cf. Hegel, op. cit., § 143.

of the social idea, and the individual, without forfeiting or merging his own personality, is ' a heart-beat in its system '.

Now there are three *momenta* through which the social idea works itself out—the family, the civil community, and the State. These are successively treated in the *Grundlinien*, §§ 158–181, §§ 182–256, and §§ 257–end, and each in turn is subjected to a close and searching analysis.

The family is the narrowest articulation of the species, and expresses itself in three categories. The first is marriage, which constitutes ' a higher personality ', and is therefore no mere contract but a real union. It must of course be monogamous : polygamy is a caricature of marriage, because in it ' there is no mutual renunciation of individuality ', and Hegel adds that it bears the same relation to the family as slavery to the rational commonwealth.

' Love ', he says, ' means in general the consciousness of my unity with another, such that I am not isolated from myself but win my self-consciousness only by giving up my explicit being, and thereby know myself as the unity of myself with the other and of the other with me.' [1]

At the same time this unity does not exclude some very wide divergences. Hegel, as a German philosopher of the early nineteenth century, has very definite views about woman's sphere and about the limits of her education. ' Of course ', he says, rather impatiently, ' women may be educated, but they are not made for the higher sciences, for philosophy, and for certain arts which require universality.' He does not exactly sum up her functions in the ' three K's ' of his national proverb, but he evidently regards her as a submissive Hausfrau who keeps the hearth bright and looks to her husband for protection and guidance. Indeed, Hegel even deprecates any close friendship between man and woman before marriage, for

[1] Op. cit., § 158 note.

fear that by its intimacy the essential differences of temperament may be blurred or obliterated. And further, he adds, that as the family is not the highest embodiment of the social idea, so the marriage tie, though in itself sacred, is not therefore indissoluble. 'Its permanence', he holds, 'must be relative and conditioned'; when the condition is irrevocably broken, divorce should be allowed by law and by religion.

The second of these categories is property: held in common, for each member draws on it according to his need, and administered by the head of the household for the good of all. In practice Hegel admits that this family communism will not always obtain; there may be disputes or evasions, or even lapses into what Aristotle calls 'the oligarchic household', which is entirely governed by the power of the purse.[1] But he holds that, rightly organized, the maintenance and distribution of property is one of the essential aspects of family life.

Thirdly comes education, the category through which the social idea passes from the family to the world beyond. The child is not a chattel or a slave; he has rights in virtue of his humanity. On the other hand his personality is not fully developed, therefore his rights must necessarily be circumscribed and imperfect. Hegel sums up the position by saying that the child 'has a right to be educated', and that the parent's duties comprise whatever is necessary to this end—even to the length of compulsion, when compulsion is needed. The two ends of education—the right training of sense and emotion and the development of a full and free personality, are not successive, for they overlap by a wide margin, and the frontier line between them is not easily discernible, but they are logically separable from one another, and in earlier years the proportionate stress

[1] *Ethics*, viii. 10. 5. He notes that in some cases the oligarchic power is exercised by 'heiresses in their own right': *ἐνίοτε δὲ ἄρχουσιν αἱ γύναικες ἐπίκληροι οὖσαι.*

should be laid on the former. 'Plato said well that we should be habituated from our earliest childhood to find our pleasures and pains aright: for this is true education.' [1]

As the children grow up, marry, and form households of their own, the original conception of the family widens into the second of Hegel's *momenta*, the social community.[2] This is not the same as the State, though by superficial observers often mistaken for it: it is rather the 'external State', the community held together by bonds of mutual interest. The individuals who compose it are conceived as interacting on each other, yet each pursuing his own way, and so constituting a system 'apparently by accident and as a by-product'. Yet even in this

'the particular is itself a universal: the very self-interest of the individual is a common principle and casts men into one mould. Sheer particularity, absolute indifference to a common life is impossible in a rational being, and men in order to gain their private ends have to look to the aims and actions of others.' [3]

It is not clear whether Hegel means this as an historical emanation from the family—like the Forsytes in Mr. Galsworthy's *Saga*—or as an aspect of civil society which has not yet become wholly rationalized: in either case he represents it as the outward mechanism of the commonwealth, and has not yet come to consider the inward springs of action. In this form it has three constituents: one the system of needs, on which is built the whole fabric of industrial and economic life; second, the administration of justice through the channels of law and custom; and third, the guilds or corporations which 'mediate between the individual and the abstract judicial

[1] Aristotle, *Ethics*, ii. 3. 2. See Plato, *Laws*, p. 653 A.

[2] *Die bürgerliche Gesellschaft.* See *Grundlinien*, § 182 seq.

[3] Reyburn, op. cit., p. 215. See Hegel, op. cit., § 186 seq., and compare the paper on 'Hegel's Philosophy of Right', by T. C. Sanders in the *Oxford Essays* of 1855, especially p. 238.

decision of the law', which, through trades unions, associations of employers and other bodies, reconcile so far as is possible the external rights of the individual to freedom of action and to the conditions of a fair life.

Last comes the State *proprie dicta*, the State in its internal form, through which and in which the ideal of right is realized. Its relation to its members is twofold:

'On the one hand it is the unity in which they rise. It is not a form forced upon them from without, but the outcome of their own nature and needs. . . . On the other hand it is the principle, the "notion" which is realized by the lesser institutions. It determines their functions, limits their spheres and co-ordinates them in accordance with its own character. The relation is two-sided, integration and differentiation, but the two aspects are complementary.' [1]

The supremacy of the State is therefore no bar to the free development of the individual, but is on the contrary its highest and fullest condition. The service of right is perfect freedom and there can be here no intrinsic opposition between complete autonomy and complete patriotism. As Mr. Sanders says, paraphrasing Hegel: [2]

'The Spirit which sleeps in Nature awakes to activity in the State. We may say that the State is the coming of God into the world, for Reason is here seen as will. We must not look to particular states and point out the defects so as to show how little they realize Reason. We ought rather to recognize the principle that animates them, the sovereignty which makes the worst State still a State, like the principle of life which makes even the cripple alive.'

For as the individual is gradually realized in the State, and rises to a higher personality by continued synthesis with his environment, so the State itself is gradually realized in the spirit of the world. Hegel recognizes four main stages through

[1] Reyburn, p. 233. [2] Op. cit., p. 243.

which this spirit has manifested itself, and looks forward to a fifth in which its ultimate realization will be accomplished.[1] The first of these he illustrates by the early Theocratic or quasi-Theocratic empires of the East. The individual had no independent status, the rule was divine, the legislation based on the sanctions of religion, the history always poetic and usually mythological: the whole life governed by a system of caste and an iron rule of taboos and prohibitions. Next came the Greek, in which the individual was not so much fettered as unconscious. Its distinctive features were the small States, the constant stimulus of war, and the fact that civic life rested upon a slave foundation. Rome attempted to hold the balance between an abstract universality and the extreme personality of the individual, but the balance was overset by the preponderance of the latter, and Rome ended in the exhaustion produced by a long age of civil warfare. Lastly, of existing stages,

'the Spirit thus thrown back on itself found a development in the German nation which carried out the inner life of the soul and reconciled true civic freedom with the self-consciousness of the individual. This, however, took place in a nation of barbarians: and so there stood in opposition to it an intellectual kingdom in which the truth of the Spirit is fully recognized. The ultimate stage is the reconciliation of the two. Then freedom perfectly developed and consciously recognized at once satisfies all the aspirations of the individual and exhibits itself in the external form of a completely organized State. Right is made actual: the conception has passed into the idea.'[2]

The constitution of the State is analysed by Hegel, on his usual tripartite division, into legislation, administration, and sovereignty. In the matter of legislation he is definitely opposed to such democratic devices as the *plébiscite* or the referendum: these, even if they could be of some service at a sudden crisis,

[1] See *Grundlinien*, §§ 354–60.

[2] §§ 359–60. See Sanders, op. cit., p. 249.

are not the highest and truest form of political right. Public opinion, no doubt, must be behind the legislature, 'or rather is in it at its lowest stratum'; but to be effective it must be organized in Parliament. Again, the real basis of popular franchise is not that it is 'an offset against taxes' but that it springs from 'the right of the collective spirit to appear in an externally universal will acting with orderly and express efficacy for the public concern'.[1] Hegel here lays the foundation on which, as we have already seen, Professor Hearnshaw erects his defence of majority-rule. The franchise is not a contract but an inherent right.

Hegel's theory of administration need not here be considered in detail: it was obviously suggested by the conditions which prevailed in Germany during his time, and it is treated by him mechanically as a system of officials; but his conception of the personality of the State again clearly emerges when he comes to deal with sovereignty. The true sovereign, he says, is the life of the social organism, from which no element can be isolated without political death, but at the same time it is, or should be, symbolized by one individual, the monarch. He is, as it were, the State come alive and expressed in one individual will. Not that he can therefore be capricious or arbitrary; he is bound by the constitution simply because his will is rational, and can therefore only be realized in universality. But the continuity of his office is a necessary condition of political growth, and therefore the ideal government is an hereditary constitutional monarchy, not merely as a bulwark against competition, but as the rational conception of the civic ideal.

It remains to consider how Hegel treats the problem of anti-social acts: how if our own personality is realized only in the State he can account for our ever acting against its dictates. And of this, it must be confessed, he gives no more

[1] Hegel, *Encyclopaedia*, § 544. See Reyburn, p. 247.

conclusive an explanation than those which have been offered by other moralists. He is indeed content to enumerate six forms of evil, and to define each without relating them in any way to his central conception. Even of these six the first and the last are not really phenomena of human nature—the whole-hearted sinner who gives himself to evil without stay or misgiving, and whom, because he is whole-hearted, 'hell itself cannot hold': the 'ironic soul', precursor of Nietzsche's superman, who holds that he is beyond the realm of moral distinctions, and above the laws which claim the allegiance of his neighbours. The other four reduce themselves to two well-distinguished types: the timidity or indifference which cares so little for the content of the moral imperative that it will take its judgement from the suggestion of others, and the 'moral sophistry' which convinces itself that an object is right if it is sufficiently desired and can always find at need an accommodating principle to justify its action.[1]

Such in brief is Hegel's theory of the State and of the mutual bonds which subsist between its life and that of the citizen. With the deeper implications we shall deal more fully in the last lecture of this series: meantime we may confess that, despite an uncouth style and an excessive formalism, we have here a noble conception and one which finds attestation in the common experience of mankind. No doctrine of political atomism has ever explained the structure of human society; we are not isolated units in fortuitous concourse, but can co-operate to a common end because we share in a common universal. And it is because this universal is most fully manifested in the State that we can feel towards her a relationship which, not in metaphor but in actual truth, must be described as personal.

[1] Compare the account of the Moral Syllogism in Aristotle, *Ethics*, vii. 3. 'Immorality', said Kant, 'means recognizing the validity of the general law and making an illogical exception in our own case.'

VII

CITIZENSHIP AND EMPIRE

If then we provisionally accept this view of the relationship between the citizen and the State we are confronted with two further problems, both in a sense derivative from the main issue. How, we may ask, is such a relationship affected in cases where the State assumes the duties and responsibilities of an Empire: is it merely widened concentrically or does it in so widening develop new characteristics and new directions of energy? And again, what is or should be the influence exerted upon it by the position of the State in the general comity of nations, or in the larger purview of humanity itself? What, in short, is the precise meaning of that internationalism about which we are hearing so much at the present day? To deal adequately with either of these questions would require not a book but a library; all that can be here attempted is a summary of the main points that are concerned with the inquiry.

Berkeley has observed that we are often emotionally affected by words to which we do not and cannot attach any precise or accurate idea. He instances 'Heresy', which in itself means only choice, but is constantly allowed to beg the question by the simple method of evading it. Something of the same fate has befallen the words Empire and Imperialism. At their utterance our democratic eye instinctively calls up a picture of diadems and purple robes: of tyranny and oppression: of monarchs holding by violence what their ancestors gained by rapine: of the complete diametric negation of all that is meant by liberty and citizenship. It is useless, therefore, to begin any

discussion until this ambiguity has been cleared away. The word Empire means and has meant a great many different things; distinguished from one another by historical periods, by geographical circumstances, and by almost all the conditions which can influence the growth of any political institution. It may range from personal autocracy administered over a sufficiently wide area, to an extended polity covering different countries and irrespective of the form of government maintained by the ruling or central power. The outlying dominions may be mere dependencies or members of a large commonwealth which gives them the maximum of local autonomy. The power may be narrowly concentrated and uniformly displayed, or it may be so varied and diffused as to leave little more than a federation of separate States. For a ready and striking example we need go no farther than the Roman Empire. During its first two centuries it was a provincial organization governed by a republic. Thereafter, despite the apparent constitutionalism of Augustus,[1] it increasingly developed into the personal rule of the Caesars; ultimately it fell, not because it had grown strong at the circumference, but because it had grown rotten at the core.

Apart from analogical uses of the term, in the sense of glorified kingship—uses which may be illustrated by the Empire of Brazil,[2] as well as by the short-lived and disastrous Empire of Mexico[3]—we may recognize four main types of imperial government. The first is personal, usually won by conquest and held by force of arms. We may illustrate from those countries which have been rather unhappily called 'the great silent Empires of the East'—unhappily because Berosus tells us that in his time the court records of Babylon, 'very carefully

[1] 'Non regno tamen neque dictatura sed principis nomine constitutam rempublicam' (Tacitus, *Annals*, i. 9). See also chs. ii and iii of the same book. [2] 1808–89. [3] 1863–7.

preserved', covered a period of 150,000 years;[1] and it is not likely that the neighbouring realms were less eloquent or less imaginative. The few fragments that have come down to us consist chiefly of myths, genealogies, accessions, and warlike achievements, the last always attributed to the personal prowess of the monarch. A parallel instance may be found in the inscriptions[2] translated by the Theban priest to Germanicus:

'That in that region had once dwelt 700,000 men of military age, with which army King Ramses had conquered Libya, Aethiopia, the Medes and Persians, Bactria, Scythia, all the territory of the Syrians, the Armenians, and their neighbours the Cappadocians, and had extended his territory from the Lycian sea to the Euxine.'

Then follows a long list of taxes, tributes, and benevolences, all imposed by the Egyptian Empire and all recorded for his glorification. A still more famous imperial conqueror was Asoka, the third monarch of the Mauryan dynasty, who began extending his frontiers in 272 B. C., and in 259 was crowned Emperor of all India north of the 12th parallel,[3] together with a considerable portion of Baluchistan, Afghanistan, and Kashmir. From his accession to his death in 232 he devoted himself to the civilization of his country, and particularly to the spread of Buddhism. His edicts, some of which are still extant, enjoin

[1] *Ὑπὲρ μυριάδων ιε'*. Berosus (*Βέροσσος* in Cory's edition) was a priest of Belus at Babylon and lived from about 330 to about 250 B. C. The fragments of him which we possess relate mostly to the Creation (Bk. I) and to the Deluge (Bk. II) with Xisuthrus in the place of Noah. A fragment of Megasthenes narrates the rebuilding of Babylon by Nebuchadnezzar and its capture by Cyrus: and there are also a few sporadic allusions in Josephus. The fragments of Berosus and Megasthenes were preserved by Abydenus and Cornelius Polyhistor: the former said to have been a pupil of Aristotle and author of a history of the Assyrians; the latter an encyclopaedic scholar patronized by Sulla. See Cory's edition.

[2] Tacitus, *Annals*, ii. 60.

[3] i.e. north of a line from Cannanore to Pondicherry.

the virtues of charity, piety, and toleration, and are specially notable for establishing hospitals and encouraging the pursuit of medical science. There is no other example in all ancient history of a man who won his position so entirely by the sword and when he had attained it changed so completely to the arts of peace. It is far more remarkable than the acts of renunciation by which kings and statesmen at the height of power have sometimes withdrawn into the seclusion of the cloister.

Alexander the Great does not properly fall under this category, for he died at thirty-two with his career of conquest yet unachieved, but there are two—perhaps three—mediaeval soldiers whose names may well be added to the record. Genghiz Khan (1162–1227) was the son of a petty chieftain, half shepherd and half brigand, who lived on the southern shores of Lake Baikal. Up to the age of forty he had no military fame, and apart from raids no military experience: then he suddenly started on a career of conquest which by the time of his death had set one of his frontiers near Sebastopol and the other near Pekin. It is even said, though not on sound authority, that one of his waves of invasion threatened to submerge Vienna; in any case it was the terror inspired by his armies that for a time added the clause, 'Ab Hungarorum sagittis libera nos Domine' to the customary petitions of the Litany.[1] In the next century, Tamerlane (1336–1405), best known to us from his presentation in Marlowe's 'ten fierce Acts', set out from his native Bokhara, overran in a few years the whole of Central Asia, was proclaimed in 1399 Emperor of Hindustan, and died, at the age of sixty-nine, on an expedition designed for no less a purpose than to add China to his dominions. Marlowe, in a magnificent passage, represents the indomitable old man on his deathbed, poring over his map, striking his finger on the regions which he had

[1] This is sometimes assigned to the invasion of Attila, which cannot be right. The sons of Genghiz Khan penetrated into Austria about 1241.

not found time to invade, and adding in a petulant refrain: 'And shall I die, and this unconquered?' Far inferior to these in dominion, almost their equal in genius, was Stepan Dushan, the Serbian butcher's son, who in the middle of the fourteenth century subdued the whole Balkan peninsula, successfully defied the Sultan Amurath I, and gave his mountaineers an honourable place among the nations of Europe.

Two things strike us as we look back on these ancient records: one the astonishing rapidity with which the conquests were achieved, one the sheer downfall in which they were for the most part speedily obliterated. Two of Alexander's generals, Ptolemy and Seleucus, founded dynasties; the others could not even hold the imperial legacy which he entrusted to them. Khubla Khan, the grandson of Genghiz Khan, for a few years extended and consolidated the Empire of his father; then the Mongol dynasty weakened and was driven out of China. The others left no trace except in historical record. Even Asoka's reforms seem to have been rescinded after his death; Tamerlane's empire collapsed at a touch, Serbia was crushed at Kossovo within three decades of its supremacy. Shelley has summed it all up in his sonnet on Ozymandias—the lonely desert, the broken derelict statue, the fragments scattered in mockery of its former greatness:

> 'And on the pedestal these words appear:
> "My name is Ozymandias, king of kings,
> Look on my works, ye mighty, and despair."
> Nothing beside remains. Round the decay
> Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare,
> The lone and level sands stretch far away.'

The second type of empire may be called the civic, and illustrated by the imperial systems of Athens and Rome. They were widely diverse from each other, they arose from different origins, they were maintained by different methods, they died

of different diseases: but they had one important point in common, that they were centralized each on a capital city, and from this undoubtedly sprang many both of their merits and of their defects.

There was nothing imperial about the birth of the Athenian Empire. When in 479 the Persian forces were finally driven home, it was decided to form a confederacy of Aegean cities and islands as a bulwark against any future invasion. That Athens should be asked to take the lead was only natural: she had shown to best advantage in the late war, she was the chief maritime power, she was represented by Aristides, whose integrity was more than proverbial, whereas the Spartan general, Pausanias, was under grave suspicion of treachery. The confederacy was named not after Athens, but after Delos, the island in which the treasury was situated. The members were equitably assessed in money or ships for the service of the common cause.[1] The Athenian leadership was veiled under the inoffensive name of Hegemony, which implied a comradeship of free and independent partners. Everything was done that human ingenuity could devise to secure a democratic union under the guidance of the most democratic of Greek States.

For a time all went well. The first assessment brought in 460 talents (£106,000), together with contingents of ships from the larger islands; malcontents like Naxos and Thasos were subdued by the combined forces of the whole confederacy; Delian Apollo kept watch over the contributions; the Aegean was patrolled, and the islanders slept peacefully in their beds undisturbed by memories of Datis and Artaphernes. Then followed the inevitable. Naval service was unpopular; allies preoccupied with their fields and vineyards gladly compounded service for money payments; the predominant partner became

[1] See Thucydides, i. 96.

the predominant power; a traditional enmity with Aegina gave her occasion to strengthen herself with impregnable fortifications; in 449 the Samians proposed that the treasury should be transferred for security to Athens, and the last political safeguard of the confederacy was surrendered. By the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War the only free allies were Chios, Lesbos, and Samos; Athens had a fleet of 60 triremes, and the sum of the contributions amounted to 600 talents, three-fifths of her total revenue.

For this constitutional change we cannot hold Athens to blame. Her allies of their own free will placed their power in her hands: she amply fulfilled the object of the confederacy in keeping the Aegean clear of foreign invasion; the supremacy which set her beyond challenge gave her also the responsibilities of protection. Admission to her Empire was granted freely and without coercion, yet Aristophanes tells us that at the zenith of her power she could enumerate no less than one thousand tributary cities.[1] Yet the power easily won was selfishly administered, and there can be no doubt that the grievances of the allies were far more than sentimental. The tribute, now nakedly so called, was revised every five years and continually increased; during the same period the Acropolis was adorned with public buildings at an estimated cost of 6,000 talents. The allies were required to bring their lawsuits to be tried in the Athenian courts, and were made to feel both at home and abroad that they were members of an inferior caste. The revolt of Mitylene in 427 was quelled with a severity which was only saved by the rescinded vote from vindictive and barbarous outrage. If the Melian conference is a fair representation of the facts, it is clear that by the middle of the Peloponnesian War Athenian policy had become merely

[1] *Wasps* 707. The number must surely be exaggerated, but allowing for all reasonable deductions it remains considerable.

tyrannous.[1] And so on the failure of the Sicilian expedition the allies gradually fell away, until in 404 the Athenian Empire received its mortal wound at Aegospotami. It is noticeable that many of the little states, which after the Persian War ranged themselves under the leadership of Athens, clamoured after the Peloponnesian for her total destruction.

In almost complete contrast, yet equally significant, is the history of the Roman provincial empire. It began frankly and openly in conquest; in the successive prizes of victorious wars: Sicily first, won from Carthage, then Sardinia, then others in due course, ten in the time of Sulla, fifteen at the fall of the Republic; governed by curule officers who passed along the rota from their year of service in Rome to their year of rule abroad. At first it worked admirably: indeed it had been in existence for nearly seventy years before a word of complaint was heard from any provincial subject;[2] and the first sign of its degeneration came through the corruption of one of its chief virtues. The Roman political system took public spirit for granted; the idea of pay for State service was as abhorrent to it as the sophist's fee was to an Athenian philosopher, and the provincial governor was therefore sent out to his new capital with plenty of honours but with no salary. It is true that the Senate equipped him with an 'ornatio' determining the number of his officers and voting him a grant for expenses, but it soon appeared that the sum voted was entirely inadequate for any kind of public display. Cato the censor, who in 198 set an example of frugality in his province of Sardinia, is said to have promulgated a law[3] cutting down expenditure to

[1] Thucydides, v. 84–end. See in particular the two sentences which constitute chs. 92 and 93. 'How can it profit', ask the Melians, 'that we should serve you as slaves?' and the Athenians' answer, 'It will profit you, for it will save you from the last extremity, and it will profit us to dominate instead of destroying you.'

[2] 173 B.C. See Livy, xlii. 1.

[3] Perhaps mentioned in Livy, xxxii. 27.

a bare minimum, and what was a minimum to Cato the Censor was starvation allowance to most of his fellow citizens. The provincial taxes, the technical name of which implied that they were the cost of military occupation, went in theory to the coffers of the State,[1] nothing by any legitimate means could come to the pockets of the governor. So this was the upshot, that a Roman official, already partly impoverished by his service at home, was sent to govern for one year a remote and unfamiliar region, with a costly retinue, with autocratic powers, and with an almost complete immunity from supervision. It is not surprising that human nature gradually sank under the strain, and that the provincial governors began to find means first of recuperating and then of overbalancing their outlay. The home government attempted to stem the evil by legislation; in 149 the lex Calpurnia appointed a court to try cases of extortion and to enforce repayment of all sums wrongfully acquired; fifty years later a lex Servilia doubled the penalty, twenty years later a lex Cornelia quadrupled it. But the laws proved unavailing; the courts were bandied between two political parties, both equally venal, and against the combined forces of influence and wealth the rights of the provincials had little chance of a hearing.[2] Indeed it became a sardonic jest that the typical Roman governor went out to make three fortunes: one to recoup himself for his expenditure, one to bribe the judges at his trial for extortion, and one to provide an income for the rest of his life.

[1] In the last century of the Roman Republic the provinces were further oppressed by the practice of farming out the taxes to publicans, who paid a fixed sum for a period of five years and exacted what they could get. Cicero, whose letters contain many allusions to provincial scandals, mentions a Roman wastrel who went about Asia 'with his little sparrow-hawk of a son' collecting imposts to which he was not in the least entitled.

[2] 'Invalido legum auxilio quae vi, ambitu, postremo pecunia turbabantur; (Tacitus, *Annals*, i. 2).

The evil was stemmed at last by the hand of Augustus. He divided the provinces into two classes [1]—imperial and senatorial—keeping under his own control those which were of most political importance or were specially exposed to foreign attack, and entrusting to the Senate those which were easiest of administration. For both alike he ordained that the governors should be paid an adequate salary, and kept in check by a financial officer appointed for the purpose.[2] And that he might not only diminish temptation but provide incentive, he established in the imperial provinces the wise and salutary rule that a governor who showed integrity and capacity might be prolonged indefinitely in his command, and so come to some real and sympathetic understanding of the subjects beneath his sway. The results of this reform were very speedily apparent; in the early years of Tiberius there are but few cases of extortion, and those wholly confined to the senatorial provinces. The Emperor nominated his man for promise and rewarded him for achievement.[3]

Indeed during the first four centuries of the Empire it may be said that the provinces were happier and more prosperous than the home country. The capital was still the city of opportunity: that was inevitable in the nature of things, but it is noticeable how often the opportunities were seized by members of sturdier and more frugal races from abroad. During the first century A. D., for example, many among the leaders of Roman politics and literature were Spaniards: Hyginus, the Emperor Augustus's librarian; Marcus Porcius Latro, the teacher and model of Ovid; the Senecas, Lucan, Mela, Columella, Cassius Rufus the poet, who as Mommsen says, 'was

[1] Egypt, as the granary of the empire, was placed outside the provincial system and put under special regulations. [2] Dio, liii. 15.

[3] For the colonial and imperial policy of Augustus see the *Monumentum Ancyranum* (ed. Peltier), cc. 26–30; Tacitus, *Annals*, i. 11.

placed by contemporary Roman opinion on a level with Virgil and Catullus'; [1] Decianus the philosopher; Valerius Licinianus the orator; Martial; Quintilian; it is a remarkable witness to the strength and virility of the provincial stock. Augustus himself personally supervised the organizations of the Spains and the Gauls, with such success that the people of Tarraco set up an altar to him in his lifetime and petitioned for leave to dedicate another after his death.[2] The Romans, in fact, valued the reality of empire and disregarded its empty show: they spread their influence mainly by a natural process of assimilation, and the home government seems always to have respected local customs and religions where these were not definitely rebellious or unclean.

In the fourth century came the unfortunate division which began with the founding of Constantinople and ended with the formal establishment of the eastern Empire. Thenceforward both systems declined. The west gradually rotted away from the centre; Ammianus Marcellinus gives us a lamentable picture of Roman society as he saw it in A. D. 303: a venal nobility, an idle and dissolute populace, every one dependent on State-aid for his maintenance and even for his pleasures; all energy, manhood, vigour gone, and in its place a listless feeble mob which could only be roused to action by some momentary spasm of cupidity or revenge.[3] No wonder that the Western provinces tended more and more to follow their own way and to grow from their own shoots. The Romans could have no longer a citizen Empire, for they had forgotten

[1] Mommsen, *Provinces of the Roman Empire* (ed. Haverfield), i. 75–7.

[2] See Tacitus, *Annals*, i. 78, and Orelli's note. Tacitus also gives, as one of the reasons for the decline of luxury at Rome, that many provincials found their fortune in the capital, and 'domesticam parsimoniam intulerunt' (*Annals*, iii. 55).

[3] See Ammianus Marcellinus, xiv. 6. The contempt of the soldier for these idle civilians is very strongly marked.

how to be citizens. In the East there sprang up at once a complete autocracy, as despotic and corrupt as any in historical record. Claudian felt deeply and truly the responsibilities of Empire, and his famous lines may almost be regarded as the charter of imperial liberty : [1]

> Haec est in gremium victos quae sola recepit,
> humanumque genus communi nomine fovit,
> matris non dominae ritu : civesque vocavit
> quos domuit, nexuque pio longinqua revinxit :

but Claudian was the sole exception in an evil age. He tells us himself that at the Byzantine court the provinces were openly sold to the highest bidder,[2] and that they were administered with a tyranny and a rapacity which recall the worst abuses of Verres and of the *publicani*. In short, they merely reflected the vices of a central régime of which Gibbon tells us that

'the form of government was a pure and simple monarchy : the name of the Roman Republic, which so long preserved a faint tradition of freedom, was confined to the Latin provinces, and the princes of Constantinople measured their greatness by the servile obedience of their people.' [3]

The third variety of Empire cannot properly be called a type, for it is confined to one example ; the Holy Roman Empire which divided Western Europe between the keys and the sword for so long a period and to so disastrous an effect. Some indications have already been given of the harm which it perpetrated or fostered ; [4] to describe its fortunes in detail would be to diverge too far from the plan of the present lecture, which is to illustrate the main kinds of imperial government

[1] Claudian, *de Cons. Stil.* iii. 150–3.
[2] Claudian, *In Eutropium*, i. 192–209.
[3] Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, iv. 137 (ch. xxxii, beginning).
[4] See chs. i and v, pp. 14–16 and 96–97.

and their relations with the central fact of citizenship. We may therefore pass on at once to the last of our categories—that of a federal Empire—and it will not be taken as undue or narrow Chauvinism if, with the choice of many examples, we select as illustration the rise and progress of our own.[1]

And first it should be observed that the earliest use of the term, as applied to this country, connoted independence rather than domination.[2] When Edgar the Peaceable proclaimed himself 'totius Albionis Imperator' he was issuing a formal defiance to the successors of Charlemagne. When Henry VIII declared that 'this realme of England is an Impire' he was disowning the authority of Pope Clement VII.[3] Indeed this usage survived at least until the middle of the eighteenth century. As late as 1765 we find in Blackstone, 'the legislature uses Empire to assert that the king is sovereign and independent within his dominions'.[4] No doubt both ideas are present in these quotations; the idea of rule as well as the idea of liberty; but it is significant that throughout our constitutional usage the chief stress is laid upon the latter.

The passage from Blackstone is the more important because, at the time when he wrote, our colonial Empire had already seen a century and a half of steady growth and expansion. We may assign its origin to three causes, the operations of which often combined or intermingled, the romance of discovery and adventure, the establishment of trading stations, and the results of successful wars waged against European

[1] For an interesting contrast between British and Roman methods see *Greater Rome and Greater Britain*, by Sir Charles Lucas.

[2] See Hearnshaw, *Democracy and the British Empire*, ch. 1, especially pp. 15–19.

[3] Henry VIII, 24. 12. See D. J. Medley, *Original Illustrations of English Constitutional History*, pp. 219–20.

[4] Blackstone, *Commentaries*, i. 242, abridged. See *Oxford Dictionary*, *s.v.* Empire.

powers who had been first in the field. At the end of the fifteenth century, Alexander VI, moved by the discoveries of Columbus, drew a line across the map of the world and entrusted to Spain all new lands on the western side, and to Portugal all on the eastern.[1] His right to the bestowal of these gifts was left at the time unchallenged, and the two great navigating powers forthwith proceeded to enter upon their inheritance. But when on the accession of Elizabeth the Pope declared her birth illegitimate, disallowed her title to the throne, absolved her subjects from their allegiance, and called upon Spain to subdue her country, our great seamen, already occupied with the discovery of the North-West Passage and the extension of British trade, found their resolutions tempered and sharpened by the claims of defence against a foreign enemy. The same spirit which repelled the Armada, and singed the King of Spain's beard, found its natural vent in attacking many of his outlying dependencies. There was certainly no idea at first of conquering the aboriginal natives. The lands of El Dorado were reputed to be full of gold and jewels; Spain, who had declared agressive war upon us, held them by a title which we regarded as indefensible; our sailors took to the adventure partly in the spirit of knight errants and partly in that of soldiers of fortune. In any case it was not the Indians but the Spaniards who were our enemies, and it is said that many of the regions which had been subjected to Spanish rule hailed Drake on his arrival as a deliverer. For a whole generation our utmost

[1] There was naturally at first a good deal of geographical confusion. The name of 'Indies' for the islands of the West Atlantic and of 'Indian' for the aboriginal inhabitants of America was due to the belief that their countries formed a part of Hindustan, and though within a generation Cortes discovered the Pacific the names were by that time too firmly established to be dislodged. The district of Lachine, near Montreal, is said to owe its name to the fact that its first explorer, La Salle, set out from it on an overland journey to China.

political activity was to 'proclaim Queen Elizabeth sovereign' in some district of California or Guiana and sail home with a cargo of merchandise gained by profitable exchange. There can be no doubt that the exchange was profitable, but it seems to have been voluntary; at any rate our relations with the natives were far more friendly and far more equitable than those of their Spanish conquerors.

The first settled 'colony' was Virginia, established by Raleigh in 1607, mainly for the purpose of tobacco growing. When he planted his settlers the number of Indian natives was about one to the square mile; within a radius of 60 miles from Jamestown there were not more than 5,000 people all told, including women and children. There were, as Bancroft says, occasional quarrels, but no wars between the Indians and the English,[1] and certainly no military aggressions on the part of our countrymen. In 1609 an English ship was wrecked on the Bermudas, and finding them entirely uninhabited, established a settlement there for the cultivation of the sugar-cane. In 1612 the British East India Company set up its first factory at Surat, with the permission of the Grand Mogul,[2] a purely commercial transaction propounded and accepted without any thought of political significance. In 1620 the Pilgrim Fathers, who had been exiled in Holland for twelve years, came across from Leyden and sailed from Southampton to Plymouth Rock. They were still, as Archbishop Laud was careful to inform them, 'in the diocese of London', but they obtained from James I an informal promise that their religious opinions would not be persecuted so long as they kept quiet and did nothing to prejudice Church or State. They chose North America because

[1] See Bancroft, *History of the United States*, i. 136–7.

[2] Portugal, to whom India had been assigned by Alexander VI, was at the time absorbed in Spain and had no independent political existence. The Grand Mogul was the overlord of Surat.

the Dutch, among whom they had been brought up, had recently begun to colonize it—apparently as an episode in their hostility to Spain—had already explored as far as Cape Cod, and had founded the cities of New Amsterdam and Albany. But at this period there was no thought of a separate Dutch colony round Plymouth. 'The Pilgrims', as Bancroft says, 'in planning their settlement evidently esteemed the country unappropriated',[1] and the chief attraction was the prospect of civilized neighbours at no great distance. In their view of the country they were not without justification: the uplands were entirely uncultivated, and the coast was so formidable that they lay at anchor for a week before they could find a landing place. Penn in 1683 colonized the district round Philadelphia, which consisted at the time of 'three or four little cottages',[2] and his personal relations with the surrounding Indian tribes appear to have been always equitable and friendly. The first colony acquired as a direct result of warfare was Jamaica (1655). Ever since the execution of Charles I Madrid had been a centre of Jacobite intrigue, which culminated at last in the open murder of the English Ambassador. As Spain refused to hear any protest or offer any redress, Cromwell invaded her West Indian possessions; the island was captured by Penn and Venables, and has remained ever since in our hands.[3]

Cape Colony, possessed by the Dutch from 1652, was twice occupied by English forces during the Napoleonic wars, and in 1814 was ceded to this country as an equivalent of the sum of £6,000,000, voted by our Government for the defence of

[1] Bancroft, ii. 551. [2] Ibid. 639.

[3] It must be added that Cromwell sent his expedition to the West Indies without formal declaration of war, which is in itself wholly indefensible. But it does not impair the fact that Spain was the aggressor. Penn and Venables, who were sent to conquer Cuba but failed, were committed to the Tower on their return.

Holland against the French. It contained at the time only 120,000 square miles, with a population of about 60,000; since then it has grown by treks, by wars, and sometimes by the punishment of rebellion, to the vast regions which it occupies at the present day. We have seen in our own time an instructive contrast of ideals between the vivid imperialism of Rhodes and the wise policy of conciliation which after the Boer War handed back the republics to their own people and their own government.

The early history of the Australian dominion is more picturesque.[1] Its first mention seems to have been due to a misconception of Marco Polo; it was actually sighted by the Portugese in 1601, and perhaps first visited by a Spanish missionary named Quiros, who went out to Christianize the East Indies. Fired by his description of the islands a couple of worthy Dutch traders, Le Maître and Schoeten, set out in his footsteps, like Sancho after Don Quixote, and proceeded to explore in the interests of commercial expansion. Their report was half-hearted, or at least unconvincing, the Home Government held back from the expense of colonization, and though some of their sailors almost circumnavigated the great continent, it is very doubtful whether even in the north-west they established any lasting settlements. Then came the curious accident by which Great Britain so signally profited. In 1768, Captain Cook was sent, at the instance of the Royal Society, to escort a party of savants who wished to investigate the transit of Venus at Tahiti. On the way back the party separated, and a few eminent men of science, among them Sir Joseph Bankes the botanist, accompanied Cook westward till they came to an unexpected coast and landed. Sir Joseph, finding an entirely

[1] See a most interesting account of the whole story in Professor Arnold Wood's *Discovery of Australia*, especially ch. 14. See also Sanderson, *History of England and the British Empire*, Bk. XVIII, pp. 991–1010.

new set of flora, named the district Botany Bay; Captain Cook, seeing no inhabitants about, annexed it and its surrounding country for King George. The city of Sydney is now an enduring witness of that botanical expedition.

The first Australian colony was planted at Botany Bay in 1787. By the end of the century a great deal of coast exploration had been accomplished, partly by Vancouver, who had been a midshipman under Cook. In 1797 sheep farming began with Captain McArthur's introduction of Merinos from South Africa, and spread so rapidly that it soon became the staple industry of the continent. Through the first half of the nineteenth century the population steadily increased in numbers and prosperity; in 1854 self-government was granted to New South Wales, in 1855 to Victoria, in 1856 to South Australia and Tasmania, in 1859 to Queensland, in 1893 to West Australia; and the charter of independence reached its fulfilment when on 1 January 1901 the six colonies were proclaimed a British colonial federation under the title of the Commonwealth of Australia.

In 1840 New Zealand was ceded by consent to the British Crown, on a guarantee that the Maori inhabitants should retain undisturbed possession of their land. The colony which was at first organized on a system of provinces, later on one of counties and boroughs, received the grant of self-government in 1852. From 1860 to 1880 came the period of the Maori Wars, but since that time the islands have settled into a state of political quiet, and since 1895, of great material prosperity. By a wise provision they have allowed the Maoris a proportionate share in the Lower House of Representatives—four members elected by their own tribesmen as constituents.

This is not to deny that in the development of the British Empire our country has made mistakes, and sometimes worse than mistakes. From such a fate no human institution is

immune, still less one that has grown up with problems so difficult to face and dangers so great to encounter. But we may truly maintain that in its origin and essence our Empire has been neither aggressive nor tyrannous: that it has sprung from honourable beginnings, and that it has made for the happiness and progress of the people whom it includes. Two examples of its history may be here briefly sketched—the Empire of India and the Dominion of Canada.

We have already seen that the first British foothold in India was planted when our East India Company set up a factory at Surat in the year 1612. Other trading stations were established on the same terms and with the same permission at Madras in 1641, and at Calcutta in 1696–1700. Meanwhile in 1661, Bombay came to us as part of the dowry of Catherine of Braganza. Portugal, the papal legatee of India, raised no objection: her one hope of liberation from the Spanish yoke lay in our alliance,[1] and for about half a century the trading stations lived peaceably together. But in 1741 came the War of the Austrian Succession, which set France and England on opposite sides, and the French, who had been acquiring large interests in southern India, made a bold attempt to drive us out of the country. Le Bourdonnais attacked Fort George (Madras) and took it in 1746, and, though he offered to restore it on payment of a large ransom, his successor Dupleix refused to ratify his acts and retained possession. Matters were made worse by the accession at Arcot of a native prince who favoured the French, and by the immediate appointment of Dupleix, by the Nizam, as Governor of South-east India, the Madras Presidency included. Then arose Robert Clive. He had been shipped out to India as an incorrigible scapegrace, had entered the Company's service, which after a year or two of intolerable drudgery he had exchanged for an

[1] From 1596 to 1668 Portugal was under the domination of Spain. She owed her deliverance largely to British help.

ensign's commission; now at the age of twenty-five he set out with eight officers, four of whom were trading servants of the company, 200 Europeans, and 300 Sepoys, captured Arcot with its 100,000 inhabitants, and held it for fifty days till he was relieved by a friendly force. Other victories followed; Dupleix was recalled in disgrace, and in 1748 the campaign terminated by the restoration of the Madras Presidency to Britain under the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. The next challenge came from the north. In 1756 Suraj-ud-Daula, who had been brought up to hate and despise the British, succeeded to the throne of Bengal, Orissa, and Behar, and at once showed his hostility at the Black Hole of Calcutta. Clive set out with 3,000 men, encountered Suraj-ud-Daula with 40,000 at Plassey (1757), defeated him beyond hope of recuperation, imposed on him an indemnity of £3,000,000, and handed over his dominions to our ally, Meer Jaffier. A similar victory at Buxar in 1764 put Oudh at the feet of the Company, and the defeat of Hyder Ali by Sir Eyre Coote gave it Mysore and the Carnatic. It was perfectly natural that these native princes should look upon us with suspicion and sometimes with hostility, Hyder Ali in particular, a military adventurer of something like genius, had a grievance against us for refusing him assistance, and attempted a punitive expedition in return, but the fact remains that the foundations of our Indian Empire were laid by a commercial company[1] with no political aims, no serious Government support, and a handful of troops which it used only for defence or reprisal.

The Regulating Act of Lord North, in 1773, virtually superseded the old East India Company, and placed our Indian possessions under Government control. It set up a supreme court at Calcutta, with a Governor-General and four councillors as chief of the administration; it prepared for its own demise

[1] For the influence of chartered companies in the growth of the British Empire see Sir Charles Lucas, *Greater Rome and Greater Britain*, ch. vi.

by appointing Warren Hastings as the first Governor-General, and giving his inveterate enemy Sir Philip Francis, a seat at the council board. Contentions began almost at once; accusations of tyranny were made and reiterated; in 1784 Pitt's India Act transferred the supreme power to a Board of Control in London; next year Hastings returned to London, and three years later he was on his trial. After a long and vehement conflict between Burke and Lord Ellenborough he was formally acquitted, and spent the last twenty years of his life in retirement, meditating upon the vicissitudes of fortune and the ingratitude of his country.

For the last century and a half, therefore, the British stake in India has been transferred from the control of a chartered company to that of the Home Government. As a result this country has felt more responsible for the good administration of India and has interposed more directly in its affairs. It is inevitable that this should have sometimes brought war and sometimes annexations. A change of dynasty might mean an entirely new policy towards us; a successful pretender might involve the whole countryside in a conflagration, which for the defence of our own crops it was our business to stamp out. Lord Dalhousie, for example, who was Governor-General from 1848 to 1856, aroused a discontent which culminated in the Indian Mutiny, by annexing a large number of native States; some for misgovernment, like Oudh, some for anarchy, like the Punjab after the death of Ranjit Singh, most in order to avoid the civil war which would have been incident on a disputed succession. There is no doubt that the method was often high handed,[1] and Lord Dalhousie's gift of railways and telegraphs was not accepted as compensation. But there are two

[1] Sir Charles Napier, who against orders invaded Scinde, conquered it at Meeanee, and sent back the punning dispatch 'Peccavi', described his exploit as 'a very advantageous, useful, humane piece of rascality'. See Trevelyan, *British History in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 26.

things to be said on the other side, first that the British Government was far better and more equitable than that of the native rulers, and second that their political condition was often a serious menace to our own possessions. The second is indeed the stronger argument of the two. It may be contended that you have no right to make people happy against their will: it cannot be denied that you may put them under some restraint if their freedom of action endangers your own.

At any rate a better and more tranquil era began when in 1858, on the quelling of the Mutiny, Lord Derby's Act vested the whole of our Indian possessions in the Crown, and appointed in London a Secretary of State for India and a permanent Indian Council. The Governor-General was raised to the rank of Viceroy, and furnished with a Council on which Indians are now eligible to sit. The Old East Indian Company survived as a *nominis umbra* until 1874, and then flickered out.

During the last half-century our problems of Indian administration have been mainly twofold. First, the preservation from periodic and overwhelming disaster of regions in which western conditions of health are unknown, and the ostensible standard of poverty is beyond any Western measure. Plague, pestilence, and famine have been formidable enemies; we may still recall to memory the two famines of 1878 and 1896, and though many steps have been taken to prevent or at least alleviate their recurrence, our Government watches with deep anxiety the difficult soil, the uncertainties of drought or tempest, and the growing needs of a teeming population. Second, the training towards responsible citizenship of races which had for centuries been accustomed to live under autocratic rule. The first serious attempts to bring the military caste into closer loyalty were both due to Disraeli: the Royal Titles Bill of 1876 (a far wiser measure than was supposed by its critics at

the time), and the brilliant inspiration which brought the Indian troops to Malta two years later. But as the Empire has grown and developed it has clearly shown itself adapted to a wider and more generous gift of political freedom. The first National Conference was held, under Lord Dufferin, during 1885–6; the Legislative Councils were reconstituted and much liberalized by Lord Lansdowne in 1892; a great extension of self-government was announced in Lord Morley's Budget speech of 1907, and established by the 'Jubilee' proclamation of the next year; in 1912–13 a Royal Commission was appointed to reorganize the Indian Civil Service. The Royal visits have been of incalculable value, as impressing a people very impressionable to Royalty; the Durbar of 1911, in which Delhi was proclaimed the capital, will always remain a landmark of Indian history. The effects of the Great War have been on the whole double-edged. At its outbreak and during its course the Indian troops showed magnificent loyalty and enthusiasm: since its close the general feeling of upheaval and discontent has brought into prominence some of the occult forces of complaint and sedition which, as was inevitable in so large and heterogeneous a multitude, had always existed, and had sometimes been fostered by unsympathetic rule and foolish methods of education.[1] It should be added that some of the more extreme movements have been encouraged either by enemies abroad or by fanatics at home, and that under their influence the nationalism of India, which is in itself as high a motive as it has been in other lands, has tended sometimes to grow Chauvinist and intolerant. I can remember hearing an exchange of views on this subject between an eminent Scottish and an eminent Indian politician. 'You know perfectly well', said the Scot, 'that if you get complete Home Rule no European will have a chance in your

[1] See a remarkable novel called *Siri Ram Revolutionist*, published anonymously in 1913.

courts.' The Indian meditated for a moment. 'After all', he gently replied, 'it is our country.'

Canada, discovered by the Cabots in 1497, was explored by Cartier and Roberval in the sixteenth century, and first settled by Champlain at the beginning of the seventeenth. In 1663, Louis XIV, on the advice of Colbert, made it into a Royal Government, comprising the lower waters of the St. Lawrence with their riparian villages and the townships of Quebec and Montreal. For nearly a hundred years the French remained in undisputed control; during the Wars of the Austrian Succession they began naturally to attack British interests at what seemed to be a vulnerable point, and proceeded to throw a line of forts along the Alleghanies and the Ohio river, which we took as a direct menace to our settlements on the eastern seaboard. A counter-attack was inevitable, and the British forces, defeated at Fort Duquesne in 1755, captured the island of Cape Breton in 1758, and the next year brought the campaign to a successful issue on the heights of Abraham. It is interesting to remember that during the earlier years of the war one of our most valuable officers was a young Virginian, whose name was George Washington. In 1763 Canada and Nova Scotia were ceded to Great Britain by the Treaty of Paris. The whole white population of the St. Lawrence basin amounted at the time to little over 60,000.

During the American War of Independence Sir Guy Carleton,[1] by wise and sympathetic concessions to the French *habitants*, secured the loyalty of Canada to the British Crown, a remarkable feat if one recollects that France was giving material assistance to the United States; but when the revolutionary war succeeded and France became no longer an auxiliary but a principal, a larger grant of freedom appeared to be necessary, and in 1791 Pitt's famous Act divided Canada into the two provinces of

[1] Governor of Canada, 1766–96.

Ontario and Quebec, granted to each representative institutions, though not yet responsible government, and in particular ordained that the latter province, which was preponderatingly French, should retain its ancestral laws and customs. It appointed for each province a governor, an executive council, and an upper and lower house of representatives. Unfortunately it assigned nearly all political power to the first three of these, and based the fourth alone on popular suffrage; meantime 40,000 loyalists from the United States had migrated across the frontier into British territory, and in course of time it appeared that the new constitution, received with acclaim when it was first promulgated, satisfied the needs neither of the French nor of the British population. In 1834 Ontario demanded that the Executive Council should be made responsible to the Lower House, Quebec that the Upper House should be made elective, both expressing in characteristically different tones their desire for a more generous gift of autonomy. Lord John Russell, who believed not only in the omniscience and omnipotence of Downing Street, but also in its omnipresence, refused both demands in 1837. Then Canada revolted, under Louis Papineau, and though this rebellion and another in 1838 were put down, the reports of disaffection grew more and more serious. Even then England suffered from divided counsels. Bentham declared with all his forthright eloquence that colonies were an intolerable burden and expense, and that the sooner we were rid of them the better; Brougham and many of the other Whigs supported him; it was only by a narrow margin that a wiser policy was adopted, and Lord Durham sent out, in May 1838, on his errand of pacification. He was accompanied by two very remarkable men, Charles Buller, who acted as his secretary, and Gibbon Wakefield, who, the year before, had planted the first British settlement in New Zealand, as well as by a large and sumptuous retinue, including a private orchestra, 'intended',

as Sydney Smith said, 'for the purpose of making overtures to the Canadians'.

To praise Lord Durham's report would at this present time be an idle task; it is probably the most important document in the history of Greater Britain. But a few excerpts from it may here be given in order to show how he interpreted the problems before him and in what terms he conceived of their solution.

'I expected', he says, 'to find a contest between a government and a people: I found two nations warring in the bosom of a single State: I found a struggle not of principles but of races; and I perceived that it would be idle to attempt any amelioration of laws or institutions until we could first succeed in terminating the deadly animosity that now separates the inhabitants of Lower Canada into French and English.'

And again:

'They rarely meet at the inns in the cities; the principal hotels are almost exclusively filled with English and with foreign travellers; and the French are for the most part received at each other's houses or at boarding-houses in which they meet with few English.'

And again, later:

'The entire mistrust which the two races have thus learned to conceive of each other's intentions, induces them to put the worst construction on the most innocent conduct: to judge every word, every act, and every intention unfairly: to attribute the most odious designs and reject every overture of kindness or fairness as covering secret designs of treachery and malignity.'

'In such a state of feeling', he continues, 'the course of civil government is hopelessly suspended. No confidence can be felt in the stability of any existing institution, or the security of person and property. It cannot occasion surprise that this state of things should have destroyed the tranquillity and happiness of families, that it should have depreciated the value

of property, and that it should have arrested the improvement and settlement of the country.'

A little later he points a moral specially applicable to Downing Street and the Whig aristocracy.

'It would be performing more than can reasonably be expected from human sagacity if any man or set of men should always decide in an unexceptionable manner on subjects that have their origin thousands of miles from the seat of the Imperial Government where they reside,[1] and of which they have no practical knowledge whatever, and therefore wrong may be often done to individuals or a false view taken of some important political question, that in the end may throw a whole community into difficulty and dissension, not from the absence of the most anxious desire to do right, but from an imperfect knowledge of facts upon which to form an opinion.'

After completing his diagnosis, Lord Durham prescribes a treatment in which diet is of more importance than medicine.

'It needs', he says, 'no change in the principles of government, no invention of a new constitutional theory to supply the remedy which would, in my opinion, completely remove the existing political disorders. It needs but to follow out consistently the principles of the British constitution, and introduce into the government of these great colonies those wise provisions by which alone the working of the representative system can in any country be rendered harmonious and efficient. . . . The responsibility to the United Legislature of all officers of the Government except the Governor and his Secretary should be secured by every means known to the British Constitution. The Governor . . . should be instructed that he must carry on his government by heads of departments in whom the United Legislature shall repose confidence, and that he must look for no support from home in any contest with the Legislature except on points involving strictly Imperial interests.'

[1] The reader will remember that at this time it took at least a month to cross the Atlantic. In the American war of 1812 the battle of New Orleans was fought two weeks after peace had been signed in Europe. The combatants had no means of knowing the facts.

These passages have been quoted at some length because they are far more than a chapter in the history of Canada: their truth is evident in all parts of the Empire, and especially in those parts where racial differences exist; their wisdom is applicable through all vicissitudes of government and all changes of political relation. The fact is that we began by administering our colonies as estates which existed primarily for the benefit of the home land: from that error we were delivered by the American War of Independence. Then we regarded them as expensive encumbrances, or at least as 'fruit', in Turgot's phrase, 'which when they grew ripe would fall off'; that disease might have become chronic but for the surgery of the Canadian revolt. Lord Durham was the first statesman who really understood what is meant by 'thinking Imperially'.

Lord Durham's administration was entirely successful, and he returned to England, after five months, to find himself the object of an almost universal attack. He had 'exceeded his powers' by banishing Papineau with eight of his chief officers to Bermuda, and threatening them with death if they returned. Almost any other governor in his position would have shot them out of hand: indeed his clemency in this matter was a potent force in saving the Dominion, but he had committed a technical offence, and his enemies, headed by Brougham, were hot in pursuit. His ordinances were disallowed: Melbourne, who understood no word of the whole proceeding, lost nerve and deserted him; in the whole Cabinet, Lord John Russell alone was generous enough to be persuaded by his evidence;[1] matters were made worse when in white anger he issued an appeal to the Canadians, who rallied to his support and burned Brougham in effigy at Quebec. This gave the Whigs an obvious and ready pretext: their renewed onslaughts exacerbated his

[1] As on a famous subsequent occasion by the arguments of Sir James Lacaita. See Trevelyan, *Garibaldi and the Making of Italy*, pp. 105–7.

vehement temper; he escaped dismissal only by resigning his position; within a few weeks of his return he had withdrawn into private life, cashiered, disgraced, and broken-hearted. In 1840 he died. But the good that he had done lived after him. In 1840, Russell, as Colonial Secretary, carried a Bill reuniting Upper and Lower Canada with equal representation in the common legislature, and a largely increased amount of local and municipal autonomy. As a tardy form of apology or recognition it was decided to send out Lord Durham's son-in-law (afterwards famous in India under the title of Lord Elgin) as the first Governor-General of the new régime. At first his rule was obeyed with universal peace and satisfaction; then, as might be expected, arose dissensions between the French and English settlers; there were riots and outrages, particularly at Montreal—the growing-pains of an adolescent State—and it required all the fairness and good temper of the Governor to deal, during his fourteen years, with the problems and difficulties of a dual administration.

The next great landmark was passed in 1867,[1] when the Dominion of Canada Act united the four provinces of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, and made provision for the admission at any subsequent period of other provinces or territories of British North America. It is true that Nova Scotia fearing, like Steele, to be 'undone by her auxiliary', protested against the Union in 1868; she received no support from Great Britain, and very soon returned to the federation.

[1] 'Five years before the Alabama Settlement the creation of the Dominion of Canada by the statesmanship of the Canadian Sir John Macdonald had brought into being a United States of British N. America. . . . Under the new constitution the Dominion included all the Provinces, except Newfoundland, of the Atlantic and Pacific sea-boards, together with Upper and Lower Canada, once mere distinct units but now linked in a common federation' (Trevelyan, *British History in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 337).

Manitoba followed in 1870, British Columbia in 1871, Prince Edward Island in 1873; after the Red River War of 1878, provoked by the rebellion of a French half-caste named Riel, all British territories, with the exception of Newfoundland, were formally annexed to the Dominion, and the extension, vague and indeterminate at first, was particularized in 1905 by the adoption of Saskatchewan and Alberta.

Meanwhile many important measures of consolidation had been passed. In 1878 Sir John Macdonald, the greatest of all Canadian statesmen, established a system of protection which was chiefly designed as a bulwark against the American competitor; in 1896, Sir Wilfrid Laurier strengthened the Cabinet by drawing into it, from provincial politics, the premiers of Ontario, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia. The policy of which these acts are typical has prevailed up to the present day, and the government of Canada is now as firm and as self-contained as that of any part of the British Empire. In its representative system it has taken Quebec as the standard of value: the Upper House has 24 members from Quebec, 24 from Ontario, and a proportionate number from the other provinces; the Lower House has 65 representatives of Quebec as a fixed basis, and allows to the other provinces as many in proportion to 65 as their population stands compared with that of Quebec at the last decennial census. The total number was originally 196; in 1908 it was 218; now it is 235, a striking testimony to the growth of immigration into the newer land.

In the third quarter of the eighteenth century we lost the American colonies, and deserved to lose them, through sheer clumsy misunderstanding of their needs and of their character. In the first quarter of the twentieth we saw welded into a common cause the whole power and resource of the British Empire. Between these two periods we have learned a good many lessons, and chief among them that the claims of citizen-

ship hang on an equal balance: that the freedom which we boast for ourselves we must be willing to impart as well as to enjoy. The interests of the Empire as a whole are paramount, and no part, neither our own nor another, has a right to check or impair the free development of the rest. Its varied constituents cover nearly a quarter of the globe and extend over a wide range of political culture and civilization; of this it is necessary to take account, for here as elsewhere, a just equality is proportionate, not absolute. Many portions of Greater Britain have already won their title to self-government, others are still in need of guidance and direction, but with the same ideal ultimately in view. Nor is self-government enough: it but hews to fullest perfection the stone which must be fitted into the edifice as a whole. A truly civic Imperialism, which alone can withstand the disintegrating influences of time and distance and conflicting interests, must include a real federation, the representatives of which join in a common council with mutual rights and mutual responsibilities. The formation of such a council is notoriously a difficult problem; it will become less difficult as the progress of invention and discovery brings us nearer to each other and unites us in a fuller sympathy and comprehension. 'Want of intercourse', said the Greek proverb, 'is the surest solvent of friendship,' and the converse is equally true. Almost all our errors in the past have been due not to lack of justice but to lack of imagination: we have been unable to see at long range, and we have mistaken the signs which it was our business to interpret. It is not too much to say that the whole future of our civic ideal depends upon a discerning and sympathetic application of the words which, at one great crisis in its fortunes, Burke uttered to uncomprehending ears:[1]

'As long as you have the wisdom to keep the sovereign authority of this country as the sanctuary of liberty, the sacred

[1] Speech on conciliation with America: end (Bohn Edition, i. 508).

temple consecrated to our common faith, wherever the chosen race and the sons of England worship freedom they will turn their faces towards you. . . . Deny them this participation of freedom and you break that sole bond which originally made and must still preserve the unity of the Empire. . . . It is the spirit of the English constitution which, infused through the mighty mass, pervades, feeds, unites, invigorates, vivifies every part of the Empire, even down to its minutest member.'

VIII

INTERNATIONALISM AND COSMOPOLITANISM

We have seen that the manifestation of the civic ideal may widen without essential change from the limits of the family to those of the State at large, and that they can maintain the same impetus and direction within the field of a federated Empire.[1] It follows to consider whether this extension of area can be so adjusted as to include international relationship or even a cosmopolitan acceptance of the unity of mankind. Is there any reason, it may be asked, why our concentric circles should end at the State or the nation or the particular race? Is it not a nobler application of the ideal to conceive it as ultimately embodied in 'the parliament of man, the federation of the world', a universal commonwealth in which distinctions of race, of nationality, and even of religion should count for no more than provincial frontiers?

It has already been suggested that the impulse is not only natural but stimulating which leads a man to think most highly of his own city and his own people. 'No lukewarm relative', says Burke, 'ever made a good citizen', and we may equally add that no lukewarm patriot is likely to show much devotion to mankind.[2] But it is a childish perversion of this feeling if

[1] In particular of the British Empire so far as it is federated. It would be irrelevant to discuss here the second aspect of Imperialism, that of protectorate over manifestly inferior races. The reader will find this fully treated in Sir Charles Lucas, *Greater Rome and Greater Britain*, ch. ix, especially pp. 142 seq.

[2] Dante, *de Vulgari Eloquentia*, i. 6, quotes a derisive proverb that Pietramala (a small Tuscan village) is regarded by its inhabitants as the

we let it run into contempt and disdain of other nations. Heine tells us that there are two kinds of patriotism: the narrow kind which contracts the soul, the hospitable kind which enlarges it, and he characteristically illustrates them from the country of his birth and the country of his adoption. If we are ever tempted to 'despise foreigners' we may find a useful corrective in the examples of this sentiment which have been collected by Westermarck[1] and other ethnologists. The Esquimaux have a legend that European races came from a first bungling attempt on the part of the Creator: a batch of prentice-work discarded and thrown aside when the true Greenlander was made. 'As stupid as a white man' say the Chippewas; 'as stupid as an Englishman' is a Polynesian byword, and the climax is reached in the contempt poured upon the rest of mankind by the Veddahs of Ceylon, who 'live on uncooked reptiles, clothe themselves in leaves, cannot count or distinguish colours, and never laugh'.

There are in this matter four prevalent errors which it may be advisable to note at the outset. The first is cosmopolitanism by absorption, the forcible unification of different and even disparate peoples into a single system of government or control. Dante's *De Monarchia* was an attempt to effect this by the restoration of a single Roman Empire, political not papal, into which all the discords of his time should be resolved. As an ideal it has periodically occupied the attention of philosophers; once only, and that over a limited area, has it been put forward by a practical statesman. On 16 February 1871 the Countess Louise de Merry Argentien, acting as special messenger from

most populous of cities. He goes on to say that a man is 'offensively unreasonable' ('obscaenae rationis') who regards his own city as the best, and adds that there are many regions 'nobler and more delightful than Florence'. It is not perhaps unjust to recall that this passage was written in exile.

[1] *The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas.*

Napoleon, interviewed Bismarck at Versailles. In the course of the conversation, Bismarck said:

'Our advance is only beginning. Look at the United States, as big as, may be bigger than Europe. They form one State under one government. Why is little Europe divided into so many states under so many kings? Why not only one Empire, the German Empire? Why not only one master, the Emperor? That is the real way to make Europe happy and prosperous and to end all dissensions.'[1]

Second and converse to this is that kind of tepid humanitarianism which cares equally for all people because it cares very little for any. Aristotle said of Plato's communism that the brotherly love which it aimed at producing would be like a drop of honey in a bucket of water;[2] of about the same strength and consistency is the vague, amiable, and wholly ineffective toleration which we are apt to proffer to all concerns not immediately our own. It springs, no doubt, less from want of sympathy than from want of imagination; in any case it is answerable for the invertebrate feebleness which paralyses so much of our political life. In order to avoid Chauvinism it is not necessary to fall into apathy and indifference.

Third, and more curious than either, is the false perspective which recognizes the differences of claim and actually transposes them. It was said of Mirabeau that he loved all men except those whom he knew personally; it may be said of many of our philanthropists and reformers that their own country is the first target of their criticism and the last object of their allegiance. They are not to be confused with the mistaken idealists who side against their country either because they believe her

[1] Quoted in an anonymous volume of political memoirs entitled *People and Places*, p. 190. It seems to have been more serious than the cry of 'Weltmacht oder Niedergang' which we heard in 1914.

[2] *Politics*, ii. 4. 8.

to be in the wrong, like Mr. Stead during the Boer War, or because they hold that chastisement would be good for her like the Defeatists in the Russian revolution ; these people have simply reversed the telescope and regard Borrioboola-Gha as nearer than Bloomsbury. There is no need to discuss the psychology of this odd perversion, which is, indeed, sufficiently subtle ; the fact is of common occurrence, and with that alone we are now concerned.

But it is the fourth error which is at the present day most widespread and most dangerous. It is the belief that international polity can be established by cutting cross-sections of different peoples or races and combining them to the exclusion of all other constituent factors. No harm is done when this misuse of the term is confined to scientific congresses and associations ; the common object is then sufficiently specialized not to mislead, but it is more serious when members of a single political party gather at some European centre, call themselves international, and profess to speak for the countries from which they are assembled. It is, no doubt, a natural swing of the pendulum from the old diplomacy to its diametric opposite ; none the less its unquestioned acceptance is a little disquieting, and we should be constantly on our guard against the misinterpretation which it implies. No class, of whatever political colour, has a right to speak for the people at large.

In Europe[1] the scheme of cosmopolitanism, as a systematic philosophy of life, may be said to date from the Stoics. Democritus had played with the idea, so had Antisthenes and Aristippus, but these had few political followers during the classical

[1] It was a frequent subject of discussion in Asiatic philosophies, the broad view being generally maintained in India (cf. the sentence in the *Panchatantra*, ' It is mean minded to inquire whether a man is one of ourselves or an alien ') and rejected in China. When Mih-Tze preached brotherly love to all men alike he was met by a storm of protest : ' the claims of the family ought to come first.'

period, and to an Athenian philosopher the distinction between Hellene and Barbarian was too deep to be obliterated. 'Do not enslave captives if they are Hellenes' is a characteristic piece of Platonic advice, and Aristotle's *Politics* takes as a matter of course the exclusion from civic life of inferior people and even of inferior classes. There is a noticeable passage at the beginning of the *Ethics* (i. 2. 8), in which he says that the chief good is at its best when distributed 'through cities'—not, as one would expect, 'through the city'—but it is very unlikely that he meant by this any more than a federation of States in close alliance. The idea of extending it to the world at large would have seemed to him impractical and possibly impious.

There were two circumstances which rendered it easy for the Stoics to take a new line of departure. One was that in their time the current of political life in Greece was running very low; 'the statesman', said Chrysippus, 'must displease either the gods or his fellow citizens'; and the old concentration on civic life was loosening hold by its own weakness. The other was that Stoicism was not purely Greek in origin. Zeno of Citium seems unquestionably to have had Semitic blood in his veins, and his school was naturally affected by the inheritance of non-Hellenic ideas: just as Christianity in its early manifestations was influenced by the fact that it was first preached in an outpost of Greek poetry and philosophy,[1] and that its first missionary apostle was a Greek scholar. In both these schemes of life, unlike all others, we may notice a blending of Hebraic and Hellenic elements, and it is to this origin that their points of resemblance and even some of their points of divergence are due.

[1] Gadara, a few miles from Nazareth, was the home of Meleager the poet and of Philodemus the Epicurean, both living in the first century B. C. It is not without significance that the Gentiles are called 'Greeks' in the New Testament, and that Epikouros is still the current Jewish name for an unbeliever.

And first the Stoics challenged public opinion by preaching an entire abolition of class distinctions.

'We are concerned', says Seneca, 'with the disposition of him who does a service, not with his estate: virtue is excluded from no class, she is accessible to all, she admits all, she invites all, citizens, freedmen, slaves, kings, exiles. She pays no respect to a man's family or income; she is content with the bare title of his humanity.' [1]

And this was not an idle profession of faith. Of the four Stoic philosophers with whose teaching we are most familiar, one was a country gentleman of narrow means, one a prime minister, one an emperor, and one a slave.

In the same spirit they preached the obliteration of all national and political frontiers. 'All men', says Marcus Aurelius, 'are fellow-citizens of the supreme city, that of which the others are but the houses.' [2] Musonius, who first used the phrase, 'city of Zeus' [3] (composed as he says of gods and men), declares that banishment is an impossibility, because wherever a man goes he is in the same city.[4] And Seneca, in a fine passage, declares that we are not confined within the

[1] 'Refert enim cuius animi sit qui praestat, non cuius status: nulli praeclusa virtus est, omnibus patet, omnes admittit, omnes invitat; ingenuos, libertinos, servos, reges, et exules. Non eligit domum aut censum: nudo nomine contenta est' (Seneca, *de Beneficiis*, iii. 18. 2). See Zeller's *Stoics*, p. 310: and compare St. Paul's Epistle to Philemon, 10–18. It must be remembered that of the early Greek Stoic writings only fragments survive and that our chief authorities are the four great Stoics of the Roman Empire: Persius, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius.

[2] Ἄνθρωπον εἶναι πολίτην τῆς ἀνωτάτης πόλεως ἧς αἱ λοιπαὶ πόλεις ὥσπερ οἰκίαι εἰσίν, Marcus Aurelius, iii. 11.

[3] Ἡ τοῦ Διὸς πόλις ἣ συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ θεῶν, Musonius, *ap.* Stobaeus, *Flor.* xl. 9.

[4] Κοινὴ πατρὶς ἀνθρώπων ἁπάντων ὁ κόσμος ἐστίν, ibid. See also Epictetus, *Discourses*, iii. 5. 26. Contrast Tacitus's remarkable statement about the banishment of Julia, *Annals*, i. 53.

circuit of our own walls, but make the world itself our fatherland, that we may have the wider exercising ground for our virtues.[1]

The basis of the Stoic doctrine was primarily metaphysical. The true life, they said, was a life according to nature, meaning by nature not raw material or primitive uncivilization, but the full unfettered perfection of the whole scheme of things. One of the laws of nature was that like was attracted by like; and through all the differences of human polity and culture reason persisted as an inherent point of similarity. Reason, in fact, was the touch of nature which made the whole world kin. Some apparently interpreted the doctrine in more physical terms; one imaginative writer held that 'the universe was a city of which the stars were citizens', and is demurely satirized by Plutarch for his opinion. Another anticipated Spencer's view of society as an organism, and is met in the same chapter with the obvious objections.[2] But as it developed through the Roman Empire, and especially after it was reinforced by the doctrines of the *Ius Gentium* it took on a more human colour and substance. Marcus Aurelius is never tired of reiterating that the possession of reason involves the love of society as

[1] 'Ideo magno animo nos non unius urbis moenibus clusimus, sed in totius orbis commercium emisimus, patriamque nobis mundum professi sumus ut liceret latiorem virtuti campum dari' (*De Tranquillitate Animi* 4).

[2] Τὸν κόσμον εἶναι πόλιν καὶ πολίτας τοὺς ἀστέρας. Plutarch makes fun of this in his treatise Περὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν πρὸς τοὺς Στωικούς, ch. xxxiv. 6. Earlier in the same chapter he deals with the doctrine of Society as a σῶμα–ζῷον, as he says, οὗ πύλλα τῶν μέρων ἐκφεύγει τὴν βούλησιν. His objection to the whole theory is given in Περὶ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου τύχης ἢ ἀρετῆς, i. 6 καὶ μὴν ἡ πολὺ θαυμαζομένη πολιτεία τοῦ τὴν Στωικὴν αἵρεσιν καταβαλλομένου Ζήνωνος εἰς ἓν τοῦτο συντείνει κεφάλαιον, ἵνα μὴ κατὰ πόλεις μήδε κατὰ δήμους οἴκωμεν, ἰδίοις ἕκαστοι διωρισμένοι δικαίοις, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἡγώμεθα δημότας καὶ πολίτας, εἷς δὲ βίος ἦ καὶ κόσμος ὥσπερ ἀγέλης συννόμου νόμῳ κοινῷ τρεφομένης. It is not in itself a fair criticism. See Zeller's *Stoics*, 312 seq.

a whole,[1] that rational beings can only be treated in comradeship,[2] that they are only happy when working for the community,[3] and that each is an integral part of one political system.[4] In one sense this is wider than Christianity, for it makes no preferences. 'Let us do good unto all men,' says St. Paul, 'and especially unto them that are of the household of faith.'[5] 'Honour all men,' says St. Peter, 'love the brotherhood.'[6] But as it is wider so it is shallower. Cosmopolitanism is an easier doctrine to those who hold that all circumstances are indifferent; that to distinguish between joy and sorrow, health and disease, birth and bereavement, is unworthy of a wise man. 'Only weak eyes', says Seneca, 'water at the misfortunes of others.' St. Paul bids us rejoice with them that do rejoice and weep with them that weep.[7] And yet after all the highest expression of the Stoic view that has ever been uttered is closely Christian in sound. 'All men are brothers,' says Epictetus, 'for they are all children of one Heavenly father.'[8]

But the Stoic ideal, like the Christian, remained unfulfilled. Even in a world which for all practical purposes consisted of countries surrounding one seaboard and controlled by one government, it was impossible to achieve this unity of purpose: when Europe reassembled after the ages of barbarian warfare, there were far too many lines of cleavage to admit even of much concerted action. Among them it has already been noted that the sentiment of nationality was a late growth. Motives of religion, of caste, of political party, of personal allegiance were far more potent during the Middle Ages than any combined call of race or country; England under her Tudor sovereigns was perhaps the first to strike the new note; outside England

[1] Marcus Aurelius, vi. 14. [2] Ibid. vi. 23. [3] Ibid. viii. 7.
[4] Ibid. ix. 23. Cf. ii. 1 and viii. 13.
[5] Galatians vi. 10. [6] 1 Peter ii. 17.
[7] Romans xii. 15. See Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, 2nd Series, p. 48.
[8] Epictetus, *Discourses*, i. 13. 3.

it has been said that there was no statesman and no political thinker who accepted it as a principle before the French Revolution, and even since that time there have been eminent historians who regarded it with dislike and suspicion.[1] The question how far it should be elevated to a principle needs further consideration. Meanwhile there can be no doubt that it exists over a great part of the civilized world as a fact. And here let no ' peevish logician ' challenge us to define nationality. The only answer to such a question is, ' Si non rogas intelligo.' We have an adequate practical idea of what is meant by kingship, but no one can define it without running counter to famous historical examples. In like manner we may say that a nation is a body of people who have firmly decided that they constitute one, and whose decision has been stimulated by some among the determining factors of race, contiguity, language, literature, government, religion, and above all a common historical tradition. Nothing so closely welds a people together or gives them so keen a feeling of national unity as the memory of past achievements and past sufferings, won or endured together.[2]

At any rate whatever be the constituents there can be no reasonable question about the result. Distinctions of national character are among the most real of all sociological phenomena at the present day. They show themselves in literature, in painting, in music, in policy, in the outlook on life, in the sense of humour and pathos, in all the channels through which a nation's life is manifested. We have but to recall the difference between Dutch and Italian painting, between English and French poetry, between German and Russian music, to see how clearly marked are national characteristics in the field of the arts : they are not less obvious in the world of daily life and

[1] Ramsay Muir, *Nationalism and Internationalism*, pp. 38–40.

[2] See Ramsay Muir, op. cit., p. 49.

affairs. Most of the difficulties encountered by international diplomacy, for example, are less of word than of thought.

Apart from France, Mr. Ramsay Muir illustrates the growth of nationality by three examples: Italy,[1] which before the time of Garibaldi was broken up into separate and hostile States, two of which belonged to Austria and two virtually to Spain; Germany, which contained in 1789 three hundred and sixty principalities and republics, which in 1813 dismissed Arndt as a dangerous revolutionary for dreaming of a common fatherland, and which achieved its political unity only by the aggressive force and domination of Bismarck; Japan, which emerged like the island of Monte Nuovo from the storms and violence of a civil war, which changed its entire civilization at a single stroke, and in less than forty years had become the first-class power which could make a treaty with Britain and inflict a heavy defeat upon Russia. In our own day the problems are again pressing: Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, and Roumania are but three among the many regions in which national aspirations are demanding satisfaction; whatever be their fortunes, it is probable that we shall never see again such instruments of oppression as the Holy Alliance or the Turkish Government in the Balkans.[2]

At the same time it cannot be too strongly urged that national

[1] Ramsay Muir, op. cit., pp. 50 seq. See the map of Italy in 1848 printed in Trevelyan's *Garibaldi and the Defence of Rome*, p. 9.

[2] 'The Great War is the last, the greatest, and the most definite and decisive challenge to and defiance of the national cause in Europe. It is an attack upon the liberties of the most ancient and firmly established of the nation states: it is in essence a repudiation of the idea that the strength and progress of European civilization is largely derived from that variety of culture which the national system maintains, and an insolent assertion of the right of one simple *kultur* to impose its methods and its hideous moral standards upon all. But this challenge has only been possible because the national principle is not yet fully established; and its full establishment must therefore be an indispensable condition of lasting peace' (Ramsay Muir, op. cit., pp. 121–2).

differences do not preclude but invite co-operation. Each people has something of its own to contribute to the common stock, something which it cannot withhold except to the injury of itself and the rest; and it is by this interchange of gifts and resources that the organic variety of the whole is constituted. Lord Bryce [1] classifies this interdependence under the three Aristotelian categories of friendship—advantage, pleasure, and character. Under the first head come many subdivisions: production, commerce, transport, finance, and the like, each of which may be a source of discord as well as of harmony. A new discovery of oil or potash or radium will certainly add to the wealth of the world, it may also lead to new jealousies and new disputes. Inter-state commerce certainly makes for peace, but trade does not always follow the flag, and tariffs are one of the most fruitful causes of irritation. Facility of transport has proved a much surer bond of union. In times of peace the freedom of the seas is now taken for granted; once Spain claimed the whole Pacific Ocean, and Portugal the Indian Ocean, and the Atlantic south of Morocco. Nor has the progress been less in land transport; during the last half century six trunk lines have crossed the Alps, and the Orient Express has bound together Eastern and Western Europe. Soon, we may conjecture, these will be supplemented, if not superseded, by fleets of aeroplanes, and when our broadcasting apparatus is perfected we shall have almost fulfilled the prayer of the lover in *Martinus Scriblerus*, and 'annihilated time and space'. Financial interrelations have less national importance in England than in many continental countries: we are chary of the State support which is freely given by the Governments of Germany and Belgium, but at the same time, as Bryce points out, those countries are politically most dependent on commerce (in its widest sense), which like England have the greatest proportion of sea-coast.

[1] *International Relations*, pp. 130–134; cf. Aristotle, *Ethics*, viii. 2 and 3.

Of the three sources of 'international friendship', Bryce regards this as the most important. The other two he dismisses as ineffective in face of any real strain. Pleasure, under which he includes all contributions to literature and art, as well as to the beauty and amenity of life, is in his opinion a fair-weather indulgence, which is discarded or concealed at the threat of a storm; character, he thinks, has even less influence, for 'nobody ever heard of a nation whose virtues made other nations love it'. In both these it would appear that he takes too restricted a view. The great Emathian conqueror who 'bade spare the house of Pindarus', set an example which is reverenced to-day by civilized people; it was no sign of weakness that during the war Beethoven was played in London and Shakespeare in Berlin, and no amount of political hostility could altogether obliterate the memories of Paris or Florence or Vienna, of our first sight of the Alps or the Aegean or of Moscow from the Sparrow hills. At the same time it may be freely admitted that of the three bonds this is the weakest. Character, where it is truly manifested and properly understood, is a real factor for good or ill in the intercourse of nations. China owes much to her well-deserved reputation for integrity, Britain to her hatred of tyranny and oppression, and though these qualities may be obscured in a moment of calumny or misrepresentation, they hold their own in the long run. More particularly is this true of certain conspicuous representatives, Lincoln, for instance, or Mazzini. 'The Duke of Devonshire's character', said Lord Balfour, 'is one of the assets of the nation'; John Bright reprieved a political prisoner in the North and South War; the instances are not so few as to be left out of account, and they would be far more frequent but for the lamentable fact that their cause is not very often operative. The influence of character in international affairs has not yet had its full scope, because the level of inter-

national morality is lower than that which holds between individuals.

For this three possible reasons may be given. First that in private affairs a man is wholly responsible for his act, it is his and his alone; in public affairs, as a member of a government, he may share responsibility, and so be less sensible to the weight of his own decision. More particularly is this the case when he is overpersuaded by arguments which seem plausible at the moment into supporting a course of action which he afterwards disapproves. It is not always easy to meet the charge of disloyalty which such a change of front would incur, and the readiest course is to follow the line of least resistance. Secondly, the crises of public business are far more important and involve far higher stakes than those which occur in a man's private negotiations. A successful *coup* may not only win him immediate applause but place him in history as one of the great benefactors of his native land, and it needs a cool head and a steady judgement to be proof against the temptation. Thirdly, and this is the only creditable reason of the three, a man's private business concerns his own interests, his public business the interests of other people; and of these, whether they be constituents or subjects, he is in a measure trustee. He cannot be generous with their property or unselfish in their cause; it is equally his duty not to go beyond the frontier of strict justice and not to fall short of it; there is no place here for Aristotle's man of equity, 'who does not maintain his full rights to his neighbour's detriment but is ready to give way, even when he has the law at his back'.[1] The statesman, in short, is in the position of an advocate who has to make the best terms he can for his client.

But whatever be the psychological explanation, the only practical remedy is that the different nations while maintaining

[1] 'Ο μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, ἀλλ' ἐλαττωτικός, καίπερ ἔχων τὸν νόμον βοηθόν, *Ethics*, v. 10. 8.

their own individuality should meet together in fuller and more friendly intercourse. State-morality is rather an arrested than a degenerate growth; it does not traverse the ethical standard but lags behind it, and the same forces of comradeship which have helped to mould and modify the conduct of individuals, may in similar circumstances be brought to bear upon the diplomatic relations of cities and countries. Much progress indeed has already been made in this direction, more, perhaps, than is commonly supposed, and it may be well to indicate in brief outline the steps that have been taken to secure official recognition of international rights. Like all other reforms they start from small beginnings and are checked by early opposition, but the spirit which animated them has persisted throughout, and is now one of our best auguries for the future settlement of Europe.

The earliest proposals were indeed wholly Utopian.[1] The Duc de Sully, first minister of Henri IV, advocated as preliminaries the abolition of the House of Hapsburg and the expulsion from Constantinople of the Grand Turk, after which Europe was to be divided into six groups of contiguous States, each having its own council and taking part in a general assembly which met at the various capitals in rotation. It is doubtful whether this plan was ever promulgated, in any case its voice was entirely drowned by the Thirty Years' War and the subsequent military prowess of Louis XIV. When these reverberations had died away the Abbé de St. Pierre, who was French secretary at Utrecht, published a *Projet de Traité pour rendre la Paix universelle*, which depended on a permanent friendship between sovereigns and a permanent congress of ambassadors, and which was followed by an almost continuous warfare up to the time of the French Revolution. Kant's *Zum ewigen*

[1] For the following illustrations I am much indebted to a full and interesting account of the matter in Ramsay Muir's *Nationalism and Internationalism*, pp. 136–83.

Frieden, published in 1795, dropped stillborn from the press and had no influence on public opinion.

Meantime, however, a more fruitful seed was being sown in a more fertile and promising soil. In 1625, Grotius, one of the greatest benefactors of mankind, published at Paris his treatise, *De iure pacis et belli*, which laid the foundations of international law. His work was carried on by Puffendorf, Leibnitz, Wolff, and especially by Vattel, the Swiss jurist, whose *Droit des gens*, printed in 1658, was long the most popular exposition of the subject. Here was a system of legislation based on the *ius gentium*, through equity and local custom, codified by a few scholars without political influence, without sanctions, without military force, but making headway by the sheer weight of its integrity and common sense. Its findings have been accepted as valid not only by great lawyers like Lord Stowell, but by official congresses like that of Westphalia, and there is more than one point of international policy which has been settled during recent years by reference to its decisions.

Nor was it valuable only in the matter of positive legislation. The spirit which it encouraged led to the establishment of the great congresses, Westphalia, Utrecht, Vienna, Aix-la-Chapelle, and their successors, at which its principles were openly advocated and accepted. The League of Peace, for instance, which was formed at Aix-la-Chapelle, formally accepted the Law of Nations as its guiding principle, and even the Holy Alliance which frustrated it began by professing the same faith. It is easy to sneer at congresses as debating societies which are powerless against the forces of Realpolitik; in the nineteenth century alone they have declared the slave trade illegal,[1] prohibited privateering, and defined naval blockade,[2] established the Red Cross,[3] prohibited explosive bullets,[4] instituted a literary

[1] Paris, 1815.
[2] Paris, 1856.
[3] Geneva, 1864 and 1868.
[4] St. Petersburg, 1867.

copyright for almost the whole of Europe,[1] and established in perpetuity the independence and neutrality of Switzerland.[2] Further, the whole body of international law was classified and redrafted at the two Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, which would have set up an authoritative tribunal for its administration, and a list of cases over which it should exercise jurisdiction, but for the persistent and suicidal opposition of Germany and Austria. And apart from these a great deal has been effected:[3] the peaceful settlement of the Alabama claim, the arbitration treaty between England and America, the question of African colonization—there are scores of others to show that the machinery is there if we are but willing to use it.

Of this willingness the League of Nations is at once the most encouraging indication and the most effectual guarantee. It was formally established on 10 January 1920, and joined at its first session by fourteen states. By the end of 1921 this number had increased to over fifty; by the end of 1922 only three powers of the first importance were still outside it: America, because of her aversion to 'entangling alliances'; Russia, because of her internal troubles; and Germany, because no agreement could be reached as to the terms of her admission. Apart from these the whole civilized world had signified its adhesion to the principles of the League and its readiness to act in accordance with them.[4]

[1] Bern, 1887. [2] Vienna, 1814.

[3] Mr. Ramsay Muir points out that between 1820 and 1840 eight international disputes were settled by arbitration; between 1840 and 1860 there were thirty, between 1860 and 1880 there were forty-four, and between 1880 and 1900, when the Hague Tribunal was proposed, there were ninety: 172 in 80 years. Of the nations concerned Britain comes first, then the U.S.A., then France.

[4] This lecture was delivered in November 1922, and the account of the League refers to its position at that time. An excellent account of this will be found in Zimmern's *Europe in Convalescence*, iii. 1.

The machinery of the League is fourfold—an assembly, a council, a court, and a secretariat. The assembly consists of 'not more than three delegates from each member-state, these three delegates having a single vote'. It is entirely a deliberative body, which claims no executive function, and its chief value is that it allows free discussion, from every conceivable standpoint, of those large untechnical questions which appeal, as Mr. Zimmern says, 'to the intelligence and conscience of mankind'. It has six committees: (1) legal and constitutional, (2) technical organization (e. g. finance, economics, transit), (3) limitation of armaments and economic blockade, (4) internal organization, (5) social and general questions (e. g. epidemics, repatriations, suppression of illicit traffic), (6) political questions (e. g. the admission of new States), and its debates are usually on their reports. Within the limits of its constitution it has already done much to resume mutual understanding and lay down the lines of common policy.

The council, which is the Upper House of the League, is an executive body composed of delegates of four great Powers (Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan), who are permanent, and of four smaller Powers elected by the Assembly, who are temporary.[1] Its first great achievement was its adjudication on Upper Silesia; during its three years of existence it has shown itself particularly well qualified to deal with specific problems on which a clear, ready, and dispassionate judgement is required. It has proved that questions in which large issues are involved can be treated without the dust and heat of political partisanship; it relies not on oratory but on expert knowledge, and its decisions are steadily gaining acceptance and authority.

The court is a purely legal body consisting of eleven judges

[1] In the first year the four elected members were Belgium, Brazil, China, and Spain.

and four deputy judges. It has jurisdiction only over such States as voluntarily submit their disputes to it, and only on such matters as are referred to it for decision, but the fact that it is already operative is a hopeful sign for the future of international arbitration.

The secretariat is an international civil service, the work of which is grouped under the sections of information, law, administrative commissions, health, politics, finance, and economics, each with a separate chairman and a body of official experts.

'To have created it', says Mr. Zimmern, 'is a greater achievement by far than to have established an international court of justice, for a court can only adjudicate on what is submitted to it, whilst an administrative service, with the health, the transport, and a number of other vital and complex but relatively non-contentious matters under its charge, works on steadily and quietly day by day, weaving into a single and harmonious pattern the common interests of mankind.'[1]

Its relation to the other constituent organs of the League is roughly parallel to that of a government office in Whitehall to Parliament or the courts of justice, and its opportunities both of administrative and of statistical work would seem to be almost unbounded.

Beside these four bodies the League works in close concert with the International Labour Organization, which has also its own subdivisions of congresses, governing body, and secretariat, as well as with the various commissions, standing or temporary, which are set up from time to time for the purpose of dealing with particular issues. One of these, for example, has charge of questions relating to armies, navies, and air forces; another of mandates, another of special points relating to health, another to transport, another to public credits and the like. It will be seen that no other international organization of such

[1] Zimmern, op. cit., p. 131.

size and importance has ever been established in the history of the world.

Signor Nitti, who has watched it from the beginning with a careful and critical eye, declares that it may become a great guarantee of peace on three conditions:

1. That it include really and within the shortest space of time possible, all the peoples, conquerors, conquered, and neutral.

2. That Articles 5 and 10 of its constitution be modified, and that after their modification a revision of the treaties be undertaken.

3. That the Reparations Commission be abolished, and that its powers be conferred on the League.[1]

In the second of these clauses Signor Nitti has unquestionably struck his finger on two defects. Article 5 enacts that:

'Except where otherwise expressly provided in this covenant or in the terms of the present treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or the Council shall require the agreement of all the members present at the meeting.'

Article 10 adds that: 'The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League.'

One in short holds that no decision can be effective unless it is unanimous, and thus introduces into a highly contentious atmosphere the old abuse of the 'liberum veto'; the other stereotypes the frontier lines of January 1920, and has already given rise to a great deal of trouble in Eastern Europe. But it is hardly conceivable that these articles will continue unrepealed, and the fulfilment of Signor Nitti's other conditions is, it may be hoped, only a question of time.

And even with its present defects of constitution the League has to its credit a long record of notable achievements. By the

[1] *Peaceless Europe*, p. 263.

end of 1921 it had (1) established the free city of Danzig; (2) governed the Saar basin since February; (3) adjudicated on Eupen and Malmedy, giving both to Belgium; (4) registered about two hundred treaties; (5) settled peacefully the question of the Aaland Isles; (6) awarded on Upper Silesia; France, Britain, Germany, and Poland accepting the award; (7) started negotiations between Poland and Lithuania as to the possession of Vilna; (8) arranged that all treaties of peace should in future contain a 'Protection of Minorities' clause, under guarantee of the League; (9) stopped the war between Serbia and Albania in November 1921; (10) presented a conclusive report on economic boycott. During the same time the Mandates Commission allocated the various territories, the Committee on Reduction of Armaments began its work, the Financial Conference at Brussels in September 1920 introduced a system of international credits, the Conference at Barcelona in March 1921 made several recommendations on transport which have since been ratified by the principal governments concerned, the Health Organization was established, the spread of typhus was everywhere checked, the traffic in women and children was abolished in over twenty States, and over 300,000 prisoners of war were repatriated. As climax to all this there followed, in the summer and autumn of 1922, the financial rehabilitation of Austria, which has not only restored her national finances but has saved Europe at large from the menace of an imminent bankruptcy.[1] And all this was done in less than three years by an association voluntarily formed, with little money and no power, in a world full of the hatred and suspicion that had been bequeathed to it by the Great War. It is a striking testimony to the value of character in international politics.

It is surely along these lines that any future advance is to be

[1] A detailed account of this will be found in the pamphlet 'Geneva 1922', by H. Wilson Harris, pp. 20–7.

made. To obliterate or ignore national distinctions is impossible, and if possible, would be most undesirable. It is asking far too much of human nature to expect that men should exhibit to remote strangers the same sympathy and affection as to those of their own kindred.[1] There must always arise between different countries clashes of conflicting interests—commercial problems, territorial problems, difficult questions of emigration and of the exclusion of immigrants; it is not to be expected that these should be solved without long and anxious negotiations. But we may hope that the day will come when international policy is determined not only by courtesy of phrase but by equity of purpose, when public aggression shall be held as disgraceful as private robbery and public deception as private falsehood, when the battlefield shall be replaced by the arbitration court, and the laws of war superseded by the laws of peace. We need not fear, as Treitschke feared, that such a consummation would sap the manhood of the race and atrophy its courage. If that peril were real it would be so grave as to outweigh all the blessings of peace, but it is an illusion. Personal bravery has not declined since public opinion discountenanced the duel, and there will always be causes to which a man may honourably sacrifice his life. It is not only for the sake of peace that international equity is desirable; there are higher things than peace, but it is with her olive that their victory may ultimately be crowned.

Yet to those who accept this as an ultimate end a word of caution is needed. The present course of our life is over-rapid: haste and impatience have been elevated to the rank of virtues;

[1] While this lecture was in preparation a gentleman wrote to a London weekly to say that his eyes filled with tears when he thought about the sufferings of the Mousterian cave-men, but that his weeping turned to 'dry-eyed horror' when he contemplated their misdeeds. There are, however, comparatively few people who can rise to this height of sensibility.

at no time have we been more in peril of ill-informed and ill-considered judgement. A long road still remains to us before we have crossed the desert; we are ill citizens if we murmur by the way or mistake a mirage for the land of promise. Our duties to our State, to our Empire, to the comity of nations, are in constant need of delicate and careful adjustment; we cannot settle them in a phrase or dismiss them with a patriotic gesture. Yet the problem is no harder than any other of conflicting claims, and requires no more of that casuistry which is but a method of finding arguments in favour of inclination. The principles of international policy are inherently the same as those which bind us to our own state and country: they are spread over a wider area, and therefore, like the large letters in the Republic, are more difficult to read, but the purport of their message is unaltered: justice founded on a law of proportionate equality, and a loyal adherence to the cause which we accept as paramount.

IX

EDUCATION IN CITIZENSHIP

Aristotle having enunciated his doctrine of the chief good, by which he means the good life of the citizen, goes on to discuss the methods by which his hearers can be trained to pursue it. Argument, he holds, is not enough, its acceptance presupposes both natural endowment and systematic training; so with his usual practical wisdom he sets about indicating a course of instruction which shall produce the temper and character that he requires. Unfortunately, his account in the *Ethics* is a bare outline,[1] its supplement in the *Politics* is incomplete,[2] and we are therefore left in the dark as to his ultimate conclusions on this most important topic. But this much at least is clear, that he regards civic education as a matter of great moment, and that he makes it the foundation of his whole scheme of civic life.

Now before we can investigate the nature of civic education we must clearly have some conception of what education is in general, what are its aims and what are the methods by which it endeavours to attain them. On this subject there is in England an almost entire consensus. At every gathering of educational experts, from a school prize-giving to a teachers' conference, some authoritative person stands up and declares, amid applause, that education is derived from the Latin verb *educere*, and that it means the process of eliciting, not of putting anything into the mind of the pupil—that would be cram—but of bringing out the knowledge which is already latent

[1] *Ethics*, x. 9.

[2] *Politics*, end of Bk. VII and fragment of Bk. VIII.

within its depths. And another will chime in with the maxim that 'education is liberation'—as you liberate energy from the atom or tea from the tea-leaves, and those who have a taste for Greek literature will illustrate by the problem in the *Meno*, and those who have a taste for English literature will recall Addison's simile of the block of marble, and those who have neither will listen and acquiesce and help to impede the course of education with one more fundamental error. It is, indeed, among errors almost pre-eminent: at least I am acquainted with no other statement of which the etymology, the philosophy, and the practical application are equally at fault. In Scotland, where the tradition of classical learning is wider spread than in the south, it is not conceivable that any speaker should derive education from *educere*, a false quantity, a grammatical blunder, and a total ignorance of Latin usage.[1] Philosophically it involves a doctrine of innate ideas more extravagant than was ever

[1] One might as well talk about the logical processes of Induction and Deduction, or about a *reducatio ad absurdum*. The first meaning of *educere* is the fact of birth: then by a natural extension it comes to mean the rearing of the child, especially by the mother. Instances of both usages may be found in Virgil, *Aen.* vi. 764–5 and 769, where it means 'bring forth' and *Aen.* vii. 762–3, viii. 413, and ix. 584, where it may mean 'reared'. The furthest extension (after the language had settled) is probably Tacitus's 'Eductum in domo regnatrice' (*Annals*, i. 4) which clearly means reared rather than educated. The word *educare* begins where the word *educere* leaves off, and is used primarily of the nurse who rears the child by providing it with suitable food and exercise. So Varro, *ap.* Non. 447 'Educit obstetrix, educat nutrix'. Thence it proceeds from physical nurture to mental and spiritual. Cicero, *de Finibus*, iii. 19, uses *educatio* generally of nurture, in *de Oratore*, iii. 31. 125 'sit modo is qui dicet aut scribet institutus liberaliter educatione doctrinaque puerili', it means specifically what we call education. Compare also 'Sosibius Britannici educator' (*Annals*, xi. 1), 'optimum quemque educatorem filii exilio aut morte afficit' (*Annals*, xii. 41), and many other instances. When Tacitus calls Anicetus the 'pueritiae Neronis educator' (*Annals*, xiv. 3), he does not mean that he elicited Nero's innate ideas but that he taught him music and letters.

imagined by Lord Herbert of Cherbury; the problem in the *Meno* proves nothing except that a bewildered slave can be made to answer leading questions, the simile of the marble shows only that Addison had a pretty and irrelevant wit. And in practical application this remarkable sentence advocates a method of pedagogy from which all instruction is excluded. No doubt it is flattering to be told that the mind of its own substance learns everything, whether by recollection of previous existence or by conceptions implanted in us at birth: it only happens, unfortunately enough, not to be true.

The name education, then, is a natural metaphor from the processes of nurture, of food and exercise, of imparting and training. And unlike many metaphors it may with fair accuracy be applied in detail, for all the faults of malnutrition and false gymnastic can be roughly paralleled in our educational history. In the early part of the last century, for instance, the whole of our schools and colleges suffered from underfeeding: resources were inadequate and teachers incapable. Hear Macaulay in 1847:

'How many of these men are now the refuse of other callings —discarded servants or ruined tradesmen: who cannot do a sum of three, who do not know whether the earth is a cube or a sphere, and cannot tell whether Jerusalem is in Asia or Africa; whom no gentleman would trust with the key of his cellar and no tradesman would send of a message.'

As for the dames, let one who was quoted the same evening speak for herself: 'It 's little they pays us and it 's little we teaches them.'[1] Such were the schools mentioned in Professor Adamson's *History of Education*, where board, lodging, and instruction were given for an inclusive fee of £12 a year; little

[1] Hansard, T. S. xci, pp. 1016, 1060; quoted on p. 9 of Sir Graham Balfour's admirable volume, *The Educational Systems of Great Britain and Ireland*.

better were many public schools and colleges—the St. Edwards and St. Ignavias which have been described once and for all by Mr. D'Arcy Thompson.[1] Clearly there was not any hope for civic education when the bare rudiments were neglected.

Then came a reaction followed by a period of sedulous overfeeding which was almost equally unintelligent. It is usually traced to Mr. Lowe and his payment by results, but it goes farther back than this. Lord John Russell's Bashaws were already abroad, the wooden examination system which aimed only at memorized knowledge had already been satirized in *Hard Times*, and in the year after this appeared the whole system of indiscriminate cram was pilloried in the person of a new university, by J. A. Froude.[2]

'At this University', he says, 'in the pass examination for the bachelor's degree (and degrees there are taken at the age at which the course at Oxford only commences) there are required (we believe we speak fairly within compass) the Greek and Latin, the French and German languages, logic, moral philosophy, an indefinite quantity of mathematics, astronomy, anatomy, organic chemistry, and a general acquaintance with the results of all the other physical sciences; all Greek history, all Roman History, and as if this were not enough, thrown in as a mere trifle, all English History: this is only for the bachelor's degree. For the degree of M.A., taken two years later, all Ancient History is required, and all European history to the close of the eighteenth century. In fact an average boy of nineteen or twenty with no thought of honours but aspiring merely to a common degree is expected to be able to answer questions upon all matters whatsoever which have as yet been done or taught or thought or suffered by the human race: a very considerable variety of subjects. The examination questions would petrify the cleverest man who ever came out

[1] *Wayside Thoughts*, pp. 72 and 94. At St. Ignavia's the educational work of the day seems to have ended at 9 a.m.

[2] See his paper on 'The Teaching of History', Oxford Essays, 1855. It is unnecessary to add that the criticisms are no longer applicable.

Senior Wrangler, and they are always ostentatiously printed for the astonishment of an admiring public.'

And again later:

'This Institution does but represent on a large scale the system now endeavouring to spread itself over all the schools in the country, and gradually forcing its way into Oxford and Cambridge. No one is at the present day supposed to be properly educated who does not know something at least of all subjects a knowledge of which is easily accessible, and the object of intellectual ambition is a sort of diluted omniscience. It is obtained by cramming a list of books of science made easy, where the largest possible quantity of information is conveyed in the smallest number of words, and which is then committed to memory without inquiry, without thought, without appropriation, without any particle of real knowledge having been gained by all this labour—not even the knowledge of what knowledge is—what are the conditions of properly knowing anything.'

Of the two methods hitherto described it is clear that this is the worse. The human mind does not readily acquiesce in starvation, and if it be left unfed may find some exercise of the muscles in feeding itself. But nothing is to be said for this apoplectic process which not only dispenses with mental effort but actually discourages it; which locks up the gymnasium and turns the rest of the school into a larder. To it and to its abuses we owe all the discredit into which most examinations have fallen and which some of them have deserved.

Fortunately we are not likely to see this particular error repeated: the science of education has condemned it as surely as the common sense of mankind. But there is a third fault to which we are still in some measure liable, and to which civic education, at any rate in our schools, is particularly exposed —the fault of inappropriate feeding. Our authorities on diet are constantly telling us of children who grow up with arrested or enfeebled powers because they are fed on victuals which are

unsuited to them, although for adults these may be wholesome or at least innocuous; and every one knows the danger of laying on young muscles an athletic burden which is proportionate to mature strength. Milo's régime in short is not suitable to the neophyte who is entering the training-school. But there is a temptation for teachers to believe that whatever interests them at thirty-five must equally interest their pupils at fourteen: they forget both that the perspective is different, and that, as Stevenson says, in order to reach Paris it is necessary to pass through Newhaven and Dieppe. Some of the tests which are given to children, and especially to young children, at the present time, imply an undue precocity which is injurious to natural and wholesome growth. 'Remember what you were at their age' is one of the soundest of educational maxims.

The aims of all education may be classified under three heads. First, because every one ought in some form to earn his own living he must necessarily receive some equipment for this end. It does not follow that he must acquire at school the particular facts which he is going to manipulate afterwards: that may often be an example of inappropriate feeding, and he is better educated who has gained a strength and flexibility of grasp which can use the tool when it comes. Ostwald, asked what type of man he preferred as demonstrator in his chemical laboratory, answered, 'a good Latinist', and it is often true that the power which fits a man to deal with practical issues in later life has had little apparent connexion with them in boyhood. But directly or indirectly one aspect of his education should be the training in *expertise* for his coming craft or profession.

Secondly, because man is 'naturally a citizen' his education should prepare him, in due gradations, for playing his part in the political and economic life of his country. To this we shall return later, and endeavour to delimit the place that it occupies

in the educational scheme; for the moment it is enough to indicate that no scheme can be considered complete without it.

Thirdly, all true education should aim at satisfying the spiritual needs of man, through the mysteries of religion, the wonders of painting and music, the beauty and depth and sympathy of great literature. Here again is need for the most careful discrimination: the light must be proportioned to the eye and the thought to the intelligence, but from the beginning the child should be brought into contact with beautiful sights and sounds, with the stimulus of noble minds and the inspiration of high ideals; he should breathe the 'air bringing health from wholesome places', by which the soul of man is eternally strengthened and sustained. Indeed the essential value of a man's education may well be determined by what, in later life, is his scale of spiritual values.

If then we agree that civic education is a province or aspect of the whole, it follows to determine at what period and within what limits it can be successfully applied. And here we are met at the outset by Aristotle's famous declaration that it is entirely unsuited to the young partly because their inexperience will prevent them from understanding it, partly because if they understood it their lack of rational guidance would prevent them from carrying it into action.[1] He adds, it may be observed, that he is applying this to 'children of all ages', and that the study of political science is useful to any one whose life is directed by reason. Of his two strictures the former is the more important. We have somewhat discredited the old belief that at some period in his life a man intellectually came of age, that he passed his scrutiny and enrolled himself among the tribes of

[1] *Ethics*, i. 3. 6 *διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖος ἀκροάτης ὁ νέος· ἄπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων, οἱ λόγοι δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων. ἔτι δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς ὢν ματαίως ἀκούσεται καὶ ἀνωφελῶς, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις.*

wisdom, and indeed Aristotle partly forestalls this by saying that the weakness to which he takes exception is dependent more on character than on time. But it is certainly true that a child's inexperience of life makes him 'an unfit student' of some social and political questions, not so much because he is unacquainted with the terms in which they are expressed as because his judgements are all in black and white, with no gradations of tone between them. He is like Zimri—

> So over violent or over civil
> That every man with him is God or devil,

and it is only in the maturity of later life that he becomes aware of the diamond-weights and the delicate shades of grey. The present writer can still remember the time when, of the two great political rivals in his boyhood, he would allow no fault to be imputed to the one and no virtue to the other.

It is curious that Aristotle should have ignored the Persian schools, of which Xenophon gives us an account in the *Cyropaedia*,[1] for these would appear to be the first systematic attempt at teaching citizenship as a school subject. In every Persian city, says Xenophon, is a free square, from which commerce and industry are rigorously excluded, and which contains the palace and the chief municipal buildings. On one side is the school for children from five to sixteen (up to five they live at home in the nursery), on the second the institute for youths from sixteen to the full manhood of twenty-six, on the third that for men of mature years, on the fourth that for the elders who are past the age of military service. The curriculum is noticeable: there appear to be no lessons, but only debates and 'trials' dealing with the practical events of the school life and conducted under the presidency of an appointed elder. These occupy the greater portion of the day, the rest is occupied

[1] *Cyropaedia*, i. 2–8.

with riding and shooting on the campus. As Xenophon puts it, 'The Persians send their children to school that they may learn righteousness, as we do that they may learn letters.'[1] And Herodotus confirms this when he sums up Persian education under three heads: to ride, to shoot with the bow, and to speak the truth.[2] The trials in which they took part were not imaginary displays but real actions for theft, cheating, assault, slander, and above all ingratitude, 'the crime for which, in general, there is most odium and least legal remedy', because, as they say, the man who refuses to requite a service is not very likely to perform one, and hence will be unmindful of his duties to God, parents, and country. The only other subject of instruction seems to be self-control, which includes the habit of implicit obedience to all who are set in authority over them. Apart from this there is nothing to distract their attention. The priests apparently can read, write, and sing, but there is no literary or musical tradition among the laity, and the highest prowess of a gentleman is to be upright, brave, and the father of many children.

It is an admirable curriculum for a primitive age when the issues of life were simple and a man was not expected to be erudite. For many reasons it could not be revived at the present day, though we have recalled some of its features in junior commonwealths and students' representative councils; at any rate it was the first to stimulate and diffuse a spirit of citizenship through the days of training which precede entrance into practical affairs.

And here it may be said that the extension of autonomy

[1] *Cyropaedia*, i. 6 *οἱ μὲν δὴ παῖδες εἰς τὰ διδασκαλεῖα φοιτῶντες διάγουσι, μανθάνοντες δικαιοσύνην, καὶ λέγουσιν ὅτι ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἔρχονται, ὥσπερ παρ' ἡμῖν ὅτι γράμματα μαθησόμενοι. οἱ δὲ ἄρχοντες αὐτῶν διατέλουσι τὸ πλεῖστον τῆς ἡμέρας δικάζοντες αὐτοῖς.*

[2] Herodotus, i. 136 *παιδεύουσι δὲ τοὺς παῖδας . . . τρία μοῦνα ἱππεύειν καὶ τοξεύειν καὶ ἀληθίζεσθαι.*

among our schools and colleges has been of very great value. In the schools no doubt it still needs a little supervision, not for the purpose of enforcing discipline, but for that of softening its edge when the young tribunal is too severe; in our universities it has been exercised, so far as my knowledge attests, thoroughly competently and wisely. It has not only trained our junior members in the conduct of business and in the administration of justice, it has at the same time made for good government and materially aided in the work of the academic community. Contrasted with the supervision and espionage of many continental schools and the anarchy of many continental universities, it is a striking testimonial to the law-making and law-abiding qualities which are a part of our race and our tradition.

It follows to consider how we are to deal with questions which, for our students, pertain as yet to the field of theory rather than that of practice: with the issues and relationships, the rights and duties, which belong to the sphere of adult civic life. And here the problem really turns on the pivot of the school career. At our universities there is abundant opportunity for historical, political, and economic study, all relevant points can be raised in class-rooms and debating societies, and the more freely and exhaustively they are learned and discussed the better for the disputants on both sides. But the school presents a greater difficulty, not because of the overcrowded curriculum, which means a curriculum over-occupied with subjects in which other teachers are interested, but because of the task of making real and significant a subject which may easily be carried beyond the comprehension of the pupils. Let us take two or three methods which have been actually propounded.

First may come the method of direct instruction, exemplified by Mr. W. L. Sheldon in his book, *Citizenship and the Duties of a Citizen*. It is divided into thirty lessons, which range from

the family to the 'universal state', and cover on the way such topics as voting, taxes, obedience to law, crime and punishment, arbitration, the future of the industrial state, and the other main issues of civic life. Each lesson is on the same model: first an aphorism, or as Mr. Sheldon calls it, a 'memory gem' to be learned by heart, then a dialogue, followed by an epitome of its main points, then in succession a list of duties, a poem, a selection from a patriotic speech, and a conclusion containing personal hints to the teachers. The only variation is that twelve of the thirty contain short stories—Florence Nightingale, Magna Carta, the death of Socrates—which are chosen as specially illustrative of the matter in hand. The treatment throughout is close and detailed, and sometimes borders the edge of indiscretion. On such occasions the hints to teachers become urgent: 'Do not say too much about slavery'; 'Pass lightly over the right to revolution'; and especially on the subject of passing bad laws in our own interest; 'if illustrations are needed take them from other countries.'

The book is in many ways informing and suggestive, but it does not seem to afford the real solution. Apart from the absurdity of raising questions about which you are afraid to speak out (one wonders what would happen if the volume fell into the hands of a pupil) it is too systematic and self-conscious, at any rate for school use. It not only maps out the whole of citizenship into neat little regions and districts, it concentrates the child's attention far too much on performance and achievement. There is real danger that if it were extensively used it might induce the same habit of mind which led another American philosopher to declare that he never laid his head upon his pillow without carefully inquiring what he had done during the day for the service of his state.[1] Many of us would be asleep before that question was satisfactorily answered.

[1] Quoted in the *American Supplement of The Times*, 4 July 1921.

Almost equally bad, bad because intrusive and premature, is the syllabus of the Moral Instruction League, quoted in the *Modern Teacher* by Dr. Boyd. It runs as follows:

Standard V (age 11–12), (*a*) Pride in one's school and loyalty to it; (*b*) duty of local patriotism, how to serve one's own town or village; (*c*) value of local institutions.

Standard VI (age 12–13), (*a*) Love of country, national emblems; (*b*) what our forefathers have earned for us, e. g. liberty and social and political institutions; (*c*) how each individual may serve his country and posterity; (*d*) the Sovereign, his power, influence, and responsibilities.

Standard VII (ages 13–14), (*a*) the vote, its nature and responsibilities; (*b*) local government; (*c*) the nation and its government; (*d*) society as an organism, its development through the family tribe and nation; (*e*) universal brotherhood.

To this two objections may be taken: first, that it is not of much use teaching children at eleven about local institutions, or at twelve about their duties to their posterity, or at thirteen about society as an organism; second, and far more serious that it breaks through all the reticence and sanctity of a child's mind and forces it to declare in the open what it would scarcely confide to its nearest intimate. Mr. Kipling's *Stalky & Co.* has given some hostages to fortune, but his chapter on the Flag-flapper is eternally true.

A better experiment, better because more indirect, has been put into operation at the East Oxford School by its head master, Mr. Greening Lamborn, and is described in his interesting volume on *Expression*.[1]

'The exercise', he says, 'which I have found most valuable of all is that which occupies the hour from 10 to 11 on Monday morning, when every one is supposed to have observed during the week-end some matter of interest on which he would like to give or receive information.'

[1] pp. 15–30.

The procedure is simple and uniform: one boy is elected chairman by show of hands, minutes of the last meeting are read, criticized, and adopted, and then begins a discussion which may range from the letters on a motor-car to the wages of a demobilized soldier. The head master is present, but on no prerogative terms,[1] and the whole initiative comes from the boys themselves. Something of the same freedom is allowed in the more formal school-hours.

'Even in the subjects which the master himself organizes and teaches, such as geography, history, science, even arithmetic, a certain number of periods should be provided in which the information given is not prearranged, but is given as the result of questions put by members of the class. . . . There is far too much information forced upon children without any initiative on their part, and such opportunities as I am suggesting will not only give scope for free talk, but will ensure that the subjects which really interest boys are taught, and will also give the teacher an indication what these matters are.'[2]

Once a week there are debates, with no formal preparation under authority, conducted on the lines of the Oxford Union, to which the older boys are periodically taken, and at frequent intervals representations are given of some of the ordinary facts of civic life: the class will give a rehearsal of police-court procedure, or will draw up an advertisement for a junior clerk and interview the candidates, or will hold a parish meeting to elect a councillor, so that by the time a boy leaves school he will have gained some familiarity with many of the questions by which he will subsequently be confronted. It is clear that

[1] 'In matter of public interest: Mr. Pulker said that Mr. Lamborn had called him "a barbarous Hun" on Friday, and he did not think a schoolmaster ought to say such things. Mr. Lamborn explained that the honourable member had murdered and mangled a beautiful stanza by reading it worse than any foreigner, and he thought his expression was justified. Mr. Pulker said he was not satisfied' (*Expression*, p. 16).

[2] Ibid., p. 19.

such a method, wisely guided and not over-systematized, may be of the highest value to the pupils of our secondary and even of our elementary schools. It will stimulate their attention, it will inform their minds, and it will unconsciously strengthen that sense of honesty and fair play which is of the very essence of citizenship.

It follows to consider how far the formal teaching of the school can be directed to a similar end. Here the most obvious channels are history, geography, and literature, and all these might be turned to better account than at present.[1] Our literature lessons are often sporadic and purposeless, our history and geography waste on remote countries and periods the time which would far better be devoted to our own. It ought to be impossible for a boy or girl to leave school knowing more about Edmund Ironside than Gladstone or about the geography of Madagascar than that of Great Britain. We want books like René Bazin's *La Douce France*,[2] which should tell our young people something about their native land. We want school histories written on the model of Macaulay, who covers two thousand years in his first chapter and seventeen in the other twenty-four. Let these subjects 'begin at home', prefaced by a brief introduction from some arbitrary point of departure, in order to set the main issues in their proper context, and then concentrated on the points of interest which are most vital and which lie nearest at hand. It is not good educational policy, though it is often adopted, to begin our epic of the Trojan War with Leda and the egg. And if it be objected that recent history will be taught with partisan colour and that its reiterations will be *crambe repetita* to the master,

[1] See an excellent little volume called *History as a School of Citizenship* by Miss A. M. Madeley (Oxford, Clarendon Press).

[2] One has been compiled by Mr. Ernest Rhys. It deserves to be far better known.

it may be answered that neither of these rejoinders is valid. To a competent teacher it is as easy to be dispassionate about the Crimea as about the Crusades—one of the most violent controversies which the present writer ever heard was on the question whether the Phoenicians did or did not reach Singapore —and there is no fear of staleness in a subject which one discusses afresh with a new class. In any case the good of such a scheme far outweighs any possible disadvantages. One of the chief obstacles to citizenship is our ignorance of recent history, and especially of a clear and well-balanced account of its social phenomena. To remove this ignorance is one of the prime duties of civic education.

In addition to these studies it will be well to use for reference, or where possible for instruction, such a book as Mr. Swann's *Primer of Citizenship*, an excellent compendium which makes no attempt to inculcate civic duties, but explains the facts of municipal and local government. Great use may also be made of the syllabuses drawn up by the educational section of the British Association and presented before its meetings at Cardiff and Edinburgh. They are perhaps overloaded with detail, and some of them begin, to my thinking, at the wrong end, but they are quarries from which a considerable amount of good material may be hewn.

A fruitful and suggestive essay on the whole subject has been contributed by Dr. W. Boyd to the volume entitled *The Modern Teacher*.[1] Here, for instance, is a valuable warning:

'Apart from the seeming remoteness of civil duties from the immediate experience of young people, and the lack of motive for learning about them, there is a complexity about social phenomena, except in their very simplest form, which makes it well-nigh impossible for the undeveloped mind to get beneath the surface to their real significance. If even well educated

[1] See *Education in Citizenship*, op. cit., especially pp. 229 onwards.

adults find it hard to understand the factors that determine the prices of the articles they buy daily, or to comprehend the mechanism of trade or banking, it is not surprising that children should only glimpse the system of public order that is behind the policeman or the far extending methods of postal communication which the postman who brings the letters to the door represents.' [1]

Dr. Boyd possibly underrates the intelligence of school children—he must fight this battle with our modern psychologists—but he raises a valid point in regard to their interests. It may perhaps be met by his later qualification [2] that though children show little concern in the functions and agencies of communal life, they are often keenly interested in the persons by whom these functions are performed. In later life they may investigate railway operating or the intricacies of the postal system: let them begin with the postman and the engine-driver.

Dr. Boyd's own programme is wisely restricted to these questions of fact. He would have no direct teaching before the age of fourteen, only such indirect training as may come through history and geography lessons and the machinery of school life. At fourteen he would begin with the question, 'What the city does for us', and explain those ordinary facts of daily life which children usually take for granted as phenomena of nature—the facts of lighting, paving, cleansing the streets, the operation of the tramways, the incidence of poor relief, the maintenance and upkeep of picture galleries and museums. Next year the same topics should be carried farther, but still kept within the limits of the municipal field. Only in the third year should the course include any account of parliamentary government, of its organization and finance, and of its relation to local and voluntary efforts.

[1] Op. cit., p. 229. [2] Op. cit., p. 237.

Finally, we may consider what should be the course of civic education after the period of school life. We have already seen that the university in itself presents no special problem; within its walls the same kind of programme may be followed on a wider plane, with fuller resources and with a greater freedom of discussion. Outside its gates a considerable and increasing amount of work is being done, with its cordial sympathy and assistance, by the various clubs and societies which are specially occupied with adult education. Their lectures, their tutorial classes, their open discussions have already proved of immense value in broadening and steadying public opinion; they have the great advantage that many of their members are actually engaged in occupations which have a direct bearing on the subject of debate, and bring to it not only a first-hand knowledge of its facts but a judgement trained and strengthened in the school of experience. All who have come into personal contact with them will testify to their steadfastness of purpose and their open-minded willingness to learn. It is not true that they are, as a rule, partisan or superficial. On the contrary, they will listen readily to a speaker with whom they disagree, unless he justly forfeits their attention by rhetoric or invective, and they are particularly notable for their dogged determination to think their questions out. They realize, in short, the truth of Goethe's maxim, that 'the greatest danger to the community is ignorance in motion', and they value knowledge far less as a weapon than as a tool.

It is in the interest of adult education, both within the university and without it, that I would close this lecture with one practical suggestion. In every city of the Empire there should be an institution established for the study and investigation of civic problems.[1] Where there is a university it should

[1] A model of what such an institution should be will be found in Barnett House, Oxford.

act in close co-operation and have some share in the management and control, where there is none the institution should be placed under a special body of trustees. In either case the council should be appointed, under certain categories, by public election, should hold office on the usual plan of overlapping rotation, and should be responsible to the municipality at large. The building should contain first and foremost a library with all the principal works on politics, economics, industrial and social history, ethnology and the like, which are needed for general study, together with relevant journals and periodicals of every side and shade of opinion, which can inform the reader as to the progress of current events. Secondly, there should be an archive-room in which articles of special interest, selected from the newspapers and magazines, might be gathered, indexed, and filed for reference. Thirdly, there should be if possible a lecture theatre in which addresses could be given on social or political questions, and in which at other times also discussions and debates might be held. Fourthly, there should be of necessity at least one committee-room in which representatives of opposite political or industrial groups could meet and discuss their differences—the question of a strike or a lock-out, of hospitals voluntary or municipalized, of the adjustment of wages, the regulation of the hours of labour, of the hundred points of antagonism by which our social and industrial life is irritated and sometimes wounded. These should not be abstract or academic debates but concrete discussions on some immediate issue, and with a practical end in view. Fifthly, there would be the customary secretarial offices, as well as accommodation for caretakers and for such other officials as it might be advisable to keep in residence.

The benefits of such an institution would be obvious. It would serve as a radiating centre of information on all subjects with which the citizen's judgement is concerned, and it would

be kept perpetually fresh by a constant accession of new books and new articles. It would be a forum of discussion on the great questions of political and municipal life where opinions freely expressed might prove themselves to be, as Milton says, 'knowledge in the making'. It would provide capital and labour, socialism and individualism with a neutral ground on which they could meet, with all the facts of the dispute ready at hand, with no suspicion of party advantage in the place or the surroundings, and therefore with the best possible hope of a fair debate and an honourable solution. It would have no policy of its own to pursue, no end of its own to serve: it could be as dispassionate as a university laboratory and in as close touch with realities as a factory workshop.

The cost would be in comparison insignificant. It is not well that such an institution should be supported by the rates or by private subscription: it should be independent of municipal fluctuations and should be as open to all as a free library. But the municipality might present and furnish the building; a gift or legacy of £25,000 (less in a smaller town) would permanently endow it, and would be the best investment that the donor ever made. The running expenses would be few, two or three salaries, costs of maintenance and upkeep, a sum set apart annually for the library; there would be little else, and when the institution had won its way into public confidence it might count on further accessions and donations. Especially would its use be felt and recognized in our large industrial cities where are many cross-currents and conflicting interests, and each affords its opportunity for equitable settlement.

To suggest this is not to put forward any Utopian or unattainable ideal of social unanimity. But it is not Utopian to hold that men are on the whole reasonable and well-wishing and that their disputes are more often due to false facts than to

false theories. Any organization which makes for enlargement of knowledge and for greater facility of conference is a means not only to industrial peace but to the quickening and stimulation of that sense of comradeship on which our civic life ultimately depends. For education in citizenship, like all education, has these two principal aims in view, to present the truth and to fit the minds of men for its reception.

X

DE CIVITATE DEI

We have seen that the State can neither be degraded into the mere tool-house and mechanism of the individual life, nor on the other hand isolated into a separate and determinate end which it is man's whole duty to serve. State and individual co-operate in a real and personal sense towards the fulfilment of the divine purpose; even if it be true that 'to every man the two most obvious personalities are himself and God', he cannot contemplate the relation between them without being aware of the State as a third. To put it in another way, man and community are two powers appointed to carry on processes which pass beyond their limitations and to converge upon an end which is greater than their own. Only in so far as each recognizes its correlation with the other can this purpose be ultimately brought about.

Hence the political failure of those philosophies which have endeavoured to eliminate, or at best to minimize the social conditions of human life and to concentrate all on direct contact between the soul and the divine. Plato in the *Theaetetus*[1] describes his philosopher as wandering through the market-place like an alien, bewildered as with a foreign language by the curious and petty concerns of the civic life. He hears one man boast that he can count seven generations of ancestors, another that he possesses ten thousand acres of estate. What are seven generations, what are ten thousand acres to one whose gaze is fixed on eternity and whose problems are those of infinite space? He can make nothing of them and their ambitions, and

[1] *Theaetetus*, pp. 173–6.

he 'is derided by the vulgar partly because he is thought to despise them and partly because he has no comprehension of what is passing under his eye'. So again in the *Republic*,[1] the guardians who have escaped from the cave of illusion into the upper air of light and reality have to be compelled by threats to descend periodically and take their reluctant turn at ruling, 'not because they wish it but because they must', recognizing all the time that they have nothing in common with their old fellow prisoners, 'fast bound in misery and iron', but that their true life is under the open heaven and the sunshine. It is not difficult to understand from this why Platonism has had so little effect upon public affairs.

Aristotle is wiser. He also maintains that contemplation is higher than action, but he is careful to maintain that the former is not to be sought in monastic seclusion, but is compatible with the entire fulfilment of social and civic duties, that it is not a career but an aspect of life which presupposes, not replaces, the practical virtues.[2] His philosopher needs no external equipment for the divine end of contemplation; it is indeed a hindrance rather than a resource; but he has none of Plato's contempt for the daily life, he takes his place among his fellow citizens 'in the world but not of the world', and performs his ordinary duties with none the less loyalty because in the secret of his heart he has an ideal beyond them.

Still Aristotle as well as Plato sets up a metaphysical or religious conception as the climax of all human endeavour, and it is not surprising that in the advent of Christianity this should return in a crude and more vehement form. The early Christians were animated not only by an intense horror and hatred

[1] *Republic*, Bk. VII, pp. 539–40.

[2] The words in *Ethics*, x. 8. 6 ἦ δ' ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ πλείοσι συζῇ αἱρεῖται τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράττειν are conclusive; so is the close interconnexion which Aristotle makes throughout between *Ethics* and *Politics*. See also x. 8. 9.

of the Roman Empire, but by a belief, for which many of them claimed Scriptural warrant, that the whole earth was presently to be destroyed, and that therefore its concerns were of no account. Christ's salutary maxim, 'Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's', was completely forgotten: they rendered nothing to Caesar which they could possibly avoid paying; they met injunction with insult, prohibition with defiance, and martyrdom with a fanatic delight, which gave Marcus Aurelius very serious doubts about their sanity. 'One ought always', he says, 'to be ready for death, and when I say ready, I mean by the effort of a reasonable judgement, not through senseless obstinacy like the Christians.'[1] Their conversation, they said, was in Heaven: they had nothing to do with taxes and military service, especially for an Empire whose crimes were calling aloud for divine vengeance and the end of whose existence was speedily approaching. It was no doubt disconcerting to authority that they should be of blameless personal character and that their religion, when one had time to examine it, should be of a singular and exalted purity; the fact remained that in common opinion they were desperate fanatics and bad citizens.

Meantime the Romans could afford to laugh at these vapourings of Montanist slaves with their shrill invectives and their prophecies of the coming conflagration. Whatever else might pass, Rome was everlasting; the name of the Eternal City, given her by Ammianus, had passed into the common currency of speech; it was beyond belief or imagination that fire or sword

[1] Μὴ κατὰ ψιλὴν παράταξιν ὥσπερ οἱ Χριστιανοί, Marcus Aurelius, xi. 3. When we think of him as a persecutor we should remember that Tertullian, of all people, expressly thanks him for 'protecting' the Christians by stopping abuses of the law (see *Apol.* 5). It is inconceivable that he can have known the details of the Lyons massacres, which were brought about by a mob exasperated by defiance and panic-stricken into cruelty.

or earthquake should ever dislodge her from her place on the seven hills. 'They shall perish', said her citizens, 'but thou shalt endure: they all shall wax old as doth a garment, but thou art the same, and thy years shall not change.'

Then in 410 the incredible happened. Rome was sacked by Alaric, captured, it would appear, in a single night,[1] and left within a few days a devastated chaos of ruin and massacre in which the only buildings officially spared were the Christian churches of St. Peter and St. Paul. The news was received throughout the Empire first with paralysed astonishment, then with an outburst of furious anger against Goths and Christians alike. It was the insult no less than the calamity which roused men's indignation to fever heat; insult to the institutions of Rome and her religion and her eleven hundred years of historical tradition. We may form some measure of the public feeling if we can imagine that London had been destroyed by aeroplanes in the Great War.

To meet this popular outcry Augustine wrote his *City of God*, the publication of which began three years later, and was continued until 426. The book is ostensibly an apologia for the Christian ideal, and an attack on Paganism as incapable even of maintaining the world order for which it stood, much more of leading to any higher conception of life and conduct.[2] Roman Paganism, he says, is founded on the lust of dominion, on Virgil's

[1] 24 August. This event, one of the most momentous in the history of the world, is described by Orosius (i. 7. 39) in seven words, 'Adest Alaricus, trepidam Romam obsidet, turbat, irrumpit.' See the account in Gibbon, ch. 31.

[2] It may be indexed as follows, though it is often very discursive: (*a*) Books I to V, failure of Paganism to afford adequate security in this life; (*b*) Books VI to X, its equal failure to lead to eternal life; (*c*) Books XI to XIV, the origins respectively of the *Civitas Terrena* and the *Civitas Dei*; (*d*) Books XV to XVIII, the course of both in time; (*e*) Books XIX to XXII, the consummation of both in eternity. It is said that Augustine derived his doctrine of the two cities from a Donatist teacher named Tyconius.

'Parcere subiectis et debellare superbos': the city of God is founded on devotion, and its maxim is that God resisteth the proud and giveth grace to the humble.[1] They are not to be regarded as two communities, though an attempt was made later to identify them respectively with Church and State, and though Augustine certainly makes occasional use of phrases which foreshadow the mediaeval maxim, 'Extra ecclesiam nulla salus'.[2] They are rather two aspects of human life, the *civitas Dei* being the social life of the sons of God,[3] the *civitas terrena*, human society organized apart from God. The one seeks the *pax terrena*, which every one can understand, for it means only freedom from aggression secured by war; the other seeks that peace of God which passeth all understanding. The origin of the *civitas Dei* was the creation of the angels, that of the *civitas terrena* was the revolt of Lucifer, and Augustine sometimes speaks as though 'the elect' were of a fixed number, depleted by this rebellion, and waiting until the ranks are again made up by the saints on earth. There is a curious echo of this in our Burial Service, 'that it may please Thee shortly to accomplish the number of Thine elect and to hasten Thy kingdom'. The elect will include persons of every age and country, so that they be brought into the fold of sound doctrine, and the Kingdom of Heaven will be realized when the tale is complete. In Book V, which is professedly on freedom and necessity, Augustine describes how the Roman Empire was the reward of certain terrestrial virtues, and in chapters 24 and 25 sketches the character of a good prince, which gradually and characteristically shapes itself into a portrait of Constantine.

[1] *De Civ. Dei*, I. i.

[2] e. g. *De Civ. Dei*, xx. 9 'Ergo Ecclesia et nunc est regnum Christi regnumque caelorum.' See a discussion of the whole question in Dr. Figgis's *Political Aspects of St. Augustine's City of God*, chap. iv, p. 68 seq.

[3] Figgis, op. cit., ii, p. 38.

But the upshot of the whole treatise is that the only hope for human society is to be organized and established on the principles of the Christian faith, that only in this way can it maintain itself in the present world or prepare itself for the world to come. It is little wonder that the Holy Roman Empire regarded itself as the inheritor of St. Augustine's doctrines; it threw away its inheritance by quarrelling over the terms of the will.

A wiser philosophy would not have separated the two 'civitates' but unified them. It has been said that God cannot make a violin except by making a Stradivarius; at any rate He does not make human progress except through human institutions, which because they are human are progressive,[1] and because they are institutions must be periodically codified in law. For law, as has been well said, is the result of a conviction not that a thing ought to be but that it is[2]: it follows custom and its success is determined by the closeness with which in its enactments the facts of custom are interpreted. In primitive races the process of codification is difficult and 'hieroglyphic'; law is intermingled with ritual and ceremony, which are known only to the privileged expert: so that we get the amusing story of the Icelandic malefactor who could not be convicted because he alone knew the particular formula of conviction. But none the less every true system of law presupposes morality, of which it is indeed the civil expression, and where this is not the case, as in some Eastern and some uncivilized nations, it is regarded without personal responsibility or something which it is clever to evade.

Another attempt to adjust the laws of human polity to the

[1] Writers who deny the fact of progress, and support their denial by confronting us with the Greeks, lay themselves open to a serious misunderstanding. They may be taken to mean not that there has been no progress in human history, but that there has been none since the Christian era.

[2] Gierke, quoted in Barker's *Political Thought from Spencer*, p. 177.

principles of divine justice is to be found in the series of ideal commonwealths which many great writers have used either for the exercise of fancy or for the advocacy of reform. Apart from the *Republic* and *Laws of Plato*, and from Plutarch's *Life of Lycurgus* we may cite More's *Utopia*, Bacon's *New Atlantis*, Harrington's *Oceana*, and Campanella's *City of the Sun*, and in our own times the tales of Morris and Wells and the visions of that rather peevish moralist, Samuel Butler. All are interesting, all are suggestive, nearly all have something of practical value to propose, but they are equally liable to two rather serious defects. One is that they are experiments of the laboratory rather than of the workshop, that their action passes *in vacuo*, not under the qualifying and impeding conditions of actual life, so that they often exhibit to us a model which works properly so long as it is not liable to a grain of dust in the wheels. The other is that being works of imagination they are specially likely to be coloured by the personal likes and dislikes of their authors. In More's *Utopia*, for instance, gold is despised, it is given to slaves in order to show that it is unworthy the attention of a free citizen; in Bacon's *New Atlantis* we are almost overwhelmed by the sense of splendour and pageantry which surrounds the fathers of Solomon's House. None of Sir Thomas More's magistrates would have ridden in 'a chariot all of cedar gilt and adorned with crystal save that the fore-end had panels of sapphires set in borders of gold and the hinder end the like of emeralds of the Peru colour. There was also a sun of gold radiant upon the top in the midst, and on the top before a small cherub of gold with wings displayed. The chariot was covered with cloths of gold tissued upon blue.' One so often thinks of Bacon as a grave and austere philosopher that it is worth quoting a passage in which he gives full rein to his love of splendour and ceremonial. But such passages do not lead to unanimity in the estimates of social conditions.

It remains to consider the true idealists, those who have seen our world 'apparelled in celestial light', as in the fullness of time it may become. Idealists in this sense are men who firmly believe what other people faintly hope; who can see every detail of the civic life, 'sub specie aeternitatis' as surely as Wordsworth could find thoughts too deep for tears in the meadow and the hedgerow; whose whole thought and creed are modelled on Blake's immortal stanza:

> I will not cease from mental fight,
> Nor shall my sword sleep in my hand,
> Till I have built Jerusalem
> In England's green and pleasant land.

This is nearer than the New Jerusalem of the Apocalypse; it is wider than the *urbs coelestis* of Augustine; its aim is the establishment here and now of the conditions through which will best be manifested the divine purpose in our common life.

Two examples of such idealism may be cited, and with them this series of lectures may be brought to an end. The first is Mazzini,[1] the whole of whose teaching was saturated with the love of God and the desire to apprehend Him.

'From the general formula that men call religion', he says, 'issues a rule of education, a basis of human brotherhood, a policy, a social economy, an art. It permeates politics in all questions of franchise, of the conditions of the masses, of nationality.'[2] 'I do not know', he adds, 'a single great

[1] 1805–72. The works of his which are here chiefly laid under contribution are *The Duties of Man* (1844 and 1858, published in book form, 1860) and *From the Council to God*, 1869.

[2] Mazzini, *Duties of Man*, esp. ch. 2. Cf. Bolton King's *Life of Mazzini*, chap. xiii, p. 223 seq. It may be interesting to give here Mazzini's considered view of nationality. 'The principle of nationality', he writes, 'is sacred to me. I believe it to be the ruling principle of the future. I feel ready to welcome without fear any change in the European map which will arise from the spontaneous manifestation of a whole people's mind as to the group to which it feels naturally, by language, traditions, geography,

conquest of the human spirit, a single important step for the perfecting of human society, which has not had its roots in strong religious faith.' 'Without God you may coerce but you cannot persuade, you may be tyrants in your turn, but you cannot be educators or apostles.' And again, 'All humanity repeats under different formulas and in different degrees the Lord's Prayer of Christendom, "Thy kingdom come . . . on earth as it is in Heaven."'

Yet he refused to call himself a Christian. As he says in his tract, *From the Council to God*, the accepted forms of Christianity were too individualist for his creed: too much intent upon saving the soul not of the community but of the worshipper. But though he looked forward to 'a higher and purer faith', he believed that its time had not yet come, and that meanwhile 'the Christian manifestation remains the most sacred revelation of the ever onward progressing spirit of mankind'.[1]

Christianity tells each man to perfect himself by his own strength and God's, but his spiritual growth is conditioned by the growth of the men round him, and therefore his own perfecting depends on the progress of the race, on the common search for good that links all men together. All morality depends on religion so conceived. Mazzini is diametrically opposed to Bentham and his 'greatest happiness of the greatest number'. Morality is our duty towards the good, and the sanction of this is the fact that it is good. So our duties are arranged in hierarchical order, first to humanity at large, then to country, then to family ('the country of the heart' as he calls it), and lastly to self.[2] He had nothing in common with Marx, whose State was conceived in terms of economic materialism, and to

and tendencies, to belong.' Note to Lord John Russell, April 1859, quoted in Mazzini's *Letters to an English Family*, ii. 167.

[1] Letter to an English friend, quoted in Bolton King, op. cit., p. 230.

[2] See especially *Duties of Man*, chap. v.

whose favoured proletariat, 'law, morality, and religion are so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which as many bourgeois interests are concealed',[1] or with Bakunin, who charged him with preaching a 'detestable bourgeois patriotism', and tried to substitute a mere riot of anarachy and destruction.

The State, according to Mazzini, exists for the sake of morality, and fulfils its chief functions in three ways. The first is by securing personal liberty,[2] without which there can be no responsibility and therefore no moral goodness. There are certain fundamental liberties which not even a democracy may infringe,[3] such as those of personal conduct, religious belief, speech, press, trade, association. On the other hand he would not admit any absolute right of property, he limited the rights of bequest, and advocated heavy taxation for the rich—holding apparently that these matters were not fundamental. The second is the right of association, which indeed is the correlative of liberty: there can be no true association except that of free men, there can be no efficient liberty without co-operation. The State, in short, should do everything in its power to encourage and facilitate the co-ordinate activity of its citizens, but should do nothing whatever to compel it. Third, and most important, is education, which goes far beyond the imparting of knowledge and even the strengthening of character. It is

[1] Quoted from that remarkable document, 'The Communist Manifesto', written in 1847 by Marx and Engels.

[2] It may be worth recalling the chief continental governments just before the revolution of 1848: Austria, Ferdinand I, with Metternich for chief minister; Prussia, Frederick William IV, who died insane; Russia, Nicholas I, who destroyed Poland; the two Sicilies, Ferdinand II, who bombarded his own capital; France, Louis-Philippe, the detected diplomatist; Spain, Isabella II, powerless to avoid civil war; Piedmont, Charles Albert, the clericalist who drove Mazzini into exile. It is not surprising that Mazzini had little good to say of monarchy.

[3] Bolton King, op. cit., p. 269. 'No majority, no force of the community may take from you what makes you men.'

'the inspiration of a national faith', and its inspiring force and centre should be the State itself. Mr. Bolton King quotes a very characteristic anecdote.[1] In discussion with a friend the question was put to Mazzini, 'If two States had arrived at an equal stage of education, the one by national the other by voluntary schools, which would be the finer nation?' 'But, my dear,' he answered, 'that is to be an atheist.'

No particular form of government is advocated as of universal application. 'Sovereignty is not in "I" or in "We", but in God.' Every government is legitimate in proportion as it stands for righteousness, if it does not do so it is null and void. No institution has any rights against the Right, even the will of the people, sacred when it interprets the moral law, is impotent when it traverses it. On the whole Mazzini prefers democracy, 'not because the people are in a majority, but because they concentrate in themselves all the faculties of human nature distributed among individuals.' At the same time he was always rather anxious about actual democracies: he was afraid of the effects of the French Revolution, he distrusted militant socialism, he disliked the curtailed theories of government which were beginning to make way in the United States. He regarded a republic as the most logical form of government, but only because at the time it held the greatest opportunities of developing those conditions of liberty, comradeship, and education which he thought essential to the progress of humanity.[2] He believed, with Aristotle,[3] that the collective wisdom of the many is more likely to be right than that of the few, but his only concern was that whether through the lips of the few or of the many the right should prevail.

[1] Op. cit., p. 273.

[2] See his speech to the Roman Assembly in 1849, quoted by Bolton King, p. 281, and a fine statement as to his reasons for defending the city, quoted in G. M. Trevelyan's *Garibaldi and the Defence of Rome*, p. 112.

[3] *Politics*, III. xi.

His central confession of faith may be summed up in a noble passage from the speech already quoted. That State, he says, will best realize God's kingdom on earth:

'where institutions tend primarily to the bettering of the poorest and most numerous class, where the principle of association is best developed, where the road of progress has no end, as education gradually extends and all elements that make for stagnation and immobility disappear, where in fine the whole community, strong, tranquil, happy, peaceful, bound in a solemn concord, stands on earth as a temple built to virtue and liberty, to progressive civilization, to the laws that govern the moral world.'[1]

The second name, that on which I should wish these lectures to close, is one never to be mentioned, in the University of Glasgow, without affection and reverence. Sir Henry Jones was not only a great teacher and a great administrator, he was before all else a vital and inspiring force, a prophet whose words have roused, stimulated, and ennobled the civic thought of his generation. Of my own personal debt to him it is not fitting that I should speak at length: I have owed to his friendship more than I can ever acknowledge, and it is with a full heart that I pay my tribute to his memory. But in this place which he served to the last moment of his life and strength, there can be no more suitable conclusion to a course on his favourite subject than one which tries, however faintly, to catch some echo of his message.

His social and political philosophy is contained for the most part in his volumes on *Browning*, on *The Working Faith of a Social Reformer*, on *Idealism as a Practical Creed*, on the *Principles of Citizenship*, and, his crowning achievement, on *A Faith that Enquires*. It is from the two last of these that the quotations which follow will chiefly be taken. It will be seen with how sure a hand he builds upon the same foundations as Mazzini.

[1] See Bolton King, p. 281.

And first, since so much of our discussion about citizenship turns on the question of civic rights, it is well to see how firmly he emphasizes the truth that rights and duties are correlative. 'The obligations or duties of the State,' he says, 'are the rights of individual citizens,'[1] and the converse is equally valid. Again, 'every right is a claim, not every claim is a right. . . . The State is not the only power to lift claims into rights, nor are legal rights the only rights.'[2] This is apparently in answer to the juristic moralists of the school of Austin, who hold that there are no rights except those that are created by law. It is more than a matter of logical definition: the juristic view is unduly narrow and cramping, and it may well induce a Pharisaic literalism into ethics which is fatal to the free play of its spirit. So again, 'the State cannot lift claims into rights in the full sense of the term, and it cannot make them absolute and categorically binding, except in so far as it arbitrates in accordance with universal reason and therefore with the nature of things. Its authority also is derivative, and it speaks in the name of a still higher power.'[3] This is in direct contravention of Treitschke's maxim that nothing can be above the State, that there is no power or ordinance to which it can be made subject and no standard of justice to which it is obliged to conform. Jones advances on the other side that every community as well as every individual man is amenable to the law of abstract right. Indeed, he goes farther and holds that it is only within the community that rights and duties have a real meaning:

'Except within society, as members of it and therefore as members of each other, men have no rights nor in consequence any duties. And, if they are members of society and of one another, they are more than exclusive individuals, or in other words, their nature is universal. Hence a capricious will or

[1] *Principles of Citizenship*, chap. vi, p. 138.
[2] Op. cit., p. 139.
[3] Ibid., pp. 139–40.

a will that claims to act as it pleases, irrespective of any rule except its own pleasure, is not the will of a rational being, or in fact a will at all. . . . Caprice on the part of the State falls under the same condemnation. Final obligatoriness is not attributed to the laws of any society or State unless their universality extends beyond the society or State.' [1]

Here we have formulated in the moral and political sphere the same principle which has always been accepted in the metaphysical: that no law can be regarded as valid which is not of wider range than the phenomena which it is called upon to explain. The political casuistry which legislates only for the circumstances of the moment is as absurd as the doctrine of natural affinities or the theory of Phlogiston. If then all civic relations depend upon moral universals, it follows that only moral beings can have either rights or duties, to which is added the striking corollary that 'the range of their rights and duties corresponds to their moral attainments and worth'.[2] This no doubt raises the difficult question of duties towards the lower animals, or even towards inanimate objects, such as works of art. It is not solved by the half-way explanation that in all acts of cruelty or destructiveness a man sins against his own human nature; that is true, but at any rate in the case of animals it is not the whole truth. We shall come nearer to a solution if we admit that animals have some share in the moral life. But fortunately the question is here a side issue.

So far, however, we may seem to have reached only a general law without content. What is the standard, we may ask, by which the actions of civic life are to be measured? Jones answers:

'The test of a right is, Does it or does it not make for the common good. . . . Does the granting or the refusal of a citizen's claim make for the development of humanity in the citizen—

[1] *Principles of Citizenship*, chap. vi, p. 141. [2] Ibid., p. 142.

his good: or does it make for the unity, solidarity, power, and comprehensiveness of the life of the State? And it is this *making for* that must be accentuated.' [1]

So again: 'The State may do, and the citizen claim, anything that makes for the good life of the citizen and nothing else.' The State, for instance, may summon its citizens to a just war and to no other. And if it be asked who is to determine the justice—whether State or individual—the answer is both, if possible. If that is impossible, the individual should try to persuade the State, and if he fails should be contented to obey orders. Opinions in manifest contradiction to social usage are generally wrong, and 'wrong opinions have no rights except the right to be refuted'.[2]

Among the rights and duties of the citizen there are none more difficult than those which centre round the possession of wealth. On this Sir Henry Jones is equally clear.

'Wealth', he says, 'is a social product, and when society has developed into a State, the State is responsible for it. It is responsible for it—for its production, distribution, security, and use—even as it is responsible for the life and liberty of its citizens.' [3] This does not mean communism or even State-control. 'Property is always personal and is rightly called private. . . . The right to gain and hold it is as fundamental as the right to life and liberty. . . . It is in truth a condition without which the latter can have no real value. . . . A person who owns nothing can do nothing and be nothing.' [4]

But it is not enough that an individual says 'mine', he must be able to say 'mine by right', and this means that some authoritative power says 'thine'.

The functions of the State in industry should be, he held, not merely negative and regulative, but positive and creative'.

[1] Ibid., p. 149. [2] Ibid., pp. 157–9. [3] Ibid., p. 163.
[4] Ibid., pp. 164–6. Compare Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, §§ 179–80, and see above, chap. vi, p. 126.

This does not entail, as might possibly be supposed, an extension of actual interference by legislation, but rather the encouragement of corporate feeling and of community of interest. One of his favourite projects was the establishment of a scheme of education by which landowners, employers of labour, and other 'capitalists' might learn more of the principles and methods of economics than many of them had hitherto succeeded in doing. Like Mazzini, he feared ignorance, especially when it was wielded by a democracy.

'Looking to the future', he says, 'I am not concerned so much about what will be done for the workers as what will be done by the workers.'[1] And again, 'The road to ruin for an ignorant and selfish democracy is far shorter than for any other kind of misgovernment, the fall is greater and the ruin more complete. There is no builder of the common good who builds so nobly and securely as a wise democracy, and there are no hands which destroy so hopelessly as the hands of the many.'[2]

And so his policy would be, Give the people responsibility, but so educate them as to deepen their care for the common good.

In *A Faith that Enquires* the same notes are touched to still finer issues. It is well known that the lectures of which the book is composed were intended by their author to be the climax and consummation of his teaching, his final utterances on the subjects of speculation which had occupied him for nearly all his life. Nowhere else among his writings do we find such a sustained elevation of thought or such continuous felicity of language; to this treasure-house he brought all his wisdom, all his experience, all the fervour of his religious belief. Three excerpts may be given, not as essentially typical of the volume, but as bearing most intimately upon its civic aspect, and to

[1] *Principles of Citizenship*, chap. vi, p. 172. [2] Ibid., p. 173.

these may be added a paragraph from an earlier treatise which might well have served as its preface and its epitome.

'The merely spiritual is as genuine an abstraction as the merely natural, nor is the relation between them external or contingent. The devout who stand aloof from temporal concerns, like the devotees of the Roman Catholic Church in times past, are committing as real a blunder as those who overlook the spiritual meaning in the secular opportunities of life.' [1]

There is indeed to be no severance between the *civitas Dei* and the *civitas terrena*: each must interpenetrate the other and unite with it to bring forth the kingdom of God upon earth. And in this process the spiritual heritage of man is not less real than the material:

'Man's ethical powers are rooted in the community into which he is born and within which he is brought up. He is anteceded, I should even say anticipated by it in a spiritual sense, just as the materials of his physical health and growth are prior to him.' [2]

Yet the new born soul finds in the condition of his present existence the opportunities and the power of development through which it is progressively realized:

'Man is not born free. He is born capable of becoming more and more free by intercourse with his fellows and experience of their world. . . . Apart from his world he is nothing and can do nothing. We may even say that his world breaks into self-consciousness and thinks and wills in and through him. But this constitutes rather than destroys the conditions of his freedom. That is to say he is free by the help of his world and in view of the rational activities which he proposes, even though nature performs them in and through him. For the world becomes an object of his experience and the content of his self as he interprets its meaning and determines its value and use. And it is this rational recoil upon the world which

[1] *A Faith that Enquires*, p. 35. [2] Ibid., p. 281.

makes it his object and constitutes the individual freedom. What was outer becomes inner. The authority that was alien and external becomes a personal conviction and the rule of behaviour is self imposed.'[1]

And here,[2] as the Preacher said, is the conclusion of the whole matter.

'God is the beginning and the end, and man is the self-conscious worker of God's will, the free process by which the last which was first returns to itself. The process, the growth is man's life, and it falls within the ideal which is eternal and all in all. The spiritual life of man, which is both intellectual and moral, is a dying into the eternal, not to cease to be in it but to live more fully, for spirits necessarily commune. He dies to the temporal interests and narrow ends of the exclusive self and lives an ever-expanding life in the life of others, manifesting more and more that spiritual principle which is the life of God who lives and loves in all things. "God is a being in whom we exist, with whom we are in principle one; with whom the human spirit is identical in the sense that He *is* all which the human spirit is capable of becoming."'

[1] *A Faith that Enquires*, p. 291.

[2] *Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher*, p. 367. The quotation at the end is from Green's *Prolegomena*, p. 198.

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